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ABSTRACT
Both literature and practice have investigated how the vast amount of ever-increasing
customer information can inform marketing strategy and decision making. However, the customer
data is often susceptible to modeling bias and misleading findings due to various factors including
sample selection and unobservable variables. The available analytics toolkit has continued to
develop but in the age of nearly perfect information, the customer decision making has also
evolved. The dissertation addresses some of the challenges in deriving valid and useful consumer
insights from customer data in the digital age. The first study addresses the limitations of traditional
customer purchase measures to account of dynamic temporal variations in the customer purchase
history. The study proposes a new approach for representation and summarization of customer
purchases to improve promotion forecasts. The method also accounts for sample selection bias that
arises due to biased selection of customers for the promotion. The second study investigates the
impact of increasing internet penetration on the consumer choices and their response to marketing
actions. Using the case study of physician’s drug prescribing, the study identifies how marketers
can misallocate resources at the regional level by not accounting for variations in internet
penetration. The third paper develops a data driven metric for measuring temporal variations in the
brand loyalty. Using a network representation of brand and customer the study also investigates
the spillover effects of manufacturer related information shocks on the brand’s loyalty.
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CHAPTER 1: DISSERTATION OVERVIEW
The accumulation of customer data from information systems has resulted in large dynamic
databases which provide unique opportunities for marketers and researchers to gain insights into
consumer behavior. Customer data analytics allows firms to identify meaningful patterns and
knowledge from databases for a deeper understanding of the consumer decision criteria for
tailoring product, services and allocating scarce resources efficiently. The analytics initiatives of
firms usually emphasize on improving the efficiency of marketing actions by continuous tracking
of consumer behavior from loyalty cards, mobile platforms, information technology (IT) services
and building proactive models to predict response to various marketing interventions. In fact,
major industries such as retail and healthcare are considering double digit annual growth rate of
approximately 39.78% and 11% respectively in their analytics investment until at least 2020
(Markets and Markets, 2014).
The applications of customer analytics continue to evolve but underutilization of the
available information sources and inadequate analytics competency still prevent firms from
utilizing technologies to its full potential. It has been observed that the firms are unable to ripe
benefits from their data driven customer retention schemes and promotional offerings. For
instance, less than 20% of direct coupon promotions are profitable and the growth rate of firms
offering rewards program is either same or slightly lower than those who are not offering them
(Forbes, 2014). The customer analytics toolset that comprises of statistical and data mining
techniques for data representation and organization, information management and predictive
modeling should deliver actionable insights that are relevant and timely. Perhaps, the key is to
1

target the customer at right time with the appropriate marketing instrument as opposed to sending
communications on the ad-hoc basis when they are less likely to respond (Saboo et al. 2016).
Recent studies have found that firms either underleveraged most of the available
information in the data or utilize modeling approaches that do not readily lend themselves to
dynamic variations in the customer data and provide inadequate insight to the managers (Saboo,
2016, Breiter and Huhzermeier 2014). As an example, majority of promotion decisions rely on
superficial marketing metrics (e.g. recency, frequency and monetary value of past purchase)
related to customer history that suppress information related to real-time variations in purchases
(Cui, Wong, and Lui, 2006; Donkers et al. 2006; Schweidel and Knox, 2013). These limitations
with respect to data representations and modeling techniques hinder the ability to investigate
interesting questions and a lot is yet to accomplished in generating intelligence from data to support
business decision making.
The current information rich environment also poses challenges in customer retention due
to competitive marketplace and accessibility of information across various products and services.
The adoption of communications technologies such as smartphones, broadband and IT-enabled
services is changing the way consumers make decisions. The IT interventions such as internet that
lead to reduction in information gathering and processing costs for the customers have a substantial
impact on their choices (Simonson, 2015). By virtue of web search, social media and personalized
recommendations the comparison friction associated with navigating various choice alternatives
is getting reduced. In addition, the composition of a customer’s consideration set while making a
purchase is now technology and context driven, over which marketers have minimal influence.
The firms can gain more out of their analytics initiatives if they can dig deeper into their data and
incorporate customer information at the micro level. Although the influence of information access
2

on consumer decision making has been theorized in the consumer choice literature, very little is
known about the impact of IT interventions on consumer choice and their response to marketing
communications.
It is evident that, modeling the response of customers to various types of promotional
offerings can be challenging due to data and methodological limitations as well as customer
specific factors arising due to an influence of modern IT on consumer choices. In my dissertation
first, I study how can we better represent the customer purchase history and incorporate temporal
variations in their store visits and spending over time. The traditional marketing metrics such as
RFM aggregated the customer information and therefore almost ignore real-time dynamic patterns
in store visits and spending. Using advanced analytics tools such as Functional Shape Analysis
can be utilized to capture and quantify the patterns in the data and use for customer response
modeling. In this direction the first study uses information about the response of customers under
three treatment scenarios (no promotion, customized promotion, and mass promotion) and links
patterns in their purchase paths to their response. The study also demonstrates the how to generate
a pseudo population using treatment weights in scenarios with more than two treatments to reduce
bias due to sample selection.
Next, I investigate the impact of rising internet usage on prescription choices of the
physicians and their response to marketing actions. In this study, I propose a theory driven
mechanism that explains the impact of internet on the drug choices of the physicians. Again, I
establish the causal link between the key variables using a Quasi experiment research design and
explicitly demonstrate the impact using counter factual simulations. The insights from this study
were mainly from the consumer perspective my next study answers questions from the brand and
manufacturer’s perspective.
3

A brand’s loyalty is tough to measure as it varies with time and is impacted by a host of
external events. Therefore, in this essay I propose a data driven measure to measure certain
dimensions of customer loyalty and study how the usage of internet (responsible for nearly perfect
information in the competitive market) is influencing it. This essay also investigates if there are
any spillover effects of manufacturer related information shocks on the brand’s loyalty. The
following paragraphs present the abstracts for the three essays in the dissertation.
Essay 1: Predicting consumer response to different types of direct retailer promotions is
key to an effective retail marketing strategy. Despite the availability of granular information on
consumer purchases, marketers often rely on aggregated purchase metrics related to recency,
frequency and past monetary expenditures (RFM variables) to make such predictions and
allocation decisions Recent developments have suggested that entire historical spending
distribution may contain richer information for predicting promotional response above and beyond
typical RFM and other time invariant measures (Zhang et al. 2015, Breiter and Huchzermeier,
2014). Further, despite widespread use of customized promotions and the costs of implementing
them compared to mass promotional activities, very little is known about the consumer metrics
that can explain heterogeneity in response to these two types of promotions. We expound upon
this theme by investigating how richer aspects of consumer spending distribution over time can
predict and explain differential response to direct promotions. Using a two-stage functional data
framework, we consider consumers’ entire history of basket expenditures (spending path) and store
visits (visits path). Based on this novel representation and a quasi-experimental research design
we demonstrate how different features of pre-promotion spending and visits paths make certain
consumers better targets for direct promotions. Specifically, we quantify information in the
purchase paths in the form of two scores associated with the trend of store expenditure and visits
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that explain more variations in sales during direct promotion than popular aggregated measures
such as RFM. The data driven framework adapts to variations in spending data and gives managers
an opportunity to gain new insights in consumer behavior for improving the performance of the
marketing operations.
Essay 2: The use of technology in medical practice has grown significantly over the years:
physicians use internet regularly to keep themselves updated on medical findings and guidelines.
The patients also keep themselves involved in the prescribing decisions by learning about
prescription drug’s side effects and efficacy through online sources. At the same time,
pharmaceutical company representatives regularly visit physicians to influence the prescription
choice in favor of marketed drug. Considering the increasing reliance of physicians and patients
on online sources of medical information the study investigates impact of rising internet usage on
the prescription choices of the physicians. The study also highlights how the emergence of the
internet as a key information sources for medical information may influence the physician’s
responsiveness to pharmaceutical marketing. The expectancy value theory of decision making is
used to motivate the hypothesis which hinges on the assertion that reduction in information costs
are associated with encourage variety seeking optimal decision making. This, in turn, reduces
prescription persistence and the impact of pharmaceutical detailing and drug popularity on
prescription choice. We support our hypotheses with an empirical analysis of the prescription
choices of geographically distributed physicians using a Quasi-experimental research design.
Further, a counterfactual simulation analysis shows that the not accounting for internet penetration
of the physician’s prescription region could lead to under or over estimation effects of detailing
under low and high internet penetration scenarios.

5

Essay 3: Prescription loyalty is the indicator of a physician’s commitment to continue

prescribing the drug. Pharmaceutical firms encourage such loyalty because it increases the market
shares of their drugs and covers cost of research and development. However, loyalty may be tough
to maintain in the digital age as more information about the quality of competing drugs from online
sources and higher patient engagement may reduce the impact of prior experiences and thereby
prescription loyalty. Therefore, empirically diagnosing the prescription drug’s loyalty across the
physicians would allow firms to optimize expenditure for the range of manufactured drugs and
prevent unnecessary costs and overcome the criticism related to over detailing. Using a
longitudinal dataset on prescription choices of physicians over a period of ten years we propose a
novel approach based on bipartite network of prescriber and prescription nodes to characterize a
drug’s loyalty in the market. Two nodes are linked when the physician prescribes the drug and
repeat prescription determines the strength of the link This representation allows to model temporal
variations in the loyalty of the prescription drugs. The study also investigates the impact of
manufacturer related information shocks and rising internet penetration on the drug loyalty. Our
findings suggest that manufacturer related information shocks negatively impact the loyalty of
extremely loyal prescribers while has no impact on the loyalty of prescribers with extremely low
loyalty for the drug. We connect these findings with recent literature on consumer choice in
information rich environment and motivate the application of the approach in resource allocation
decisions.

References
AMA (2017) In: https://www.ama-assn.org/content/ama-calls-ban-direct-consumer-advertisingprescription-drugs-and-medical-devices

6

Breiter, A., and Huchzermeier, A. 2014. 'Promotion Planning and Supply Chain Contracting in a
High-Low Pricing Environment,' Production and Operations Management (24:2), pp.
219-236(doi: 10.1111/poms.12250).
Cui, G., Wong, M., and Lui, H. 2006. 'Machine Learning for Direct Marketing Response
Models: Bayesian Networks with Evolutionary Programming,' Management Science
(52:4), pp. 597-612(doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1060.0514).
Donkers, B., Paap, R., Jonker, J., & Franses, P. (2006). Deriving target selection rules from
endogenously selected samples. J. Appl. Econ., 21(5), 549-562.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/jae.858
Forbes (2014). Retrieved 3 April 2017, from
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mckinsey/2014/02/03/making-loyalty-pay-six-lessonsfrom-the-innovators/#2018dfc62bda
Heskett, J. (2014). HBS Working Knowledge. Retrieved 5 April 2017, from
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/does-internet-technology-threaten-brand-loyalty
Jank, W., & Yahav, I. (2010). E-loyalty networks in online auctions. The Annals Of Applied
Statistics, 4(1), 151-178. http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/09-aoas310
Marketsandmarkets.com. (2014). Marketsandmarkets.com. Retrieved 18 March 2017, from
http://www.marketsandmarkets.com/PressReleases/retail-analytics.asp
Saboo, Alok R.; Kumar, V.; and Park, Insu. 2016. "Using Big Data to Model Time-Varying
Effects for Marketing Resource (Re)Allocation," MIS Quarterly, (40: 4) pp.911-939.
Schweidel, D. and Knox, G. (2013). Incorporating direct marketing activity into latent attrition
models. Marketing Science, 32(3), pp.471--487.

7

Simonson, I. (2015). Mission (Largely) Accomplished: What's Next for Consumer BDT-JDM
Researchers?. Journal Of Marketing Behavior, 1(1), 9-35.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/107.00000001
Zhang, Y., Bradlow, E., & Small, D. (2015). Predicting Customer Value Using Clumpiness:
From RFM to RFMC. Marketing Science, 34(2), 195-208.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2014.0873

8

CHAPTER 2: LOOKING BEYOND RFM METRICS FOR
UNDERSTANDING RESPONSE TO DIRECT PROMOTIONS: A
FUNCTIONAL DATA APPROACH
2.1 Introduction

The explosion of real-time transactional data available to retailers today offers significant
opportunities when planning direct promotion campaigns. In fact, the data-driven approach to
customer analytics in the retail industry is expected to rise by 40% between 2014-19 (Markets and
Markets, 2014). The personalized and preferential nature of targeted promotions, along with their
limited-time offers and their randomness in nature that creates consumer uncertainty about the
timing of future discounts, all accelerate spending during promotional periods (Bell et al. 2011;
Kahn and Schmttlein 1992). However, resources and budget constraints force retailers to target
only a limited number of households with such direct promotions (Cui, Wong, and Lui 2006), and
even those are often unsuccessful (Anderson et al. 2006; Jing and Lewis, 2011; Huang et al. 2014).
This is primarily due to retailers’ reliance on superficial marketing metrics, such as those related
to recency and frequency of purchase and past monetary expenditures (RFM variables) (Schweidel
and Knox 2013), when planning direct promotional campaigns. However, it is known that this
type of aggregation of information does not account for heterogeneous temporal variations in
monetary spending and store visits over time, which affect promotional responsiveness (Blattberg
et al. 1981; Johnson et al. 2013). As such, it is crucial for retailers to develop more sophisticated
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models that better utilize historical data to better predict household responsiveness to different
types of direct promotions.
In this study, we show that the rich information contained in a household’s disaggregated
spending and store visits history can be a robust predictor for promotional responsiveness both
regarding statistical and practical reasons. First, prior studies have found evidence of temporal
patterns and dynamics of spending (Damon et al. 2013) that are simply not captured using
aggregated data and measures of recency, frequency and monetary value of the purchase. For
example, food stamp recipients may cluster their expenditures and typically have one large grocery
trip each month because of transportation constraints. Alternatively, consider two households with
the same aggregate store-level spending during a window of analysis before a promotion. One
might exhibit a decreasing trend in spending just before promotion, while the other might
demonstrate an increasing trend, neither of which could be discerned using aggregated data.
Second, retailers target customers with a variety of promotions and their response to these
promotions over time cannot be captured using summaries of spending and store visits. The entire
trajectory of spending or store visits may uncover patterns otherwise hindered by some aggregation
procedure. For instance, a declining trend in spending after exposure to promotion may indicate
customer churn or lesser chance of higher spending during the subsequent promotion. It should
be noted that we emphasize on the customer spending and visits in this research as traditional
marketing metrics such as RFM aggregate customer’s visits (“recency (R) and frequency (F)”) and
store spending (Monetary (M) value) information. It would also be interesting to investigate how
the information on the household’s entire spending and visits path (collectively referred to as
“Purchase Path” later in the manuscript) before the promotion are related to the RFM metrics and
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what extra information can they add to our understanding of consumer response to the direct
promotion.
Despite the growth in retailer customized direct promotions, as well as the costs of
implementing them relative to mass promotions, no study to our knowledge has empirically
investigated household heterogeneity in response to these two types of promotions based on
household’s disaggregated spending and visits path data prior to promotional. Also, it would be
interesting to investigate how customer’s response to the other loyalty card variables can be related
to dynamic changes in spending trajectory. To address this gap, we propose a Functional Data
Analysis (FDA) based approach to include dynamic information in the customer purchase path.
Because retailers benefit the most from promotions that increase store expenditures across
multiple categories versus simply expenditures on the promoted brands (Venkatesan and Farris
2012), we are interested in the impact of direct promotions on store-level expenditures. We posit
that a household’s trajectory of spending and visits over time can be useful for informing about its
responsiveness to different types of direct promotions and other loyalty card interventions. To this
end, we address the following questions:
1. Is there a relationship between a household’s pre-promotion spending and visits path and
its store expenditures during a direct promotion?
2. What dynamic features of a spending path are related to greater spending during a direct
promotion and do these features determine the response to other campaign and store
interventions?
3. To what degree can spending paths better predict and explain a household’s response to
direct promotions over and above traditional RFM variables.

11

To address these questions, we employ a non-parametric functional representation of a
household’s pre-promotion spending and visits history (Ramsey and Silverman 2006). We
represent this “spending and visits path” of each household as a latent, but the continuous trajectory
of store-level expenditures and store visits over time and draw relevant information from these
continuous functions using dimension reduction techniques. As such, the main unit of analysis is
the set of household’s spending and visits path prior to a direct promotion, with minimal data
compression and no aggregation biases.
The functional data representation of a household’s spending and visits history has two
advantages: 1) it controls for heterogeneity and noise in spending across households, and 2) it is
suitable for sparse and time-dependent observational data such as store expenditures (Ullah and
Finch 2013). However, a caveat implied by this non-parametric representation is the potential for
fitting bias. This means that instead of explaining the actual signal, the model may “learn”
irrelevant noise, compromising the quality of the predictions as well as the interpretability of the
results. To mitigate this issue, we develop a two-stage approach that addresses the concerns of
fitting bias both in simulations and in our empirical application.
We empirically test the proposed framework using loyalty card data provided by a major
grocery chain that sent mass and customized promotions to select households during the time the
data was collected. To account bias in model estimates due to nonrandom assignment of the
promotional campaigns to the customer we employ an Inverse Probability Treatment Weights
(IPTW) based approach. In this approach, we weight the customers on the propensity for a
treatment assignment to generate a pseudo-randomized treatment assignment.
Our findings based on a quasi-experimental design show a strong relationship between
RFM and purchase path features. However, specific purchase path associated with household’s
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spending and visit’s trajectory over time explain further variations in within store spending during
the direct promotion. More specifically, the increasing or decreasing trend of the purchases visits
moderates of the response to various loyalty card and promotional campaign interventions. For
instance, households exhibiting increasing spending and visits trend over time spend significantly
higher in both types of promotions.
The results of our study reveal the importance of considering dynamic variations in
household expenditures for predicting response to direct promotions. We also show how retailers
can quantify the features of the spending paths of households new to their databases, and with
limited amounts of historical data, to significantly improve the forecasts of the promotional
response for such households, and by doing so, can improve their targeting strategies.
The rest of the essay is organized as follows. First, we review the existing research on
segmentation and forecasting of response to direct promotions. We then describe and explain the
importance of examining households’ spending and visits path and how they can be used to predict
expenditure during retailer promotions. Next, we present the method, data, results, and robustness
checks from our empirical analysis and draw managerial insights from the findings. Finally, we
conclude by connecting our findings to existing research and drawing managerial implications.

2.2 Background and Motivation
Modeling response to direct promotions is a high priority to retailers for increasing store
sales, reducing costs and improving store profitability. However, it can be challenging to forecast
household expenditures during targeted promotions, making strategic decisions in this area
difficult (Ali et al. 2009). In fact, less than 20% of direct promotions tend to be profitable due to
inaccurate forecasts of response to the promoted offerings. In turn these inaccuracies can lead to
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increases in retailer inventory holding costs when the demand is overestimated or stock outs when
demand is underestimated (Jing and Lewis 2011; Breiter and Huhzermeier 2014; Huang et al.
2014).
While manufacturers often provide and fund the redemption costs of their coupons that are
part of a retailer's direct mail promotional campaign, it is the retailer who identifies the households
that will receive the direct promotion.

Typically, retailers segment their households based on

certain thresholds of contribution relevant to long-term profitability, such as the recency (R),
frequency (F) and monetary (M) value of past store visits, and use these to determine which are
most likely to respond to, and thus will receive, a targeted promotion (Donkers et al. 2006;
Schweidel and Knox 2013). Buckinx and Van den Poel (2005) used past purchasing behavior to
predict the future probability of (partial) defection from a fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG)
retailer. Others have utilized time-invariant variables such as demographics (Heilman et al. 2003;
Zahavi and Levin 1997; Baesens et al. 2002; Buckinx and Poel 2005), promotion features (Huang
et al. 2014; Cooper et al. 1999; Trapero et al. 2014) and store display variables (Divakar et al.
2005; Trapero et al. 2014) to predict promotional response.
Sophisticated Promotional Support Systems such as SCAN*PRO (Leeflang et al. 2002) or
PromoCastTM (Cooper et al. 1999) use statistically motivated regression or time series models,
with inputs such as RFM variables, price cuts, feature advertising, special displays, etc., but can
easily over-fit the data and have interpretability issues.
As an alternative to complex response models, some retailers use a “base times lift”
approach to account for the rise in expenditures during a direct promotion (Huang et al. 2014).
This two-step procedure generates a baseline forecast with simple time-series models and then
adjusts for incoming promotional events. Lee et al. (2007) and Nikolopoulos (2010) developed
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forecasting systems where the baseline sales forecast from statistical models were adjusted based
on information from similar prior promotions or “guesses” of the managers to account for
accelerated spending during promotions. The problem with these approaches is they require
substantial longitudinal information on a household’s response to similar past promotions, which
is impractical when no information on a similar promotion is available, as well as a manager’s
expertise to adjust the forecasts, which can lead to subjectivity bias.
Within non-parametric techniques, artificial neural networks (Baesens et al. 2002, Zahavi
and Levin 1997) and regression tree methods (Rao and Steckel 1995) with RFM variables have
also been used to predict customer response to direct promotions. However, these models provide
little managerial insights and the selection of the best network topology is a concern as it is not
possible to determine the fitting bias of such models on the data.
The actions of competing stores, regulatory changes, the emergence of new retail channels,
and the evolving customer-retailer relationship over time may also impact response to direct
promotions (Sood et al. 2016). These temporal and dynamic variations in response to direct
promotions call for real-time adjustments in targeting strategies based on the vast amount of data
collected through marketing information systems. One of the challenge that most of the prior
research and practice face while analyzing fast moving customer data is that of visualizing and
extracting useful information for modeling. Due to limitations of majority of statistical modeling
approaches researchers often employed aggregated or time-invariant profiling measures, ignoring
potential temporal variations in household spending and visits and their impact on direct marketing
efforts.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to utilize a households’ disaggregated
spending path history to: 1) predict response to direct promotions, 2) identify the dynamic features
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of spending and visit paths that significantly explain direct promotional response, and 3) assess
the response to different types of promotion based on the pre-promotion spending patterns.
2.2.1 Using Purchase Paths to Predict Promotion Response: A Functional Data Approach
Loyalty card data provides retailers with information on the discrete store expenditures and
purchase visits of households over time. These discrete observations can be thought of as
realizations of an underlying continuous process, driven by household demand and resulting in a
household’s store purchases and visits. We will refer to this continuous process as a household’s
spending and visits path (collectively as “Purchase Paths”). The first Figure 1 below shows the
spending path of a household starting at time -20 (i.e., 20 weeks before the promotion) and ending
at time 0 (i.e., the time of the promotion), where the dots correspond to the discrete store
expenditures, and the dashed smooth curve represents the underlying spending path. The smooth
curve is recovered from the discrete observations via Functional Data Analysis which we motivate
and describe next.
In figure 2 below the dark dots represents if the household visited the store (1) or not (0)
during a week. The smoothed curve imposed on these discrete observations corresponds to the
continuous visits path of the customer. Usually, the aggregated RFM measures would summarize
the past 20 weeks information in the forms of three metrics, but the methods in the FDA techniques
would allow incorporating the information in the entire spending and visits history of the
customers. For instance, in the above figure, we can observe that the customer spending and store
trips are consistently increasing before the promotion which could have some implications for their
spending during the direct promotions. Prior studies have also documented that excess inventory
as the result of frequent purchases before a promotion can reduce overall spending during a
promotion (Johnson et al. 2013).
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Figure 1 Spending Path

Figure 2 Visits Path

However, declining spending and visits trend for a Household may indicate store
switching, a decrease in bulk purchases, or a shrinking household due to external forces
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unobserved by the retailer, but all of which could affect a household’s promotional response. So,
while RFM variables might identify two households that spent the same amount at a store in the
past month, spending and visits path can identify how households differ in their temporal evolution
in ways that might affect their promotional response.
The central assumption of a Functional Data Approach is the existence of a differentiable
smooth, continuous function that generates the observed data. In the context of our study, this is
a continuous demand for grocery items leading to observable store visits and store-level
expenditures. Thus, our first objective is to recover from the observed data the smooth and
continuous underlying function. One caveat is the potential risk of over- or under-fitting the
smooth continuous function to the data; that is, the potential risk of recovering noise rather than
the signal (Ramsey and Silverman 2006). We propose a six-step approach that minimizes this risk.
We provide an outline and summary of these six steps below.
Step 1: Generate continuous spending and visit path curves. Using Figure 3 for illustrative
purposes, let 𝑆𝑖 (𝑡) and 𝑉𝑖 (𝑡) represent a household (‘i’) observed weekly store expenditures and
trips (1 if customa er visited the store on week t and 0 otherwise)

respectively leading up to the

potential exposure to a direct promotion. In the first step, we approximate 𝑆𝑖 (𝑡) and 𝑉𝑖 (𝑡) using a
smooth, continuous and differentiable functions 𝐹𝑖𝑠 (𝑡) and 𝐹𝑖𝑣 (𝑡) using smoothing splines.
Smoothing splines for example for observations 𝑆𝑖 (𝑡) would minimize the residual sum of squares
2
∑𝑡𝑡=𝑡
|𝑆 (𝑡) − 𝐹𝑖𝑠 (𝑡)|2 and control for over-fitting or local variability by imposing a roughness
1 𝑖

penalty (R):
2

𝑡

′′
2
R (𝐹𝑖𝑠 ) = ∫𝑡=𝑡
|𝐹𝑖𝑠 (𝑡)| 𝑑𝑡 --- 1
1

Locally highly variable, or “wiggly”, curves will have larger values of R.
2

𝑡

′′
2
2
∑𝑡𝑡=𝑡
|𝑆 – 𝐹𝑖𝑠 (𝑡)|2 + 𝜆𝑗 ∫𝑡=𝑡
|𝐹𝑖𝑠 (𝑡)| 𝑑𝑡 --- 2
1 𝑖𝑡
1
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A smoothing spline minimizes equation (2) which balances data-fit against over-fitting via
the smoothing parameter 𝜆𝑗 . Larger values of 𝜆𝑗 impose larger penalties on “wiggliness” and result
in functions 𝐹𝑖𝑠 (𝑡) and 𝐹𝑖𝑣 (𝑡) that resemble a straight line. As 𝜆𝑗 approaches zero, the function
𝐹𝑖 (𝑡) becomes more flexible and, in the limit, reduces the residuals to zero allowing the function
to capture every data point perfectly.
The choice of 𝜆𝑗 has a strong impact on the resulting curves as it controls the balance
between under- and over-smoothing. We optimize 𝜆𝑗 in an iterative, data-driven way as outlined
in Step 4. More details on our smoothing spline procedure can be found in Web Appendix A.
Step 2: Functional shape analysis and principal scores. Step 1 identifies the continuous
functional object 𝐹𝑖𝑠 (𝑡) and 𝐹𝑖𝑣 (𝑡) that represents a household’s continuous store-level spending
and weekly visits path. However, a continuous curve cannot be used in a regression-like prediction
or forecasting model, as regression models rely on discrete information as input variables. To that
end, we employ functional shape analysis to extract basis shapes that form the building blocks for
the functional objects. For each basis shape, we obtain a set of scores (via principal regression
analysis) that will be employed in the prediction model. For example, if three basis shapes best
represent each functional object, then for each object, three separate (principal) scores are
obtained. These scores uniquely determine the functional object and can be used as discrete input
variables in the prediction model. The appendix A and B provide more details on the Functional
Principal Component Analysis (FPCA) procedure.
Step 3: Model building. In Step 3 we use the input variables, which include the functional
principal component scores from the previous step, to build a prediction model. Let 𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑖1~ 𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑛1
denote the top n1 principal scores that explain at least 90% of the variation (Xiong and Bhardwaj
2014) for the spending trajectory of customer i, 𝑉𝐶𝑆𝑖1~ 𝑉𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑛2 denote the top n2 principal scores
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for the visits trajectory of customer i . We then model 𝑌𝑖 (total expenditure during the direct
promotion) as:
𝑌𝑖 = f (𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑖1~ 𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑛1, 𝑉𝐶𝑆𝑖1~ 𝑉𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑛2) + 𝜀𝑖 --- 3
We use stepwise regression via the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for variable selection and
to eliminate uninformative input variables.
Step 4: Optimizing the roughness penalty 𝜆𝑗 . As pointed out earlier, the quality of 𝐹𝑖𝑠 (𝑡)
and 𝐹𝑖𝑣 (𝑡) and, from Step 1 depends heavily on the choice of the roughness penalty parameter 𝜆𝑗 .
In fact, 𝜆𝑗 controls the trade-off between over- and under-fitting and hence between capturing the
signal vs. modeling noise.
To avoid fitting biases, we iterate Steps 1-3 over various values of 𝜆𝑗 and then select the
value of 𝜆𝑗 (𝜆𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 ) that results in the lowest 𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑗 for the dependent variable of interest 𝑌𝑖 ,
resulting in the best model that trades off fit and complexity. Essentially, spending path curves
approximate the latent stochastic process of a household’s spending from its longitudinal discrete
store-level spending data, possibly perturbed by random errors assumed to be independent across
and within customers (Wang, Chiou, and Muller 2016). We note that lower values of 𝜆𝑗 lead to
more flexible curves that may incorporate more noise from the household data, and this in turn
will lead to lower explanatory power of the principal scores, implying more principal scores are
required to summarize at least 90% (Xiong and Bhardwaj 2014) of information across the curves.
In such cases, the final predictive models identified in Step 3 would have a greater number of
predictors in the analysis.
Steps 5 and 6: Final Model and prediction. In these steps, we obtain the final model using
significant features represented as principal component scores of the curves 𝐹𝑖𝑠 (𝑡) and 𝐹𝑖𝑣 (𝑡)
obtained by using 𝜆𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙 . The final model (Equation 3) is flexible enough to include other key
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predictors or variable of interests also added generate insights and improve predictions. It is
important to note that the dependent variable 𝑌𝑖 in our study is the total amount spent by a
household during the n week promotional period, as this is a key metric for retailers when
evaluating the effectiveness of promotional efforts and is recommended for providing meaningful
insights from household data (Xavier et al. 2004; Stilley et al. 2010). In contrast, all predictor
variables, including the function 𝐹𝑖𝑠 (𝑡) and 𝐹𝑖𝑣 (𝑡), are computed before the start of the promotional
period, like lagged variables in econometric models.
We also generate insights by segmenting households on key spending path features and
identify patterns in the spending paths that are associated with higher spending during the mass
and customized direct promotions. The response of the new customers to the direct promotions is
predicted by obtaining the smoothed functions 𝐹𝑖𝑠 (𝑡) and 𝐹𝑖𝑣 (𝑡) using 𝜆𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙 and using the
relevant principal component scores as predictors in the final model. We discuss this in more detail
in the next section where we present an empirical application of this two-stage FDA for a grocery
store retailer.

2.3 Empirical Analysis and Results
2.3.1 Data and Measures
We utilize two years (March 2005-March 2007) of loyalty card data for 798 customers
from a leading national grocery store chain for. Fifty-five million customers are enrolled in the
retailer's loyalty card program and 13M of these household’s shop at the retailer every month.
Furthermore, 80% of the retailer's customers carry the loyalty card and 95% those households’
expenditures at the retailer are captured with the loyalty card.
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The information gathered on cardholders was used by the retailer to send customized and
mass direct mail promotional incentives to certain households based on their value to the firm.
Despite the growth of targeted digital promotions, higher response rates of direct mail (3.7%) vs.
digital (0.6%) promotions explain why retailers continue to rely on direct mail promotions to retain
customers and increase store spending (Forbes Insights and Turn 2015). The dataset contains
information about the timing and nature of the direct mail efforts, however details about how
households were chosen for each promotion was not disclosed by the data provider, other than
those chosen to receive each promotion type crossed a certain threshold of revenue contribution.
We note that we test for the potential of sample selection bias later in the paper.
The customized promotions contained 14-16 coupons specially chosen for each household
receiving one. The coupons were of the form, “$5 off Category X when spending $20” and “$1
off Brand X”, and the mailer envelope included the copy, “Thanks for being such a great customer!
Please enjoy the savings reserved only for premier customers like you.” Figure 4 shows an
example of a customized promotion.
The mass promotions took the form of a brochure with a themed event (e.g., "Back to
School," Healthy Living," "Breakfast," etc.) and contained recipes, helpful tips, etc. along with
approximately ten coupons for products related to the theme (i.e., pencils and notebook, health
products, breakfast sausage, etc.). The same set of coupons was included in every brochure for
the same themed event and the mailer read, "Premier customer coupons inside” or “Thanks for
shopping with us.” Figure 4 shows a page from a brochure under the “Back to School” theme.
Both customized and mass promotions have coupon redemption duration, and, in this study, we
are interested in the household’s spending during this duration.
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The dataset contained the store visits of every household (when it used its loyalty card),
beginning with the first store visit after signing up for the retailer’s loyalty program. Therefore,
the first direct promotion observed for each household was the first direct communication
between the retailer and the household. We observe the total amount a household spent at the
retailer on each store visit, the primary variable of interest and various other campaign-related
variables, loyalty program variables and customer demographic information. Our dataset has a
total of 798 unique customers whose purchase history was recorded by the retailer within a twoyear period using the loyalty card.

Figure 3 Customized (left) and Mass Coupon (right)
Since some customers were enrolled in the loyalty program towards the later part of the
observation period, there is a difference in the time frame for which the transaction data of the
customer is recorded. On average, we have 92 weeks of total store expenditure and visits history
for these customers with the maximum being 102 weeks and minimum being 25 weeks. The
complete list of variables and their description can be found in the Table 1 below.
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Table 1 Variable Description
Variable

Description
Dependent Variable

Campaign Sales (SALES)

Total amount of dollars spent during the promotional
campaign. Includes a reference six-week period when no
campaign was present.
Campaign Variables

Campaign (CAMP)

Represented by two dummy indicators such that CAMP1 =
1 (𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝐴) and CAMP2 = 1 (if
targeted campaign is B) during the observation period. ‘No
Campaign’ being the baseline level.

Campaign Before (CBEF)

Number of times the household is targeted with the similar
campaign before.

Campaign Period (CPER)

Number of weeks for which the household is exposed to a
promotional campaign

Total Coupons (COUP)

Number of coupons sent to the household if targeted with a
promotional campaign

Favorite Coupons (FAVC)

Percentage of coupons in the household’s favorite category

Total Campaigns (TCAMP)

Total number of campaigns the household is exposed to
during the promotion period.
Loyalty Program Variables

Loyalty discounts (LDISC)

Average loyalty discounts advertised in the household’s
favorite category during the promotion period.

Weekly Mailer (MAIL)

Average number of household’s top 30 favorite categories
featured in the weekly mailer during the promotion period

End-of-Aisle Display (DISP)

Average number of household’s top 30 favorite categories
with an end-of-aisle display during the promotion period.

Time in Loyalty Program (TIME)

Number of weeks household is enrolled to the loyalty
program when received the campaign
Customer Demographics

Age (AGE)

Age of the customer

Income (INCOME)

The income in dollars of the customer

Married (MARRIED)

Dummy variable that equals 1 if a customer is married and 0
otherwise

24

Table 2 Variable Description continued
Household Size (HHSIZE)

Total number of family members in the household
Transaction Variables

Recency (REC)

Weeks elapsed since last purchase

Frequency (FREQ)

Number of store visits in past 20 weeks

Monetary (MON)

Monetary value of spending during past 20 weeks

pcs.2

Second principle component score of the spending path

vcs.2

Second principle component score of visits path

Over this two-year period, the retailer targeted the customers with 24 direct promotions
with some customers receiving up to 14 different direct promotion while some are receiving none.
These promotional campaigns spanned from 6 to 10 weeks implying that the customers had the
opportunity to redeem the coupons received in the direct mail within that duration. There were
durations within the observation period when customers had the opportunity to redeem coupons
from both types (customized and mass) of direct promotions or were targeted with multiple
promotional campaigns during the same time.
Out of 24 direct promotions, 3 were customized while the remaining 21 were mass
promotions where all customers received the same set of coupons based on a particular theme.
However, customized promotions usually in our sample, the least amount of time it took for a
customer to receive a direct promotion discount since the beginning of the loyalty program was 21
weeks. Therefore, for each customer, we utilize 20 weeks of prior spending and visits trajectory to
understand the response to direct promotions. Households tend to exhibit weekly and monthly
cyclic fluctuations in store expenditures (Damon, King and Leibtag 2013), therefore a twentyweek spending history is sufficient to capture key patterns in the spending paths. Furthermore, due
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to the frequent targeting of customers by the retailer in our data, it was rare for a household to go
more than ten weeks without being targeted with a promotion.
Table 3 Variable Summary

SALES
CBEF
FAVC
ALLC
COUP
LDISC
DISP
MAIL
AGE
INCOME
MARRIED
NUMKIDS
TIME
CPER
REC
FREQ
MON
pcs.2
vcs.2

Campaign A
N = 2172
Mean
SD
553
399
3.26
2.06
19.19
11.11
1.58
0.70
7.56
2.38
-19.50
3.32
18.50
3.71
20.01
3.04
44.49
11.68
64.50
47.49
0.42
0.49
0.53
0.94
58.59
14.76
8.22
0.57
0.41
1.18
15.67
3.54
67.18
42.77
-1.84
62.25
-0.174
0.425

Campaign B
N = 1667
Mean
SD
562
369
4.94
3.15
6.05
11.04
2.29
0.78
9.30
6.83
-19.62
3.34
18.94
3.65
20.45
3.02
42.83
11.12
71.12
51.95
0.45
0.50
0.67
1.01
65.71
16.92
6.43
0.99
0.27
0.82
16.72
3.09
89.68
50.15
-2.95
72.62
-0.262
0.382

No Campaign (NC)
N = 708
Mean
SD
479
400
0.70
1.68
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-19.28
3.50
18.06
4.56
19.92
4.10
44.89
11.63
64.85
47.73
0.44
0.50
0.57
0.97
39.20
19.31
8.05
1.38
0.77
2.36
13.72
4.88
54.63
44.70
12.63
63.71
0.115
0.50

The unit of analysis in our study is a customer-campaign combination and the objective is
to study that impact of pre-promotion spending and visits trajectory and various loyalty program,
campaign and household related factors on the spending during the promotional period. To contrast
the promotional spending with non-promotional spending or to develop a baseline spending case
we randomly selected a duration (uniformly drawn [6-10]) within the customer time series when
no promotion was present and extract the 20-week prior spending and visits trajectory for model
building. Eventually, we obtain 4547 observations for each household-campaign combination
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(including no campaign period) and the table below summarizes the variable statistics for the
dataset.
For each promotional or no promotional period we implement the proposed two-stage FDA
model to extract the trajectory information in the form of the Principal Component Scores.
Essentially, for all customer-campaign combination we proceed through steps of FDA framework
described before to incorporate entire information in the final model. To address the research
questions of the study we model the total spending of a household during a promotional campaign
as following:
LOG(𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 x 𝐶𝐴𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 x 𝐶𝐵𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 x 𝐶𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 x 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 x
𝐹𝐴𝑉𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 x 𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 x 𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 x 𝐿𝑀𝐴𝐼𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 x 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 x 𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽11 x 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12 x 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13 x 𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14 x 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15 x 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽16 x 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽17 x 𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆 x 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑉 x 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖𝑗 ; i = 1,…n, j = 1,…. 𝑚𝑖 --- 4
Where, 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the sales or total spending for customer ‘i’ in the promotional campaign
at time ‘t’, n represents the total number of households, 𝑚𝑖 is number of repeated observations or
promotional campaigns for the customer ‘i’ in the sample. It should be noted that campaign
assignment to the customers is not random and is driven by a process which is not known to us.
Hence, we account for the endogeneity in the promotion assignment using propensity score
weighting procedure.
2.3.2 Accounting for Endogeneity in Campaign Assignment
To address the possibility of campaign selection bias, we investigate whether there are
systematic differences in the households that received the two types of promotions or no promotion
based on their RFM metrics, spending and visit trajectory and demographic information. To
address these concerns, we employ Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighting (IPTW) procedure
using propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984) that allows us to obtain statistically

27

meaningful between-group comparisons in case of confounding treatments. The IPTW procedure
allows creating a pseudo-population (weighted groups that mimic no confounding scenario) where
the pretreatment covariates (RFM, demographics etc.) and campaign selection would be
independent of each other (a property of a randomized treatment).We randomize the selection of
the customers in an Quasi-experimental fashion by assigning appropriate weights to the
households based on their propensity to be selected into any of the three groups (no promotion,
campaign A and campaign B).
The selection of a household to a promotional campaign may depend on their RFM metrics,
demographics variable (e.g., income) or spending or visits trajectory. For instance, customers with
high prior monetary spending, income or frequent visits are usually rewarded with the discount
coupons by the retailers. If we observe all the pretreatment variables that determine the campaign
selection decision and some observations in the treatment groups have similar values of the
covariates then, using the appropriate weighting the treatment sample can be reweighted to make
the distribution of the covariates match across the groups.
Prior studies have found that if the weights given to the households are equal to the
reciprocal of the propensity of being selected into the treatment, then the reweighting should
succeed in randomizing the pretreatment covariates across the treatment groups. Therefore, we
construct the IPTWs by estimating each household’s probability of having received their
respective treatments (No promotion, Campaign A, and Campaign B) based on observed
pretreatment variables and then weight by the inverse of their assignment probabilities. If 𝐶𝐴𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡
is an indicator variable denoting whether the subject ‘i’ was selected for a campaign at time tor not
and if 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the propensity score for being selected in the assigned campaign for the household
then, the IPTW weights can be defined as:
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𝐼𝑃𝑇𝑊𝑖 = 𝐶𝐴𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 / 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + (1-𝐶𝐴𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 ) / 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 --- 5
Once the IPTWs are generated, treatment effects are obtained by estimating the outcome
model like equation 4 using weighted regression (Joeff et al., 2004). Therefore, the first step in
IPTW weighting is the estimation of the propensity of being selected in their respective groups
three groups such that:
𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡−𝑙 , 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡−𝑙 , 𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡−𝑙 , 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 , 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡 , 𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 , 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 ,
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑖−𝑙 , 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑙 , 𝐴𝑉𝐺𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡−𝑙 ) --- 6
We model the propensity of being selected for a campaign (𝐶𝐴𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 ) for a household as a
function of observable pretreatment covariates three weeks prior to the beginning of the promotion.
We selected a lag of three weeks in the pretreatment covariates as retailers identify the appropriate
households for the promotions up to three weeks in advance. We also experiment with other lags
such as 2 and 4 weeks and found no significant variations in our causal estimates.
We use Generalized Boosted Regression (GBR) to estimate the 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 as they produce more
balanced weights than multinomial logistic regression in a multiple treatment scenario. The GBR
models are tree-based regression models which use a recursive algorithm to describe the
relationship between a set of pretreatment variables and the treatment assignment (McCaffrey et
al., 2013). Unlike parametric logistic regression which assumes that the covariates are linear and
additive on log-odds scale GBR can handle a large number of pretreatment covariates while also
allowing for flexible, nonlinear relationships amongst the pretreatment variables.
The recursive algorithm of GBR starts with a simple regression tree and with each iteration
a new tree is added such that it provides the best fit to the residuals from the earlier iteration. Each
iteration increases the likelihood of obtaining the data, and with sufficient iteration, the algorithm
can perfectly fit the data or overfit it. In the case of propensity score matching task, the suitable
condition for ending the iterative process would be attaining the balance of the pre-treatment
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variables across the treatment groups. Essentially, one would like to end the iteration of the GBR
algorithm when a statistic such as absolute standardized mean difference (ASMD) is not significant
for all pre-treatment variables across each combination of the treatment pair (McCaffrey et al.,
2013). For example, in the final balanced sample, the ASMD of say Monetary value (M) of
spending prior to the promotion should not be significantly different across household for all
possible treatment pairs (e.g. No Campaign and Campaign A, Campaign A and Campaign B,
Campaign B and No Campaign).
2.3.3 Model Fit Statistics
Applying the two-stage FDA framework approach, we start by using the spending and
visits paths of each household for over the twenty weeks prior to the beginning of response period
(including promotion types A and B and no promotion period) under consideration. We first related
the total amount spent during the response period (𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 ), to identify the optimal smoothing
parameter (𝜆𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 ) for the calibrated model. To optimize 𝜆𝑗 , we investigate a smoothed
functional representation of the household’s purchase paths (spending and visits path) across a
range of values of the parameter (𝜆𝑗 ).
Given the absence of any knowledge of the spending patterns that determine 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 , we
consider all possible principal components curves that together explain 90% of the variation across
respective smoothed curves 𝐹𝑖𝑠 (𝑡) and 𝐹𝑖𝑣 (𝑡). The top ‘n’ principal components scores related to
the spending trajectory function are represented as (𝑝𝑐𝑠. 1, 𝑝𝑐𝑠. 2 … . . 𝑝𝑐𝑠. 𝑛) while those related
to the visits trajectory function are represented as (𝑣𝑐𝑠. 1, 𝑣𝑐𝑠. 2 … . 𝑣𝑐𝑠. 𝑛).

The principal

component scores represent the similarity of the household trajectory along the identified major
sources of variations for all households in the sample, or principal component (PC) vectors. For
example, 𝑃𝐶𝑆1 for a household describes the extent to which its spending trajectory function 𝐹𝑖𝑠 (𝑡)
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varies in the direction of the first principal component (𝑃𝐶1𝑆 ) obtained from the FPCA of the
spending trajectories (𝐹 𝑠 (𝑡)) of all households in the sample. It is evaluated as
∑𝑡 𝑃𝐶1(𝑡) (𝐹𝑖𝑠 (𝑡) – 𝐹 𝑠 (𝑡)), where ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝐹 𝑠 (𝑡) is the mean spending path across all households (Xiong
and Bharadwaj 2014). Next, 𝑉𝐶𝑆2 for a household describes the extent to which a household’s
velocity curve (𝐹 𝑣 (𝑡)) varies in the direction of the second principal component (𝑃𝐶2𝑉 ) vector
obtained from the FPCA of the visits trajectory functions (𝐹 𝑣 (𝑡)) of all households in the sample.
Table 4 Final Model for Various Smoothing Parameters
Spar
(𝜆′𝑗 )

0

0.1

0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1

R. Sq.

AIC

0.3836

10994

0.3838

10992

0.3850

10979

0.3855

10965

0.3857

10957

0.3858

10953

0.3851

10955

0.3854

10952

0.3838

10963

0.1970

12165

0.1970

12165

Model
lsales ~ pcs.1 + pcs.2 + pcs.3 + pcs.4 + pcs.5 + pcs.6 + pcs.7 + pcs.8 + pcs.9 + pcs.10
+ pcs.11 + pcs.12 + pcs.13 + pcs.14 + pcs.15 + pcs.16 + vcs.1 + vcs.2 + vcs.3 + vcs.4
+ vcs.5 + vcs.6 + vcs.7 + vcs.8 + vcs.9 + vcs.10 + vcs.11 + vcs.12 + vcs.13 + vcs.14
+ vcs.15 + vcs.16 + vcs.17 + vcs.18
lsales ~ pcs.1 + pcs.2 + pcs.3 + pcs.4 + pcs.5 + pcs.6 + pcs.7 + pcs.8 + pcs.9 + pcs.10
+ pcs.11 + pcs.12 + pcs.13 + pcs.14 + pcs.15 + pcs.16 + vcs.1 + vcs.2 + vcs.3 + vcs.4
+ vcs.5 + vcs.6 + vcs.7 + vcs.8 + vcs.9 + vcs.10 + vcs.11 + vcs.12 + vcs.13 + vcs.14
+ vcs.15 + vcs.16 + vcs.17 + vcs.18
lsales ~ pcs.1 + pcs.2 + pcs.3 + pcs.4 + pcs.5 + pcs.6 + pcs.7 + pcs.8 + pcs.9 + pcs.10
+ pcs.11 + pcs.12 + pcs.13 + pcs.14 + vcs.1 + vcs.2 + vcs.3 + vcs.4 + vcs.5 + vcs.6 +
vcs.7 + vcs.8 + vcs.9 + vcs.10 + vcs.11 + vcs.12 + vcs.13 + vcs.14 + vcs.15
lsales ~ pcs.1 + pcs.2 + pcs.3 + pcs.4 + pcs.5 + pcs.6 + pcs.7 + pcs.8 + pcs.9 + vcs.1 +
vcs.2 + vcs.3 + vcs.4 + vcs.5 + vcs.6 + vcs.7 + vcs.8 + vcs.9 + vcs.10
lsales ~ pcs.1 + pcs.2 + pcs.3 + pcs.4 + pcs.5 + pcs.6 + vcs.1 + vcs.2 + vcs.3 + vcs.4 +
vcs.5 + vcs.6 + vcs.7
lsales ~ pcs.1 + pcs.2 + pcs.3 + pcs.4 + vcs.1 + vcs.2 + vcs.3 + vcs.4 + vcs.5
lsales ~ pcs.1 + pcs.2 + pcs.3 + vcs.1 + vcs.2 + vcs.3
lsales ~ pcs.1 + pcs.2 + vcs.1 + vcs.2 + vcs.3
lsales ~ pcs.1 + pcs.2 + vcs.1 + vcs.2
lsales ~ +vcs.1 + vcs.2
lsales ~ +vcs.1 + vcs.2

Table 3 shows the fit statistics Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) for the models estimated
in Stage 1 for different values of the smoothing parameter 𝜆𝑗 . We observe that the models with
smaller values of 𝜆𝑗 require a greater number of principal component scores of spending and visits
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trajectory to explain approximately the same amount of variation in log(SALES) during the
response period. This is due to higher roughness or variation in the representative functional curves
with lower values of the smoothing parameter (𝜆𝑗 ). The functions with lower values of 𝜆𝑗
incorporate more noise from the household spending and visits trajectory and therefore have
smaller explanatory power.
The goodness-of-fit measures are also higher for smaller values of 𝜆𝑗 , but subsequently
decrease (indicating better fit) as 𝜆𝑗 increases, before rising again for higher values of this variable.
Although the variation explained by these models (Adjusted R-Squared) does not vary
significantly with 𝜆𝑗 , the number of component scores required to explain the variation does
change. We conduct a simulation experiment to demonstrate how the choice of 𝜆𝑗 may influence
the model fit and prediction errors (see Web Appendix XXX).
Based on the above, we identify the model with 𝜆𝑗 = 0.7 in table 3 as the best fitting model
for the customized promotion as it has the lowest AIC (10952) among all the models. The results
show that the pcs.1 and pcs.2 the scores associated with first and second principal components of
the spending trajectory curves (𝐹 𝑠 (𝑡)) and vcs.1, vcs.2, vcs.3 the scores associated with first,
second and third principal components of the visits trajectory curves for a household best predict
sales during the response period.
The above findings provide preliminary evidence of the effect of the spending and visits
trajectory of the households on the sales. Specifically, we find that two features associated with
the spending trajectory curves and three features associated with the visits trajectory curves of a
household best predict the sales during the response period. Next, we study the relationship
between the features drawn from the spending and visits trajectories and the popular RFM metrics.
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2.3.4 Relationship Between RFM and Purchase Path Features
The RFM metrics and the features of the spending and visits paths (Purchase Path) in the
form of principal component scores are obtained from a similar information source. In the RFM
measures of recency and frequency are drawn from the data related to the store visits of a
household over time while the scores vcs.1, vcs.2 and vcs.3 obtained earlier summarize
information in the visits trajectory of the households. Similarly, the monetary value of spending
aggregate information in the prior spending of the households without considering the variations
in the spending trajectory over time. Table 4 below shows the correlation between the RFM
measures derived from the raw data and the features derived from the smoothed trajectory
functions.
Table 5 Correlation Between RFM and Purchase Path Features
pcs.1

pcs.2

vcs.1

vcs.2

vcs.3

R

F

M

pcs.1

1.000

0.000

0.519

0.004

-0.019

0.207

-0.519

-0.999

pcs.2

0.000

1.000

-0.017

0.498

0.017

-0.163

0.014

-0.00068

vcs.1

0.519

-0.017

1.000

0.000

0.000

0.451

-0.999

-0.51886

vcs.2

0.004

0.498

0.000

1.000

0.000

-0.324

-0.005

-0.0041

vcs.3

-0.019

0.017

0.000

0.000

1.000

-0.220

0.015

0.019633

R

0.207

-0.163

0.451

-0.324

-0.220

1.000

-0.453

-0.20668

F

-0.519

0.014

-1.000

-0.005

0.015

-0.453

1.000

0.519107

M

-1.000

-0.001

-0.519

-0.004

0.020

-0.207

0.519

1

From the above table features from the same set of functional curves (e.g. pcs.1 and pcs.2)
are not correlated to each other due orthogonal nature of the principal component analysis.
However, the first principal scores of the spending and visits trajectory functions are perfectly
correlated to the frequency and monetary metrics. Next, we analyze the features in the spending
and visits trajectory functions that explain most variations across the households to understand the
perfect collinearity with F and M metrics.
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Figure 4 above represents first and second principal components of the spending trajectory
curves for the households in the dataset. The PC1 and PC2 of spending trajectory curves explain
86% and 9.4% of the variations respectively (or 96% in total) for the spending trajectory curves in
the sample. The PC1 assigns approximately equal weight to spending by a household through the
20 weeks prior to the promotion. Therefore, households with higher average / overall prepromotion spending with the store will have higher principle component score (pcs.1) for this
component. Therefore, pcs.1 is perfectly correlated with the M of the RFM metrics as both capture
overall spending by a household with the store. The second principal component for spending
trajectory curves exhibits an increasing trend and the households whose weekly spending rose
from below to higher than average in the sample after 10 weeks prior to the promotion will have
higher score on pcs.2

Figure 4 Principal Components Spending Path
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Figure 5 Principal Components Visits Path
Similarly, the Figure 5 above shows the patterns (PC1, PC2, and PC3) that explain most
variations in the visits trajectory functions of the households that significantly predict the sales
during the response period. The PC1, PC2 and PC3 explain 70%, 17% and 10% of the variations
(and a total of 98%) of the variations in the visits trajectories of the households. The PC1 imparts
approximately similar weightage to all visits until 20 weeks prior to the promotion. Hence, it is no
surprise that customer with higher visits in 20 weeks prior to the promotion would have a higher
score (vcs.1) on this component. The household with higher visits also have higher values on the
F metric of the RFM. Hence, it is no surprise that vcs.1 and F are almost perfectly correlated.
On the other hand, the PC2 for the visits function imparts higher weight to visits at the
extremes of the observation period. Meaning households for whom the visits filliped from below
to higher than sample average at approximately 10 weeks prior to the promotion would have higher
score on the component vcs.2. The PC3 on the other hand has a more complicated interpretation
as it imparts positive weightage to visits before 14 weeks and after 5 weeks prior to the promotion
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while it imparts negative weightage to the visits within 14 and 5 weeks prior to the promotion.
Hence household exhibiting a similar pattern as that of PC3 in their visits trajectory would have
higher score on the vcs.3. Given the complicated interpretation of the PC3 and lesser explanatory
power in comparison to PC1 and PC2 we examine the utility of the new information form the
spending and visits trajectories in the form of pcs.2 and vcs.2 in explaining the sales during the
response period. As pcs.1 and vcs.1 are almost entirely correlated to the M and F measures in RFM
metrics they do not provide any new insight from modeling perspective hence, we focus on pcs.2
and vcs.2 to understanding their relationship with sales during the response period.
Next, we contrast the patterns in the household’s spending and visits trajectory based on
pcs.2 and vcs.2 to understand their influence on the sales during the promotion. Figure 6 below
shows the spending path of households with high (more than the first quartile) pcs.2 while figure
7 contrasts the spending path of households with low (less than the first quartile) pcs.2 score. It
can be observed that households with high pcs.2 based on spending path until 20 weeks before the
promotion period have increasing weekly spending trend while those with low pcs.2 have a
decreasing weekly spending trend. Similarly, the figure 8 and 9 contrasts the household’s visits
path based on the vcs.2. Here also we observe that the households with high (above first quartile)
vcs.2 exhibit increasing visits probability at the store as the promotion approaches while those with
low vcs.2 exhibit decreasing probability. From the figures below, it is evident that the scores pcs.2
and vcs.2 capture a feature in the purchase paths of the household’s that is not captured by the
RFM metrics. The increasing trend in the spending (higher pcs.2) and visits (higher vcs.2) may
have implications for the response to direct promotions and retailer interventions.
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Figure 6 Spending Path High pcs.2

Figure 7 Spending Path Low pcs.2
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Figure 8 Spending Path High vcs.2

Figure 9 Spending Path Low vcs.2
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For instance, increasing spending of a household over time may be an indicator of
increasing buying power or improving the relationship with the retailer. While the declining trend
before the promotion signals customer churn or reduced buying capacity. Similarly, increasing
store visits before the promotion signals improving relationship and preference for buying at the
store. The households with increasing spending and visits trends can be expected to spend higher
during the direct promotions in comparison to those with a decreasing trend. Similarly, one can
also argue that the impact of campaign-related variables such as COUP, FAVC, TCAMP, and
CBEF should be positively moderated by transaction paths trend before the promotion.
2.3.5 Purchase Paths and Promotion Response
In this section, we analyze the variations explained by the features drawn from the purchase
path of a household in the form of pcs.2 and vcs.2 and the response to promotional campaigns.
Since, the campaign assignment to the households may not be random we first obtain the IPTW
weights for the households using the GBR approach explained earlier and checked for the balance
of the pretreatment variables. Prior studies have found that marketers often consider RFM metrics
of the customers to target them with the direct promotions (Cui, Wong and Lui, 2006). Hence, our
pre-treatment variables include the RFM metrics, household demographics, transaction path
features and average spending in past direct promotion. We relate the values of the pretreatment
variables until three weeks before the beginning of the response period to obtain IPTW weights
using the GBR procedure. The stopping condition of the iterative algorithm of the GBR is the
balance of the pretreatment variable values across all treatment pairs. Table XXX below
summarizes comparison of absolute standardized mean difference (ASMD) of pretreatment
variables between three treatment combinations (NC-A, A-B, B-NC). To limit the table size, we
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show for each treatment variable the maximum ASMD between any of the treatment combination
and the respective minimum p-value of the means comparison.
Table 5 Pre-Treatment Variables Balance
Pre-Treatment Variable
Age (AGE)
Married (MARRRIED)
Income (INCOME)
Numkids (NUMKIDS)
Recency (REC)
Frequency(FREQ)
Monetary(MON)
pcs.2
vcs.2
Avg. Spending Past Promotions
(ASPP)

Max(ASMD)
Min(P-Value)
Max(ASMD) Min(P-Value)
(Unweighted)
(Weighted)
0.1794
0.0006
0.0848
0.6326
0.0543
0.4898
0.0426
0.9902
0.1343
0.0199
0.0483
0.8149
0.1462
0
0.0442
0.9819
0.4159
0
0.059
0.9623
0.8059
0
0.0985
0.287
0.7457
0
0.0706
0.2408
0.1738
0
0.0177
0.8158
0.2792
0
0.0058
0.8474
0.7178

0

0.0677

0.1618

From table 5 above it is apparent weighting leads to a significant reduction in the ASMD
across the treatment combinations for each pretreatment variable. For instance, the maximum
ASMD for REC was 0.41 in the unweighted sample but after applying weights the maximum
ASMD gets reduced to 0.05 and is not significantly different. Figure 10,11 and 12 below
graphically represents the variation in the ASMD of the ten pretreatment variables for all three
combinations of the treatment groups. It is evident that for all three treatment pairs there is no
significant difference in the values pre-treatment variables in the weighted sample. Therefore,
IPTW weights obtained from the GBR algorithm have been successful in creating a pseudo sample
where there is no significant variation in the pre-treatment variable values across all three treatment
combinations.
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Balance A vs B
Absolute Standardized Mean
Difference

0.5
0.45
AGE

0.4

MARRIED

0.35

INCOME
NUMKIDS

0.3

RECL

0.25

FREQL

0.2

MONL
0.15

pcs.2l

0.1

vcs.2l
AVGPS

0.05
0
Unweighted

Weighted

Figure 10 Absolute Standard Different Pre-treatment Variables (A vs B)

Balance A vs NC

Absolute Standardized Mean
Difference

0.6
AGE

0.5

MARRIED
INCOME

0.4

NUMKIDS
RECL

0.3

FREQL
MONL

0.2

pcs.2l
vcs.2l

0.1

AVGPS
0
Unweighted

Weighted

Figure 11 Absolute Standard Different Pre-treatment Variables (B vs NC)
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Balance B vs NC

Absolute Standardized Mean
Difference

0.9
0.8
AGE
0.7

MARRIED

0.6

INCOME
NUMKIDS

0.5

RECL

0.4

FREQL

0.3

MONL
pcs.2l

0.2

vcs.2l
AVGPS

0.1
0
Unweighted

Weighted

Figure 12 Absolute Standard Difference (B vs NC)

Table 5 below summarizes the results of generalized linear models estimated using the
weighted least squares (WLS) procedure using the IPTW weights. To account for heterogeneity
in the variance of the residuals across campaigns, we report robust standard errors clustered at the
campaign level. Model 1 shows the estimation results without the use of IPTW weights and shows
that in comparison to the no-promotion (NP) response period the household spend significantly
higher during the campaign type B. However, on using IPTW weights we find that there is no
significant difference in the log(SALES) during type A and type B direct campaigns in comparison
to NC periods. This is probably the outcome of the biased assignment of the households in the
three groups. Probably the retailer assigned high spending households in the campaign B group.
Consistent with the prior studies the RFM variables are significantly related to the sales
from a household. Campaign related variables such as CBEF, FAVC and ALLC significantly
impact the sales from a household. The loyalty card discounts advertised in the household’s
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favorite category has a positive impact on the sales during the response period. Similarly, other
store-related variables such as weekly mailer sent to the household and household’s favorite
product on end-of-aisle display (DISP) also significantly affects the sales.
Table 6 Model Summary Statistics 1

CAMP_A (base NC)
CAMP_B (base NC)
Campaign Before (CBEF)
% Fav. Coupons (FACV)
All Campaigns (ALLC)
Total Coupons (COUP)
Loyalty Discount (LDISC)
End-of-Aisle (DISP)
Weekly Mailer (MAIL)
Age (AGE)
Income (INCOME)
Married (MARRIED)
Number of Kids (NUMKIDS)
Time in Loyalty Program
(TIME)
Campaign Duration (CPER)
Recency (REC)
Frequency (FREQ)
Monetary (MON)
Spending Path Feature (pcs.2)
Visits Path Feature (vcs.2)
pcs.2#vcs.2
CAMP_A#pcs.2
CAMP_B#vcs.2
CAMP_A#pcs.2
CAMP_B#vcs.2
N
AIC
BIC

Model -1
Unweighted
0.06
0.15**
0.024***
0.0063***
0.00056
-0.011***
0.032***
0.019***
0.12***
0.0023***
0.00064***
0.016
-0.026***

Model-2
Weighted
0.056
0.083
0.029***
0.0047**
0.00095
-0.012***
0.028***
0.016***
0.12***
0.0028***
0.00064***
0.032*
-0.023***

Model-3
Weighted
0.055
0.078
0.029***
0.0045**
0.011
-0.012***
0.028***
0.014***
0.12***
0.0027***
0.00064***
0.028*
-0.022***

Model -4
Weighted
0.054
0.078
0.030***
0.0046**
0.011
-0.012***
0.028***
0.014***
0.12***
0.0027***
0.00064***
0.029*
-0.021***

Model -5
Weighted
0.054
0.076
0.029***
0.0045**
0.014
-0.012***
0.028***
0.014***
0.12***
0.0027***
0.00064***
0.027*
-0.020***

-0.0051***
0.16***
-0.094***
0.014***
0.010***

-0.0040***
0.16***
-0.090***
0.015***
0.010***

-0.0041***
0.16***
-0.068**
0.018***
0.010***
0.0011***
0.073

-0.0041***
0.16***
-0.066**
0.018***
0.010***
0.0010***
0.073
-0.00033

-0.0041***
0.16***
-0.069**
0.017***
0.010***
0.00069***
-0.013

4547
9205.2
9320.8

4547
30541.9
30657.5

4547
30344.9
30473.3

4547
30342.9
30477.8

0.00024*
0.00082***
0.15***
0.12*
4547
30301.4
30442.7

The features identified in the household’s spending path (pcs.2) also significantly affect
the sales (model 3, β = 0.0011, p <= 0.01). This implies that for the same RFM metrics values the
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households with higher pcs.2 score will be spending higher during the response period. To be more
precise a one standard deviation increases in the pcs.2 increases the sales by 6%. However, the
main effect of the vcs.2 on the sales during the response period is not significant (model 3, β =
0.073, p > 0.1).
The effect of a promotional campaign on the sales is significantly moderated by the features
of the spending and velocity paths of the households. For instance, on estimating the average
marginal effect (AME) of the campaign on sales for households with low (3rd quartile) and high
(1st quartile) of both pcs.2 and vcs.2 we find that: a) for households with low pcs.2 the sales during
the type A campaign in 2% higher than no campaign scenario but for those with high pcs.2 score
the sales are 9% higher in comparison to no campaign period.

While for campaign “B” the

spending is 4% higher for households with low pcs.2 and 10% higher for households with high
pcs.2 in comparison to no promotion period.
Similarly, for households with low vcs.2 the spending during type “A” campaign is 2%
higher but for those with high vcs.2 the spending is 9% higher than the normal. In campaign B the
households with low vcs.2 would spend 5% more than normal but those with high vcs.2 would
spending 10% more than normal. Hence, after controlling for RFM and another customer,
campaign, and store related variables the spending and visits path features provide useful
information about the household response to direct promotions.
2.3.6 Moderating Effect of Purchase Paths on Response to Store and Campaign
Interventions
Table 6 shows how the features associated with the spending and visits paths impact the effect of
RFM and other campaign interventions. We find that sales of the households with increasing visits
trend (higher vcs.2) significantly impact the effect of the RFM on the store sales.
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Table 7 Model Summary Statistics 2

CAMP_A (base NC)
CAMP_B (base NC)
Campaign Before (CBEF)
% Fav. Coupons (FACV)
Total Campaigns (TCAMP)
Total Coupons (COUP)
Loyalty Discount (LDISC)
End-of-Aisle (DISP)
Weekly Mailer (MAIL)
Age (AGE)
Income (INCOME)
Married (MARRIED)
Number of Kids (NUMKIDS)
Time in Loyalty Program
(TIME)
Campaign Duration (CPER)
Recency (REC)
Frequency (FREQ)
Monetary (MON)
Spending Path Feature (pcs.2)
Visits Path Feature (vcs.2)
REC#pcs.2
REC#vcs.2
FREQ#pcs.2
FREQ#vcs.2
MON#pcs.2
MON#vcs.2
CBEF#pcs.2
CBEF#vcs.2
TCAMP#pcs.2
TCAMP#vcs.2
N
AIC
BIC

Model 6
Weighted
0.056
0.081
0.029***
0.0045**
0.011
-0.012***
0.027***
0.014***
0.12***
0.0026***
0.00064***
0.031*
-0.022***

Model 7
Weighted
0.060
0.084
0.030***
0.0045**
0.011
-0.012***
0.027***
0.014***
0.12***
0.0027***
0.00064***
0.029*
-0.022***

Model 8
Weighted
0.054
0.075
0.030***
0.0045**
0.013
-0.012***
0.027***
0.014***
0.12***
0.0026***
0.00066***
0.028*
-0.022***

Model 9
Weighted
0.052
0.073
0.030***
0.0045**
0.013
-0.012***
0.028***
0.014***
0.12***
0.0026***
0.00063***
0.029*
-0.022***

Model 10
Weighted
0.052
0.073
0.030***
0.0045**
0.014
-0.012***
0.028***
0.014***
0.12***
0.0027***
0.00065***
0.026
-0.021***

-0.004***
0.16***
-0.022
0.020***
0.010***
0.0010***
0.037
0.00017
0.061*

-0.004***
0.16***
-0.057**
0.019***
0.010***
0.0026**
0.31***

-0.004***
0.16***
-0.063**
0.019***
0.010***
0.0019***
0.16**

-0.004***
0.16***
-0.069**
0.018***
0.010***
0.00089***
0.022

-0.004***
0.16***
-0.069**
0.018***
0.010***
0.00091***
0.00061

-0.000089
-0.018*
-0.0000058
-0.0021***
0.000041
0.021*

4547
30257.4
30398.7

4547
30312.0
30453.3

4547
30303.9
30445.2

4547
30325.4
30466.7

0.000081
0.066***
4547
30319.5
30460.8

For instance, for the same value of the frequency of visits the household with increasing
trend would spend lower during the response period possibly due to higher inventory of products
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before the response period. Prior studies have also documented that prior inventory prior to the
promotion as the result of frequent visits or higher monetary spending prior to the promotion can
reduce the overall spending during the promotion (Johnson et al. 2013; Dreze et al. 2004).
The purchase path of the household also moderates the effect of number of prior direct
promotions (CBEF) and total campaigns (TCAMP) during the response period. For instance, the
main effect of the prior campaigns on spending is significant and positive but the effect if higher
for the household showing growth in the store visits over time. Similarly, the effect of simultaneous
direct promotions is also higher for households showing growth in the store visits over time. The
growth in store visits indicates higher customer engagement with the store possible due to
satisfaction with retailer’s services, store environment and convenience. Table 7 below shows the
effect of the campaign and store related factors on the spending during the response period.
Table 8 Model Summary Statistics 3

CAMP_A (base NC)
CAMP_B (base NC)
Campaign Before (CBEF)
% Fav. Coupons (FACV)
Total Campaigns (ALLC)
Total Coupons (COUP)
Loyalty Discount (LDISC)
End-of-Aisle (DISP)
Weekly Mailer (MAIL)
Age (AGE)
Income (INCOME)
Married (MARRIED)
Number of Kids (NUMKIDS)
Time in Loyalty Program
(TIME)
Campaign Duration (CPER)
Recency (REC)
Frequency (FREQ)
Monetary (MON)

Model 11
Weighted
0.054
0.076
0.029***
0.0045**
0.012
-0.012***
0.028***
0.014***
0.12***
0.0027***
0.00064***
0.028*
-0.021***

Model 12
Weighted
0.051
0.070
0.030***
0.0045**
0.013
-0.012***
0.027***
0.014***
0.12***
0.0027***
0.00065***
0.025
-0.020***

Model 13
Weighted
0.053
0.079
0.028***
0.0045**
0.0090
-0.012***
0.025***
0.013***
0.11***
0.0024**
0.00066***
0.030*
-0.021***

Model 14
Weighted
0.051
0.081
0.029***
0.0044**
0.010
-0.011***
0.025***
0.013***
0.11***
0.0023**
0.00067***
0.033**
-0.021***

Model 15
Weighted
0.053
0.077
0.029***
0.0045**
0.011
-0.012***
0.028***
0.014***
0.12***
0.0027***
0.00066***
0.027
-0.021***

-0.0041***
0.16***
-0.068**
0.018***
0.010***

-0.0041***
0.16***
-0.068**
0.018***
0.010***

-0.0040***
0.16***
-0.054*
0.020***
0.010***

-0.0042***
0.16***
-0.047
0.021***
0.010***

-0.0040***
0.16***
-0.067**
0.018***
0.010***
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Table 9 Model Summary Statistics 3 continued
Spending Path Feature (pcs.2)
Visits Path Feature (vcs.2)
FAVC#pcs.2
FAVC#vcs.2
COUP#pcs.2
COUP#vcs.2
DISP#pcs.2
DISP#vcs.2
MAIL#pcs.2
MAIL#vcs.2
INCOME#pcs.2
INCOME#vcs.2
N
AIC
BIC

0.0010***
0.043
0.000004
0.0039

0.00100***
-0.00092

0.0021
0.65*

0.0023
0.91*

0.0013***
-0.025

0.00001
0.014***
-0.00006
-0.031*
-0.00006
-0.042*

4547
30336.4
30477.6

4547
30317.9
30459.2

4547
30182.6
30323.9

4547
30112.2
30253.4

-0.000004
0.0016**
4547
30328.9
30470.2

The main effect of number of coupons (after controlling for favorite coupons) in the direct
promotions on spending is negative but is less negative for households showing increasing store
visits prior to the promotion. However, the positive effect of household’s favorite items with endof-aisle display (DISP) decreases for those with increasing visits at the store over time. The
households with frequent visits to the store are possibly aware of the item locations, and therefore
they may be indifferent to quick access to the favorite items on the aisle. Overall, from our
moderation analysis, we find that information in the household’s visits path may be key in
determining the response to variation store and campaign interventions. Next, we try to understand
the improvement in the predictions that can be derived from the use of information in the spending
path
2.3.7 Predicting Campaign Sales
In our data sample, the 798 households are targeted with 24 direct promotion campaigns
over a period of two years. In this study, we extract the household purchase path (spending and
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visits path) features to understanding their explanatory power over traditional RFM metrics used
by the retailers. Next, we compare the predictive capability of the models utilizing RFM only vs.
RFM + purchase path features associated with a household to estimate sales during the direct
promotion. Our model evaluation strategy consists of training the model on 23 campaigns and
using left over campaign as the holdout test set. We also compare the performance of the models
trained with and without the propensity score weights. The use of IPTW weights controls for
nonrandom assignments and reduces bias in the coefficient estimates of the regression models.
Table 10 Prediction Errors (Hold Out Campaign)

Mean Squared Error
Mean Squared Error (-3)

RFM
Un-Weighted
50559
54597

RFM
Weighted
50393
54501

RFM + Purchase
Paths
Un-Weighted
48686
49551

RFM +
Purchase Paths
Weighted
48482
49397

From the above table 8, the predictive models incorporating RFM and purchase path
information in the form of pcs.2 and vcs.2 have lesser prediction error. Also, accounting for nonrandom assignment using the IPTW weights also improved the sales prediction on the holdout a
sample. We also predict the sales during a direct promotion using information until three weeks
before the promotion and here also we obtain the similar results with a weighted model with RFM
and purchase path information predicting with higher accuracy.
2.3.8 Simulation Experiment
We perform a simulation experiment to compare the performance of models using the
purchase path information and the RFM metrics information in predicting the response to direct
promotions. We generate a synthetic customer purchase data and vary the randomness in the
consumption rate of the customers and evaluated the model fit and hold our predictions using
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information in the purchase path and the RFM metrics. The objective of the experiment is to show
that utilizing the disaggregated information in the spending and visits path of the customer would
always explain and predict more variations in the customer data in comparison to the disaggregated
RFM variables. The data generation function for customer expenditure over time is based on the
customer inventory model (CIM) proposed by Blatterberg et al. (1981).
We simulate the weekly expenditure of 1000 customers having optimal order quantity (𝑄0𝑖 )
and consumption rate (𝐶𝑖 ) between the purchase cycles. The duration between two successive
purchases (made when product inventory at home is zero or below the consumption rate) is termed
as purchase cycle. For each of these 1000 customers we, randomly sample a base value of 𝑄0𝑖 and
consumption rate 𝐶𝑖 uniformly between 1 and 1000. The demand for a product during the direct
promotion is assumed to depend on the product inventory at home during time of the the
promotion. The customer responds to the promotion by purchasing quantity equivalent to the
difference between 𝑄0𝑖 and product inventory at home (Breiter and Huhzermeier 2014). As an
example, if 𝑄0𝑖 associated with a customer is 10 units and 𝐶𝑖 is 5 units per week and customer
purchases 10 units of the product in the current week (w) then the next purchase is assumed to be
after two (w+2) weeks (the product inventory becomes zero after two weeks at 𝐶𝑖 = 5 units).
However, if a direct promotion is scheduled after one (w+1) week, then the customer is expected
to replenish its stock of the product at home by stockpiling 5 units (max capacity (10) – inventory
at home (5)) at w+1.
To induce randomness in the spending of the customer, we allow the base consumption
rate 𝐶𝑖 between the purchase cycles to deviate from the base value by a factor ‘r’ (varies from 0%
to 100% of the base consumption rate) such that the consumption 𝐶𝑖𝑝 between the purchase cycle
is is a random draw from a normal distribution with mean 𝐶𝑖 and standard deviation r*𝐶𝑖 . A direct
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promotion is randomly introduced in the customer’s spending path and the response is predicted
using the model utilizing spending path curves and RFM measures from the expenditure data. The
dependent variable of interest (response to direct promotion / units purchased during promotion)
is equivalent to the difference between the 𝑄0𝑖 and the product inventory during the week of
promotion. We utilize information in 10 weeks of prior spending and visits path information of
800 customers to train the model and use the remaining 200 customers as the holdout sample for
predictions.

Variations Explained By RFM and FDA (Traning Set)
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Figure 13 Adj. R Squared vs Randomness

Figure 13 above compares the variations explained by the linear model using the
information only from purchase paths versus the same from the aggregated RFM measures on the
training dataset. It can be observed that when there is less randomness in the dataset the Adj. R
Squared values are approximately the same for the two models. However, as the randomness in
the data increases the explained variation decreases for models with both types of information.
However, the models utilizing spending path information perform significantly better than those
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with only RFM information with increasing randomness. This observation highlights the
explanatory power of using the information in the entire purchase paths of the customers than
using the information only in the aggregated metrics such as RFM. Further, the MAPE of
predictions (figure 14 above) for the customers in the holdout dataset are lesser for the models
utilizing information in the spending paths of the customers in comparison to model with only
RFM variables across the various level of randomness in the customer data.
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Figure 14 MAPE RFM vs FDA Approach

Consistent with the earlier analysis the models with the spending path incorporates only
90% of the variations explained in the disaggregated purchase history. Further, our simulations
confirm that the optimal 𝜆𝑓 from the first stage the model leads to best out of sample predictions
across all degrees of randomness in the customer data. The far superior performance (low MAPE)
for increasing randomness in customer data demonstrates the ability of the purchase path features
to capture trends in consumer purchases. The functional model learns from the patterns in the entire
history of store expenditure and visits which is not possible from the aggregated data measures
such as RFM. The complete R script for simulation experiment in available in Appendix B.
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2.4 Discussion and Conclusion
The success of direct marketing campaigns relies on the accuracy of models used to predict
promotional response. Due to limited promotional budgets and an effort to reduce waste caused
by unredeemed promotions, marketers strive to target only those households with a high
probability of promotional response. This study examines the relationship between entire purchase
path (spending and visits path) of households before receiving a mass or customized promotion
and the household’s total expenditures at the retailer during the promotional period.
We utilize twenty weeks of household store-level spending and visits data before exposure
to a direct retailer promotion and use key features from this purchase path as predictor variables
of a household’s spending during the promotional period. The contribution of this study can be
summarized as follows: (1) we propose a flexible, semi-parametric functional data approach to
identify purchase path features from a household’s spending history, (2) we compare the RFM and
purchase path feature and explain extra information obtained from purchase paths, (3) we provide
new managerial insights on purchase path that significantly explain a household’s total spending
during customized and mass promotions, (4) we provide a parsimonious model that adapts to
randomness in the presence of sparse and noisy spending information, (4) we develop a method to
help marketing managers determine the total spending of targeted households well in advance of
(at least four weeks prior to) the start of a direct promotion.
The results of this study suggest that essential information in a household’s purchase path
provides information that is more useful for predicting spending during a promotional period than
RFM, household demographics and loyalty card promotional variables. As such, the characteristics
of a household’s spending path can explain why a given household responds more favorably to a
specific type of direct promotion, as well as predict those that will do so in the future. For example,
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we find that households with increasing trend in their spending and visits before the promotion
spend more during both types of promotions. This is perhaps because increasing spending and
store visits over time indicates satisfaction and convenience with shopping at the store. The
aggregated information in the monetary spending (M) and frequency of visits (F) could not capture
the nuances of spending and visits variations over time that can be captured using entire purchase
path information.
We also find that patterns in household’s store visit moderates the relationships between
other campaign and store related variables. For instance, two households with similar prior
campaign exposure or similar number favorite coupons in the campaign the one with increasing
visits over time would spend significantly higher during the direct promotion. Our analysis is
robust to potential selection bias as we control for this bias using IPTW weights and use Weighted
Least Squared (WLS) regression to estimate the parameters of interest. We indeed found that the
assignment of households to the treatment groups to be biased and un weighted models lead to
biased estimates of the model coefficients. The predictive accuracy of sales during the promotions
is also significantly higher for models incorporating RFM and purchase path features than the
models with only RFM and other demographic information. For all predictive models under
consideration, the models that account for the weighted models perform significantly better than
unweighted models.
We also conducted a simulation experiment to understand the performance of the proposed
FDA framework in a controlled environment with varying randomness in the households’
consumption rate. We find that the representation of the spending path curves (determined by a
roughness penalty) fitted on the household data positively improves out-of-sample predictions.
Therefore, the data-driven approach adapts to the variations in the sparse household data at the
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disposal of the managers for building marketing response models. The results of the simulation
show that the performance of the functional approach remains consistently better than the model
with accumulated RFM data.
Although this paper provides many insights for managers that utilize direct promotions,
the study is not without limitations. First, we were unable to control for household purchases in
other distribution channels that might affect spending at the focal retailer during the promotional
period. While less than 1% of total grocery sales in the US occurred online during the period of
analysis (2005-07), future research must integrate purchasing data from multiple channels to
provide a more comprehensive understanding of a household’s spending path.
Second, although we adjusted for potential selection bias by using a propensity score
matching procedure, a randomized controlled experiment would be helpful in complementing our
empirical investigation.
Third, we selected 20 weeks prior spending history of the households, and in some case,
they were targeted with multiple promotions during the response period. Although, we control for
multiple promotions by using it as a control in our explanatory model the future research must
develop methods to disentangle and estimate the impact of simultaneous promotional efforts on a
household.
Finally, our findings are context specific in that we investigate household spending at a
grocery retailer. However, the two-stage functional data approach proposed in this study is
exploratory and does not a priori assume patterns in the data that impact the response variable.
Hence, it can easily be generalized to other predictive scenarios involving longitudinal data and
can adapt to variations in that data to give the best predictive outcomes. Given these strengths, the
approach has been applied to the context of online auctions (Jank and Shmueli 2006), virtual stock
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markets (Foutz and Jank 2010), and product diffusion (Sood et al. 2009). However, the breadth
of its applications is endless, and future studies could apply this approach to other types of
longitudinal data and similar relationships, such as the relationship between browsing history and
response to online advertisements or brand switching, to name a few.
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CHAPTER 3: MODELING PHYSICIANS’ PRESCRIPTION CHOICES
AND THEIR RESPONSE TO DETAILING IN THE AGE OF INTERNET
3.1 Introduction and Motivation

Physicians invest in information search, analysis and learning to provide the best treatment
for their patients, (Janakiraman et al., 2008); they accumulate knowledge about available drugs
and match them to the individual needs of patients (Smith 1996). However, the alternative drugs
available and the information from an ever-increasing number of clinical trials and medical
breakthroughs complicates the prescription decision and reduces the likelihood of a tailor-made
treatment for patients.
Prior studies have found significant variation in the prescription patterns for physicians in
the same diagnostic situation (Joyce et al. 2011). The unavailability of required information or the
higher cost of gathering information, can lead to doctors prescribing suboptimal drugs to their
patients. Physicians resort to habitual prescribing from an armamentarium (mostly popular or
highly detailed) to different patients to minimize overall risk due to incomplete information. The
tendency of the physicians to avoid risks by prescribing the popular drug may lead to suboptimal
outcomes for the patients. However, with increasing availability of health information sources and
proactive involvement of the patient’s in the prescription decision making the consideration set for
a physician to increase and make them more selective in their decision making.
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The ability of a physician to discriminate between drug alternatives is affected by
information gathering and processing costs. Pharmaceutical detailing is a timesaving source of
drug-related information for physicians but is often considered to be biased and associated with
increased inertia in prescription patterns (Erdem and Sun 2001, Janakiraman et al. 2008).
However, increasing internet penetration and computers has paved way for easy access, storage
and exchange of health information and guidance. A postal survey of general practice physicians
in the United Kingdom (UK) found that 53% used computers for accessing electronic medical
databases while 83% used internet to acquire clinical information (Davies, 2007). Computer-based
decision support tools (i.e., Desk Reference in Epstein and Ketcham, 2014) offer verified drugrelated information while also reducing the marginal cost of acquiring patient information. The
extent to which drug and patient information are incorporated into physician decision processes
may alter the prescription outcome.
Despite growing evidence that access to internet influences decision making (Hastings and
Weinstein, 2008) and patients involvement in prescription choice, few studies have looked at how
technology diffusion has impacted the prescribing behavior of physicians. Instead, the relationship
between IT and prescription choice has mostly been inferred from self-reported measures of drug
choice under controlled environments (Epstein and Ketcham, 2014). Although this approach
allows for testing of moderation hypotheses, it fails to capture the actual decision choices after
controlling for dynamic variations in the information stock from detailing of a specific drug and
its competitors.
Furthermore, the use of cross-sectional data makes the identification of causal effects more
challenging. The pharmaceutical industry and government agencies regularly conduct drug trials
and post-marketing surveillance to test the efficacy of available drugs under different conditions.
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In 2012 alone, pharmaceutical companies in the United States invested more than $27 billion in
marketing activities of which $24 billion alone on detailing physicians and over $3 billion in directto-consumer (DTC) advertising (Pharma Marketing News, 2013). The DTC advertising accounts
for around 10% of total advertising spending in the US and is not allowed in the United Kingdom.
Pharmaceutical detailing is a timesaving source of information for physicians as pharmaceutical
sales representatives personally visit primary care physicians, inform them on the outcomes of
recent clinical studies, and remind them about specific drug information.
However, the literature on the impact of detailing on the demand for prescription drugs
suggests an intricate relationship. The heterogeneity in prescribing behavior has been attributed to
intrinsic characteristics of doctors (Janakiraman et al. 2008), drug efficacy (Venkataraman and
Stremersch, 2007) and advertising content (Kappe and Stremersch, 2016). The use of aggregated
sales or prescription data in most studies also excludes decision variables for modeling individual
prescription choice. On the other hand, there is some evidence of variation in prescription across
geographical regions (Timmermans and Mauck 2005), but most of studies do not consider
heterogeneity in prescribing due to spatial variation. Finally, a significant omission in the literature
to date and one, which is the core of our analyses, is the relationship between increasing internet
penetration on prescribing decisions and the resulting response to pharmaceutical detailing.
This knowledge gap is vital as ever-increasing healthcare expenditure coupled with the
increase in longevity in developed countries is attracting stricter scrutiny of physician prescribing
decisions, and it is estimated that the UK National Health Service (NHS) wastes about £2.5 billion
each year on preventable errors mostly related to prescription medication (Torjesen, 2014).
Moreover, as multinational pharmaceutical firms look to expand activities in less developed
markets an understanding of the regional disparity in IT penetration and the resulting impact on
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detailing elasticity could inform resource allocation decisions. Therefore, this study aims to answer
the following research questions:
1. Is increasing internet penetration influencing physician’s prescription behavior? If so, then
how?
2. How does internet usage impact the influence of prior prescriptions and drug popularity on
the physician’s prescription choice?
3. Can spatial variation in the internet penetration explain heterogeneity in physician’s
response to pharmaceutical detailing?
The study combines longitudinal data on individual physician prescription choices;
detailing of drug alternatives to the individual physician and variations in regional demographics
over time to address the research questions. The primary data comprises of 32,177 prescription
choices and 7286 detailing meetings of a sample of 135 general physicians, serving approximately
500,000 people enrolled in the NHS1, distributed across ten geographical regions of the UK
between the years 1997-2006. The dataset also contains detailed information on physician’s
practice size, experience, patient diagnosis and drug type. We augment this data with information
regarding internet penetration, general patient profile and information related from regional
variations in health markets from British Household Panel Survey (BHPS).
The longitudinal nature of the data and significant regional variation in IT diffusion during
the observation period allows us to identify the impact of increasing IT on prescribing decisions2.
The choice of the time horizon also compares favorably with the established literature in

1

The estimate of the total number of people enrolled in the system during the observational period under
consideration is based on the summaries presented in Hawe (2009).
2
It is also important to notice that during this period of the practice e-detailing had not started and a similar study
conducted today would be subject to confounds which would make the effects we study more difficult to identify
and isolate.
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prescribing inertia (Jankiraman et al. 2008; Stern and Trajtenberg, 1998) the impact of detailing
(Ching and Ishihara, 2012) and the general literature studying effects of IT diffusion on firm
productivity and society (see Greenstein, 2010 for an excellent review). Finally, and importantly,
regulatory changes during these years allow us to derive a quasi-exogenous design and explore the
effect of the endogenous detailing efforts of the manufacturers. Section 5 describes the model
identification strategy in detail.
Our empirical work is based on well-established notions rooted in Expectancy-Value
Theory (EVT) which proposes that physicians assign a value to various drug attributes given the
patient diagnosis and subsequently prescribe the drug with maximum utility. We enrich this notion
using literature on the cost-reducing effect of IT and theories of informational influence to
understand the impact of IT on prescribing decisions and detailing effectiveness.
The essay is organized as follows; in Section 2 we describe the prescribing process from
the theoretical lens of EVT. Next, we identify the information processing costs associated with
drug decision-making and their impact on inertia in prescribing behavior. We also discuss the role
of internet in reducing prescribing costs and detailing utility. Section 4 describes the market
characteristics and the data. Section 5 discusses the analytical approach including the empirical
strategy to address endogeneity. The results, managerial implications, and their transportability are
discussed in sections 6.

3.2 Drug Prescription Process
The drug prescription process is complicated: it involves patient diagnostic information,
drug alternatives, their attributes and the respective utility values associated with those attributes.
We examine the physician prescription decision using the theoretical framework of the
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expectancy-value theory (Chinburapa et al. 1993), which proposes that physicians follow a linear
and additive compensatory decision process for choosing the optimal drug for a patient. This rule
links the attributes of the relevant drug as well as the patient diagnosis and prior medical history
to the medical outcome. Given a set of alternative drugs, each characterized by a set of attributes,
the drug with highest overall evaluation is chosen for the prescription. The drug attributes are
determined by the patient's medical condition, prior history, and other environmental factors.
These attributes are related to issues such as side effects, withdrawal symptoms and sensitivity of
the drug to other medications.
The choice of compensatory decision process is dependent on the task complexity or other
environmental factors related to the physician. The complexity of a prescription task is directly
proportional to the number of drug alternatives available and the number of drugs attributes to
process based on patient’s characteristics (e.g. side effect and medical history). Similarly, the
motivation of the physician to provide the best-fit drug encourages more analytical and careful
decision-making where physicians refrain from utilizing a subset of the drug information. In this
study, we assume that physicians are rational decision makers and will prescribe the optimal drug
to their patients.
Another stream of research in marketing and information systems explain prescription
choices as the outcome of the physician's beliefs about the effectiveness, side effects, patient's
characteristics, and feedback (Chintagunta et al. 2012; Narayanan and Manchanda 2009). These
studies argue that physicians often make decisions with incomplete information and so, marketing
activities or patient feedback serve as important drivers for determining the drug prescription. In
some instances, physicians' risk attitude and forward-looking behavior also influence drug choice
(Ching and Ishihara 2010).
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3.2.1 Prescription Inertia and its Consequences
Persistence in physician prescription behavior is an aspect of concern to the health care and
marketing organizations. This refers to the tendency of a physician to prescribe the same drug to
different patients to avoid search or information gathering cost (Janakiraman et al. 2008). It is
important to notice that the repeat prescription of a drug to the same patient due to the continuation
of the therapy is excluded from this definition of persistence. Persistence in prescribing is a
consequence of the high information processing costs in either compensatory or non-compensatory
decision-making adopted by the physician. Also, referred as habitual prescribing, persistence in
drug choice is clinically suboptimal and economically wasteful for patients in a drug class with
heterogeneous interactions between the drugs and patient conditions (Stern & Trajtenberg, 1998).
A higher number of medication errors stem from habitual prescribing of similar drugs to different
patients, for example, some anti-depressants drugs are sensitive to a variety of patient conditions
and ongoing medications and have different withdrawal symptoms. Habitual prescribing also
hinders diffusion of innovation and competition in the pharmaceutical market (Stern and
Trajtenberg, 1998).
Persistence in prescribing may vary across the physicians, and it has been reported that
physicians remain persistent on 55% of prescription occasions with only about 6% of physicians
switching states from persistent to non-persistent (Janakiraman et al. 2008). The evidence of
persistence in prescribing behavior is well documented in prior studies in health care (Mizik and
Jacobson 2004, Coscelli 2000; Hellerstein 1998) and the concentration of the armamentarium is
also linked to the observable drug characteristics and marketing efforts (Stern & Trajtenberg,
1998). Drugs which are detailed more or those with higher market shares are consistently
prescribed to mitigate risks arising from incomplete information. Physician characteristics such as
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experience, insufficient diagnosis skills or the lack of incentive to gather information, influence
the capability of a physician to assess alternatives and encourages habitual prescribing. A key point
to be noted here is that physicians may not prescribe a different drug on each patient visit. They
can persist with a drug if two patients with similar unobservable characteristics and diagnosis visit.
3.2.2 Physician Information Seeking Behavior and the Role of Internet
Information processing from different sources (e.g. patient, peers, pharmaceutical
manufacturers) is a key aspect of the prescribing process (Gorman, 1995; Smith 1995). When
selecting a drug, a physician processes information from various sources including the patient
history, diagnosis, and the current portfolio of available drugs that can be administered. The
pharmaceutical industry and government agencies regularly conduct drug trials and postmarketing surveillance to test the efficacy of the available drugs under different conditions and
subsequently inform physicians about them. Irrespective of the distribution channel (online or
offline) the preferred external information sources for a physician include: (1) medical journals,
(2) sales representatives (3) peers and area opinion leaders and (4) patient feedback.
The urgency of the patient’s problem, peer pressure to adhere to medical norms and belief
that an optimal solution exists encourages physicians to seek information from external sources
(Robson & Robinson, 2015; Gorman and Helmand, 1995). Practice and geographical variables
such as job role and environment, and health service location also drive information needs of
physicians. For example, specialists seek more in-depth information and are more likely to
research existing literature than the generalists. Arroll et. al (2002) and Davies, (2007) found that
50% of the physicians seek answers to questions related to medical facts (e.g. side effects) while
30% search for a medical opinion on patient management.
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The growth of communication technologies such as broadband, email, and the availability
of electronic databases has provided access to new sources of information. The internet has become
a useful tool for the dissemination of medical research evidence and guidance. For example, the
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) uses the internet to enable access to fulltext documents and guidelines via electronic databases. Several studies have evaluated the internet
as an information resource for doctors, and a survey of British general practitioners found that 82%
used the internet and around 53% used electronic biomedical databases for their information needs
(Davies, 2007). The online health portals such as Health Web, MedicinePlus.gov are nowadays
used by the physicians and patients alike to gather health-related information.
3.2.3 IT and Prescribing Decision
The key to optimal drug prescribing and variety seeking on the part of the physician is their
capability to compare all possible drug alternatives based on the attributes that determine patient
outcomes. Alternative drugs, time pressure and limited information processing capability lead to
decision-making costs for optimal prescribing. In general, four distinct types of cost
(communication, cognition, coordination, and capability) hinder the tailoring of medication at the
patient level (Frank and Zeckhauser, 2007). These costs are closely related to the cost of thinking
from the choice literature (Shugan, 1980).
Communication costs are related to the challenges faced by physicians in eliciting
information from patients for determining optimal therapy. The patients often visit with the models
of illness, agendas, and expectations from the treatment (Kleinman 1987). The physicians face the
task of persuading the patients to accept the proposed medication or accurately gathering additional
medical information. On the other side of the consultation the freely available medical information
from the internet, educates patients on drug efficacy and side effects and encourages them to
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express their preference in the prescription decision. The coordination costs are related to the
exchange of medical information between patient and physician for monitoring medical progress
or sharing drug-related information.
The third cost associated with a prescription decision process is the cost of learning about
a newer or less accustomed therapy. General practitioners prescribe drugs for a variety of patient
conditions, but they may have gained substantial experience in some selected therapies. Hence,
when prescribing a newer class of treatment, the physician may need to gather information from
some external sources.
Finally, in drug prescribing the cognition costs are related to the effort a physician expends
to discriminate between various alternatives and diagnostic information. This cost is directly
proportional to the number of attributes (m) across all possible drugs (n) being compared (Figure
1). Under a linear compensatory process, the decision-making costs monotonically increase with
the number of comparisons. The higher cognitive effort in the rational calculation of the utility of
various alternatives, also leads the physicians to resort to satisficing behavior (Simon 1958) or the
use of heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, Frank 1987) such as the prescription of a most
recently prescribed or most popular drug which may in fact be a suboptimal choice for the specific
patient.
The capabilities of a physician to manage these four costs determine the level of
personalization based on patient symptoms and possible preferences. The physician may choose
not to personalize treatments when the returns from customizing are lower than the cognitive
efforts of a highly customized prescription. To minimize the cost of thinking, doctors select a
minimal number of attributes (m) across the drugs for comparison. They often resort to established
norms or rule of thumbs when there is: a) uncertainty over patient diagnosis and their
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responsiveness to various treatments, b) treatment is of short duration c) when the possible
treatments are comparable d) high information gathering cost (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974;
Frank 1987; Frank & Zeckhauser, 2007).
The advances in information technology and the use of computers and digital media since
the early 1990s have influenced the medical practice and have significantly reduced the four costs
described earlier. Before the adoption of computers, patient records were recorded on paper and
stored at a central location contributing to higher information search and cost. The nature of
computer data entry today facilitates efficient updating of patient records, problems and
prescription lists. Providers often allow patients to view information such as medication lists,
problem lists, allergies, lab results and other customized materials through secure patient portals.
The availability of online information streamlines doctor-patient communication, reduces errors
and empowers patients to play an active role in decision-making.
The diffusion of internet over time has reduced decision costs for obtaining clinical
information and guidance through email services, electronic databases, and the Internet.
Healthcare authorities across the globe are taking steps to coordinate clinical research through ITenabled networks. In the context of the prescription decision costs described earlier, diffusion of
IT lowers learning costs by providing access to codified knowledge, while, digital communication
channels (enabled through IT) reduce the costs of communicating with patients and coordinating
with other physicians. IT facilitates efficient updating of patient records, problems and prescription
lists thus contributing to lower cognition cost. The engagement of patients in the prescription
process is also enhanced by the availability of medication lists, contra-indications, lab results and
other customized materials through secure patient portals.

71

The use of computers and the emergence of online information sources and information
sharing using digital media have reduced 4 C's linked to the prescription decision process. The
popularity of online resources amongst the physicians to seek patient related information (e.g.
diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis) or drug has been documented (Davis 2007). Online forums
provide outlets for physicians and patients alike to learn about clinical findings and experiences of
other patients sharing the same treatments. Healthcare authorities across the nations are also taking
steps to support the coordination of clinical and research activities in regional or inter-regional
networks of institutions. While information search and thinking, costs encourage physicians to
stick to their prior prescriptions or most popular drug, the cost reducing effect of internet use
encourages self-learning and patient engagement in the prescribing process. Therefore, the internet
diffusion undermines the impact of drug popularity and prescribing inertia on the prescription
choices.
H1(a): The effect of drug popularity on prescription choice will reduce with the increase in
internet penetration.
H1(b): The physician’s prescribing inertia will reduce with increase in the internet
penetration
Previous studies in marketing and psychology have also found that the ability to process
complex information encourages exploratory behavior amongst the customer and influences brand
choice (Houston and Mednick 1963, Pearson and Maddi 1966). In addition, the influence of
technology-enabled social learning on a choice decision is studied in detail in the context of
sponsored health-plan options (Sorensen, 2006) or retirement plan choice (Duflo and Saez, 2003).
Other studies in public health literature have provided evidence of similarity between drug
prescriptions of physicians within the same hospital or neighborhood (Epstein and Nicholson,
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2009) and the negative impact of health information technology adoption by hospitals on adverse
reaction (Roberts et al., 2010). However, we are not aware of any study that empirically
investigated the effect of technology use on the drug choices of the physicians.

3.3 Pharmaceutical Detailing as an Information Source

Pharmaceutical detailing is a convenient source of information for physicians as
pharmaceutical sales representatives (PSRs) share materials related to drug effectiveness, side
effects, and prescription guidelines. The impact of detailing on prescribing behavior is a matter of
concern for the policymakers as it has the potential to influence patient wellbeing and healthcare
costs. The proponents of detailing argue that timely and detailed information improves prescription
choices while opponents argue that a persuasive sales pitch of PSRs may be biased and can mislead
physicians into prescribing expensive branded drugs.
At the brand level, Azoulay (2002) found that detailing could turn minute differences in
the efficacy of the drugs to a considerable advantage in the market. Similarly, Berndt et al. (1995)
showed that the sales elasticity is largest for detailing when compared to direct mailings and Direct
to Consumer (DTC) advertising. Other studies observe that the impact of detailing is determined
by the product life cycle (Narayan et al. 2004), actual effectiveness and side effects (Venkataraman
and Stremersch, 2007) and the information content of the detail (Kappe and Stremersch, 2016).
Some scholars propose a different effect of detailing due to the lack of expertise of PSRs, with
physicians failing to give much weight to messages, accepting details for personal benefit (e.g., to
get free samples) instead. Some studies have found a negative (Parsons and Abeele, 1981) or nonsignificant associations between detailing and demand for branded drugs (Rosenthal et al., 2003).
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Other studies found that the association between detailing and drug choice is modest and strong
effects may actually be due to unobserved selection bias or data aggregation (Mizik and Jacobson,
2004; Datta and Dave, 2016). For a recent review of these issues see Wieringa et al. (2015).
Regulations also impact detailing effectiveness, for example, in the UK (the context of our
study) there are strict rules on hospitality and gifts to physicians from PSRs, the provision of free
samples to is prohibited, and there is no direct to consumer advertising (DTCA) which is explicitly
banned in the UK.
Thus, from the theoretical lens of EVT, PSR visits are expected to result in physicians
assigning higher values to certain drug attributes leading to the increased overall utility of the
detailed drug. Meetings would update a physician’s information set regarding the drug and counter
memory decay to reduce cognition cost on a prescription occasion. Sales meetings build awareness
of the brand, which is higher for more recent exposures and lower for older ones (Broadbent, S.
1979). Therefore, PSR visits serve as a peripheral cue and salient stimuli to influence prescription
choice, and so our next hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 2(a): Pharmaceutical detailing would positively influence the prescribing of the
detailed drug.
Physicians choose between alternative drugs with distinct modes of action and side effects
for the same clinical outcome. The marketing of these competing alternatives can negatively
impact the demand for a focal drug via substitution while, but it can also positively impact demand
by increasing overall category sales (Fischer and Albers, 2010).
Competing pharmaceutical firms do not coordinate and have limited information about
competitive detailing. These constraints have also restricted research aiming to understand the
impact of competitor detailing efforts on prescription choices. However, there is evidence of a
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negative substitution effect on the demand for a drug in a co-marketing arrangement (Ching and
Ishihara, 2012). In the case of combination therapies, detailing of other prescription drugs can
increase demand through complementing a focal drug or decrease the demand due to substitution
(Liu et al., 2015). Using aggregated sales data at the monthly level Fischer and Albers (2010)
found that for some brands the substitution effect is greater than the market expansion effect while
for some others the opposite appears to be true.
Ignoring competitor detailing efforts has a negligible impact on the elasticity estimates of
drug detailing (Mizik and Jacobson, 2004) but including it would reduce potential omitted variable
bias. The complexity related to treating nervous system diseases, the absence of any groundbreaking competitive molecule and restrictions on DTC advertising implies limited market
expansion effects of competing drugs in our study context. However, the willingness of a physician
to entertain detailing of competing drugs indicates their desire to look for substitutes or explore
other options. Therefore, competitor-detailing efforts would disrupt the relative evaluation of a
focal drug by influencing the utility values associated with the attributes of the competing drugs.
Hence, our next hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 2(b): The pharmaceutical detailing of competing drugs would reduce prescribing of
the focal drug.
3.3.1 The Impact of the Internet on Response to Pharmaceutical Detailing

The utility of an information source such as detailing depends on its perceived value,
importance, timeliness, and accessibility (Robson and Robinson, 2015). Physicians tend to give
precedence and more weight to information that is likely to produce useful task resolution in a
choice-based decision process (Feldman and Lynch, 1988). Theories of informational influence
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also suggest that individuals are inclined to accept information received from others if they assess
it as useful evidence about reality (Sussman and Siegal, 2003).
Hence, PSR credibility as perceived by physicians will determine the impact of detailing
on subsequent prescription decisions (Briñol and Petty, 2009). However, a study conducted by
IBM (2006) found that 76% of the doctors perceive the information they receive from sales
meetings to be biased and only 50% believe that they take place at a convenient time. Since
physicians seek timely and reliable clinical information; they continuously keep looking for
alternative information sources.
The increasing diffusion of internet is opening an array of new and reliable information
channels for evidence-based medical information. Technologies such as electronic health records,
biometric and telemedicine devices and wired (and wireless) internet devices assist in the
maintenance and exchange of health information. User-generated information arising from sources
such as discussion forums, online portals, and peer groups should be less biased than from
individuals such as PSRs. For instance, signaling theory suggests that aggregate opinions from
multiple sources are less likely to be less biased than a single contributor’s opinion (Donath, 2007).
The influence of internet in increasing productivity at the individual and organizational
level has also been studied: IT significantly increases labor productivity (Doms,1997), economic
growth (Oliner and Sichel, 2000), business creation (Fairlie, 2006) and academic, scientific
productivity (Ding et al., 2010). IT helps expedite business decisions and encourages entrepreneurs
to invest by timely information about regulations, tax codes and competitors (Fairlie, 2006).
Access to IT in hospitals not only provides equipment, services, and information but also enables
knowledge workers to collaborate and increase their productivity (Menon et al., 2000).
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Therefore, the information cost-reducing and productivity-enhancing effects of internet
may mitigate the impact of detailing on prescribing through two cognitive mechanisms. First, a
physician may give higher relative weighting to information from other credible channels such as
medical databases, peers, and patients for updating their drug-related information set. They may
also choose to scrutinize information from PSRs before incorporating it into their decisions, which
in turn would undermine the persuasive effect of detailing. On the other hand, the efficiency gains
as the result of the IT allow the physician to consider more alternative drugs and their attributes
when prescribing. Hence, we expect that the extent of IT diffusion will moderate the impact of
detailing.
Hypothesis 3(a): The positive impact of pharmaceutical detailing on the prescription of the
detailed drug will decrease with increasing internet diffusion.
Similarly, detailing of competing for drugs influences the utility of alternatives, and
increasing IT diffusion should reduce the relative weight of information from PSRs about
competing drugs and so our final hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 3(b): The negative impact of competitive detailing on the prescription of a focal drug
will decrease with increasing internet diffusion.
In our hypotheses, we assume that patients are heterogeneous in their medical
characteristics and no single drug that suits all patients in the treatment category. This is a
reasonable assumption, especially for drugs in the antidepressant category due to their interactions
with other medicines and patient characteristics. Figure 14 below shows the conceptual model
summarizing the mechanism through which IT influences prescription behavior. To minimize the
information matching costs doctors, select a minimal number of attributes (m) across the available
drug alternatives (n) for comparison leading to smaller personalization while the cost-reducing
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effect of IT promotes higher personalization. Physicians also gain greater insight into a patient’s
diagnosis from electronic channels to evaluate drugs across a higher number of attributes (m).
Clinical information from credible online sources is given more weight and so updates the utility
values of drug attributes reducing the influence of pharmaceutical detailing.

Figure 15 Conceptual Model

3.4 Methodology
3.4.1 Data and Market Description
The study employs a unique longitudinal dataset of the prescription choices of 135 general
practice physicians in the anti-depressant drug category. The dataset is obtained from a market
research firm and comprises the daily record of new prescription decisions, detailing visits and
some patient-specific information for a duration of ten years (1997-2006) in the United Kingdom
(UK). The physician practices are located across ten Government Office Region (GOR) of the
United Kingdom. Table X1 in the below details the distribution of physicians, prescriptions and
detailing across the GORs.
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Table 11 Distribution of the Physicians
Region
East Midlands
East of England
London
North West
Scotland
South East
South West
West Midlands
Yorkshire &Humber
Wales
Total

Physicians Prescriptions
12
10
15
14
13
21
14
10
20
06
135

3191
2113
1928
3867
3914
6453
2692
1967
4229
1703
32177

Detailing
355
456
760
863
916
1233
608
291
1492
291
7486

Total Practice
Size
34
69
55
59
42
65
60
21
53
23
481

Average
Practice Size
3.7
5.3
3.4
3.6
7
5
5.4
3.5
4.07
3.8
4.36

We consider the 32177 prescription choices and 7486 detailing visits for 135 physicians in
the anti-depressant category. The mean size of practice of these physicians is 4.46 implying that
we consider practices with around 481 active physicians. During the observation period, each
practice had an average of about five thousand registered patients.
The drugs in the anti-depressant category are used to treat different types of depression and
other nervous system related disorders. The Anatomical Therapeutic Classification (ATC) code
for the drugs in this category is “N6A”. Most anti-depressant drugs available in the market interact
with other medications and are sensitive to patient medical conditions, and Desai et al. (2013)
estimate that around 4.1 % of the medication errors involve antidepressant drugs. The prescription
protocol for anti-depressants requires physicians to actively engage with their patients to elicit past
medical information for an optimal outcome.
Each prescription written by the physicians in our dataset is linked to the patient’s diagnosis
through an ICD (International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision) code. The code indicates
the diagnosis as perceived by the physician and the prescription choice is linked to it. Apparently,
the antidepressants were prescribed for 47 distinct diagnosis codes but the ICD code “9” comprised
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the major chunk (~93.2%) of the prescriptions in the category. Therefore, we control for patient
diagnosis in the study by considering the prescriptions by the physicians in the ICD code “9”. The
optimal prescription should vary across the patient diagnosis and not controlling for it in the
empirical analysis would lead under estimation of the persistence in the drug prescribing. Further,
we only consider new or ‘switch’ prescriptions written by the physicians as these represent active
decisions as opposed to repeat medication for returning patients.
During the observation period, the physicians prescribed a total of 33 different drugs for
the treatment of depression. Around 6 of the prescribed 33 drugs entered the market for the first
time between the observation period 1997-2006.
Because of a large number of possible alternatives, we restrict our analysis to branded drugs
with at least 5% of the market share in prescription choices during the observation period
consistent with other prior studies in the domain (Ching and Ishihara 2012; Jankiraman et al. 2006).
This selection criterion yields five molecules: Venlafaxine(VENL), Fluoxetine(FLO3), Paroxetine
(PARO), Citalopram (CITA) and Sertraline (SERT). These five drugs collectively contribute to
approximately 70% of all prescriptions in the antidepressant category for the diagnosis code “9”
in the sample. All five drugs under consideration belong of a newer generation of the antidepressants also known as Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor (SSRI) anti-depressants. These
drugs are used to treat similar medical conditions and are similar in their mode of action. They do
however differ in their efficacies, side effects and propensity to interact with patient’s
characteristics and prior medications. For instance, VENL is linked with higher rates of nausea
and vomiting than other SSRIs while SERT is associated with increased risk of diarrhea. PARO is
associated with higher rates of sexual dysfunction.
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The SSRI’s function by regulating the absorption of the neurotransmitter Serotonin in the
brain and are selective in their impact on the other neurotransmitters. These drugs are also effective
in disorders related to anxiety such as Bulimia, obsessive-compulsive disorder and panic disorder.
SSRI’s also interact with other anti-depressants and are not recommended for patients with kidney
or liver disease. For instance, the consumption of SSRI class of drugs along with products that
cause drowsiness including alcohol, drugs for sleep anxiety, muscle relaxants and narcotic pain
relievers increase the risk of Serotonin toxicity. Use of common prescription drugs such as Asprin
with SSRI’s can increase the risk of bleeding (Labos et al., 2011)
Table 12 Drug Distributions
Drug
Fluoxetine (FLOU)
Paroxetine (PARO)
Citalopram (CITA)
Venlafaxine(VENL)
Sertraline (SERT)
Total

Category
SSRI
SSRI
SSRI
SSRI
SSRI

Share
35.8
22.9
20.0
10.2
9.17
100%

Prescriptions
11548
7936
6450
3291
2952
32177

Detailing
1047
1573
1140
2104
1622
7486

Year of Introduction
1987
1992
1989
1993
1990

The sample considers 32177 prescription choices and 7486 detailing visits for five SSRI
type anti-depressants. All five prescription drugs were available in the market at least three years
prior to beginning of the observations period and were prescribed and detailed at least once by the
physicians under consideration. The figures 15 and 16 below shows the progression of detailing
visits and prescriptions over time for the physicians under consideration. Both VENL and SERT
were under patent protection during the observation period and the first generic versions of the
these drugs were approved in the year 2011 and 2007 respectively. It should be noted that the
generic variants of the branded drugs are chemically equivalent and do not significantly differ in
terms of their mode of action and side effects FDA.gov (2016).
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Figure 16 Prescriptions Over Time

Figure 17 Detailing Over Time
However, PARO, FLOR and CITA were not under the patent protection and the first
generic versions of these drugs were approved in 2003,2001 and 2004 respectively. The effect of
patent expiration on the detailing of these drugs can be observed from figure 16 as their detailing
was considerably reduced towards the end of the sample period. We utilize these variations in the
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pharmaceutical detailing to identify its effect on the prescription choices of the physicians and test
our proposed hypothesis.
The cost of providing health care services to the residents of the United Kingdom is borne
by the National Health Services (NHS), which contracts virtually all GPs. Patients under 18,
pregnant women and those over 60 receive their medication free of charge. The rest of the
population pay a fixed ‘prescription charge’ which bears no relationship to the cost of the
medication to the NHS, it is estimated that about 80% of the total UK drug costs is dispensed
without charge to the patient. By the end of 1999 only 11.6% of the UK population had some form
of private medical insurance cover (Euro.who.int, 2016), but this is almost exclusively linked to
surgical procedures and largely associated with employment benefits. The centralized nature of
the health care system compels pharmaceutical companies to communicate directly with NHS for
approval of new drugs and the conditions under which they can be prescribed. (Magrini & Font,
2007; Gov.uk, 2014).
The advertising of prescription only drugs directly to the consumers (patients) is strictly
regulated under the advertising regulation act of 1994. Unlike the US, pharmaceutical companies
are not permitted to advertise directly on broadcast media, but they may under certain conditions
to answer specific questions, provide facts and reference materials without making any product
claims or reference to the brand.
We assume that physicians have a sense of professional integrity and they take rational
decisions to avoid malpractice suits or any harm to their reputation (Narayanan et al. 2005).
Specifically, the British standards and ethics guidance clearly states “when prescribing medicines,

83

you must ensure that your prescribing is appropriate and responsible and in the patient’s, best
interests” (Gov.uk, 20173).
The physician’s professional network and patient profile in the region may contribute to
heterogeneity in the prescription choices. To account for variations in regional demographics,
patient profile, insured population we utilize data from British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)
(Bardasi et al. 2012; University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research, 2014).
BHPS is a nationally representative annual survey of approximately 10,000 households. The BHPS
is also the source of data on the internet penetration in the prescription region of the physician.
In the British health care system, National Health Service (NHS) is providing care to the
citizens since 1948 irrespective of their ability to pay for it. NHS is supported by the Department
of Health and the local health authorities based on their assessment allocate budget and funds to
NHS affiliated trusts, hospitals, and primary care agencies. Except for the cases of emergencies,
the referral of a General Practitioner (GP) is required for hospital treatments.
Since, the beginning of the 21st century NHS has been taking several steps to modernize
its IT infrastructure and provide more efficient services to the citizens of UK. For instance, the
creation of a special NHS information authority was undertaken in 1999 for developing
infrastructure for electronic medical records, health information services and electronic healthcare
delivery. As a part of this expansion plan, NHS initiated several services including:
1. NHS Direct: Established in 1998, NHS Direct provided 24-hour health inquiry and information
services over internet and telephone. The objective of this service was to increase the patient
participation in care.

3

See also https://www.medicalcouncil.ie/Existing-Registrants-/Complaints/Guide-to-ProfessionalConduct-and-Ethics-for-Registered-Medical-Practitioners.pdf
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2. National Electronic Library for Health (NELH): The NELH service was stated by NHS in 1998
for health care professionals and public. This service connected various health information sources
such as Chrocrane library and medical research review services such as the Data Base of Abstract
of Reviews of Effectiveness (DARE). The objective of this service was to promote evidence-based
medicine and physician learning.
3. NHSnet : NHSnet is the secure wide area network for the NHS. This service was available
during the observation period form the British Telecom and Cable and Wireless Communications.
NHSnet incorporates secure and dedicated NHS network to provide health information service like
internet. Some of the services that were available on NHSnet included: electronic mail service,
NHSweb for health professionals, IT support services for medical practices, secure internet
connection and website hosting, online patient appointments.
The IT initiatives of the NHS were supported by the increasing number of internet users
across various regions of UK. These initiatives promoted evidence-based medicine, innovation
adoption and quality control.

3.4.3 Measures
The response variable of interest in our study is the prescription choice (𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑡 ) of the drug
‘d’ by the physician ‘i’ at occasion ‘t’ of a new patient visit with a certain diagnosis (depression in
our study). The physicians can prescribe any of the five prescription drugs (FLOU, PARO, CITA,
SERT, and VENL) with a maximum prescription utility on a patient visit. Since, all the four
prescription drugs belong to the same SSRI category none is inferior or superior to other. Instead,
physicians experience and patient requirements would determine the most appropriate drug on a
prescription occasion.
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The other independent variables are the stock of detailing for the drug d (𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇)), the
stock of detailing for the competing drugs d’ (𝑓(𝐶𝐷𝐸𝑇)), learning from prior prescription
experience of drug d 𝑓(LER), internet penetration in the physician’s region (INTERNET) and
prescription choice on most recent prior patient visit (𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑡−1 ). The 𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇), 𝑓(𝐶𝐷𝐸𝑇) and
𝑓(LER) are time-variant variables and differ across physicians and drug on each prescription
occasion ‘t’. The persuasive effect of promotional tools such as detailing depends not only on the
current detailing efforts but also on the past detailing. Prior studies in marketing and advertising
utilized a stock variable to reflect memory decay and carryover effect from the prior marketing
actions (Berndt et al. 1997; Gonul et al. 2001; Janakiraman et al. 2008). Consistent with these prior
studies, we operationalize the detailing stock of the focal drug 𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇) as:
𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇𝑑𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇𝑑𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝐷𝐸𝑇𝑑𝑖𝑤 + 𝜆𝑑 𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇𝑑𝑖(𝑤−1) ) --- 7
In the above equation, 𝐷𝐸𝑇𝑑𝑖𝑤 is the number of detailing meetings in the week ‘w’ prior
to the prescription occasion ‘t’, 𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇𝑑𝑖(𝑤−1) ) is the stock of detailing in w-1 and 𝜆𝑑 is the decay
factor to incorporate memory decay. We fix the discount rate, 𝜆𝑑 = 0.98 consistent with prior
studies in this domain with the weekly observed data (Gönül and Carter 2009). As a robustness
check we also considered the alternative two alternative discount rates, 0.90, 0.95 and found no
significant changes in the estimates of the model parameters. Similarly, the stock of competitive
detailing and drug learning for a physician is computed implicitly, given the discounting rate, by
recursive discounting (equation 3). We match the prescription occasion ‘t’ and the prescription
week ‘w’ to operationalize the stock of detailing on the instances when the drugs are prescribed
by the physician.
Prior prescription experience of a drug informs the physicians about the drug effectiveness
and this learning is also incorporated in the physician decision making. Like detailing the impact
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of prior experience on the prescription choices would also be impacted by the memory decay. He
we operationalize the learning from past prescription experience as a stock function similar to
detailing stock such that:
𝑓(𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑑𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝑓(𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑑𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑑𝑖𝑤 + 𝜆𝑑 𝑓(𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑑𝑖(𝑤−1) ) - 8
We also consider the impact of peers’ choices on the prescription decision by controlling
for the popularity (POP) of the prescription drug. The popularity of the drug is a dynamically
measured variable (evaluated on each patient’s visit) and is equivalent to the percentage of times
the prescription drug is prescribed by other physicians in past six months to the patients with
depression. We experiment with past four months and one year as well but did not observe
significant variations in the model estimates. It should be noted that 𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇), 𝑓(𝐶𝐷𝐸𝑇), 𝑓(𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑁)
and POP are drug alternative specific variables and would differ in their values for each drug
during a prescription occasion.
The level of internet diffusion (INTERNET) in the physician practice is measured as the
percentage of households with internet connection in the GOR of the physician. INTERNET is a
time and geography dependent variable (varies with the GOR of the physician) and is measured
annually. This measure is more reliable than the country-level annually measured ICT variables
such as internet use as they are aggregated across the regions. The variation in INTERNET across
the GORs of UK also allows for the identification of the effect of IT on persistence in prescribing
and the impact of detailing even after controlling for time trend (Wooldridge, 2008).
Another key variable of interest is previous prescription (𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑡−1 ) written by the physician.
It is a binary variable and is equal to 1 if the physician prescribed the drug d under consideration
on the most recent visit by a patient presenting with depression. Prior studies have found a strong
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positive impact of prior prescription choices on the subsequent prescriptions (Janakiraman et al.
2008; Mizik & Jacobson, 2004; Coscelli 2003).

Internet Penetration Over Time
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Figure 18 Internet Penetration Over Time
We expect a negative interaction effect in our empirical analysis implying that the higher
diffusion of the internet reduces the tendency for prescribing the previously specified drug ‘d’ at
the next patient visit. The introduction of a lagged dependent variable controls for autocorrelation
in the series arising due to inertia and persistence in prescription behavior.
We control for a variety of confounding variables which might impact the prescription of
a drug by the physician. First, the patient’s condition on a prescription occasion would determine
the drug choice therefore, we only consider prescriptions written to ‘new’ patients diagnosed with
depression (ICD-9). Second, we control for the age of the patient visiting the physician
(PAT_AGE). PAT_AGE is a time dependent variable measured at each prescription occasion ‘t’.
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SSRI anti-depressants such as Prozac are generally not recommended for elderly patients due to
their side effects and longer withdrawal protocols (Buffam & Buffum, 2005). Due to unavailability
of data or missing observations we are unable to control for other patient specific factors. However,
to account for a general patient profile and preference in the physician’s practice region we control
for percentage of individuals with private insurance (INSU) and their average income (INCOM).
The variables INSU, INCOME are annually measured at the GOR level and are obtained from
BHPS. The tension to adhere to the private insurers’ guidelines may impact the prescription choice
of a drug while the variations in INCOME may make one drug more preferable than another for a
patient.
Further, we also control for market characteristics such as the number of new prescription
drugs (NEW_D) for treating depression released during the prescription year. The availability of
new drugs may impact the relative utility of prescribing a prescription drug. We also control for
the patent expiration (PAT_EXP) of the prescription drug under consideration using a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if the patent of the drug under consideration is expired or 0
otherwise. The prescription trend is controlled by using a time trend variable represented as the
year of prescription.
We also control for time invariant physician variables such as sex (SEX), year of
qualification (YOQ), size of practice (SOP) to account for heterogeneity in choices due to
physician characteristics. The older physicians may prefer to prescribe a drug based on an older
formula and may be reluctant to adopt new innovations due to knowledge accumulation over time.
Drug preferences may develop differently for physicians in smaller practices compared to those in
a larger practice due to network effects and the disparity in patients visiting large practices with
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the availability of information from colleagues influences physician’s persistence, drug choice as
well as detailing visits.
Table 11 below summarizes the alternative specific variables over observations period and
across all GORs under consideration. The alternative specific variables vary for each of the five
prescription alternatives on a prescription occasion.
Table 13 Alternative Specific Variables
Drug

Variable

Minimum

Mean

Maximum

SD

CITA
Detailing Stock (f(DET))

0

1.361436

14.02303

1.798181

Competitive Detailing Stock (f(CDET))

0

9.553868

63.95528

8.845459

Learning Stock (f(LER))

0

9.94372

74.68462

13.17023

Prior Prescription (PP)

0

0.19918

1

0.39939

Popularity (POP)

0

0.190688

0.477778

0.117513

Detailing Stock (f(DET))

0

1.30171

17.71856

1.811654

Competitive Detailing Stock (f(CDET))

0

9.613594

65.11171

9.030859

Learning Stock (f(LER))

0

19.8172

88.62664

17.72986

Prior Prescription (PP)

0

0.357336

1

0.479222

Popularity (POP)

0

0.358583

0.455006

0.034214

Detailing Stock (f(DET))

0

1.861123

16.4229

1.966272

Competitive Detailing Stock (f(CDET))

0

9.054181

67.40995

8.783061

Learning Stock (f(LER))

0

14.40099

120.2243

15.781

Prior Prescription (PP)

0

0.246108

1

0.430749

Popularity (POP)

0

0.254393

0.409091

0.104822

Detailing Stock (f(DET))

0

1.945365

15.24806

2.2577

Competitive Detailing Stock (f(CDET))

0

8.969939

59.16053

8.460762

Learning Stock (f(LER))

0

4.865118

54.02011

7.291484

Prior Prescription (PP)

0

0.091463

1

0.288271

Popularity (POP)

0

0.093763

0.235294

0.01971

Detailing Stock (f(DET))

0

1.973041

13.19042

2.082636

Competitive Detailing Stock (f(CDET))

0

8.942263

62.36562

8.521542

Learning Stock (f(LER))

0

5.312027

36.28799

6.006011

Prior Prescription (PP)

0

0.101719

1

0.302283

Popularity (POP)

0

0.101951

0.163951

0.027438

FLOU

PARO

SERT

VENL
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The table 12 below summarizes the case specific variables averaged across ten years and
all government office regions. These variables do not vary across the drug alternatives on a
prescription occasion.
Table 14 Case Specific Variables
Variables
New Drugs (NEW_D)
Prescription Size (PR_SIZE)
Qualification Date (QUAL_DATE)
Doctor Sex (DR_SEX)
Income (INCOM)
Private Insurance (INSU)
Internet (INTERNET)

Minimum
0
1
1940
0
833.3103
0.0097051
0.19

Mean
Maximum SD
0.618485
3 1.034441
4.422786
7 1.88933
1971.302
1990 7.225068
0.79563
1 0.403247
1131.212 1716.716 179.6667
0.039624 0.095065 0.014955
0.4669
0.77
0.156

3.4.4 Model Specification and Estimation
To address our research questions and test the underlying hypotheses we first model
prescription decision of a physician using the probabilistic choice modeling approach (McFadden,
1981). This approach is suitable in our study’s context as physicians maximize the utility of the
prescription drug for the patients after considering the attributes of available alternatives and
patient’s characteristics. For instance, let 𝐶𝑝𝑖 = 1,2,.. N be the prescription choice of a physician
‘p’ (where N is the number of prescription alternatives) on a prescription occasion ‘i’. Let 𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑖 be
the unobserved utility associated with prescribing drug ‘d’ for the physician ‘p’. Under the
assumption of the utility maximization the physician would prescribe the drug ‘d’ if 𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑖 > 𝑈𝑝𝑑′𝑖
for all d’ != d. The choice modeling literature assumes this unobserved utility to be a combination
of a systematic (𝑆𝑝𝑑𝑖 ) and a stochastic component such that,
𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑖 = 𝑆𝑝𝑑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑝𝑑𝑖 --- 9
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Therefore, on the prescription occasion the probability that the physician chooses the drug
‘d’ (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑝𝑑𝑖 ~ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝐶𝑝𝑑𝑖 = 1) would be determined by the comparison of the unobserved
utilities of the drud ‘d’ and other alternatives (Pr(𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑖 > 𝑈𝑝𝑑′𝑖 ). We model the systematic
component of the unobserved utility of prescribing a drug using a combined Conditional Logit
Model framework where we account to alternative specific variability as well as the variations in
the individual characteristics of the decision maker. Hence, we model the systematic component
of the utility as:
𝑆𝑝𝑑𝑖 = 𝛽 ∗ 𝐷𝑟𝑢𝑔 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑑𝑖 + 𝛼𝑑 *𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑀𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑝𝑖 --- 10

In the above equation, the 𝐷𝑟𝑢𝑔 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠 includes: 𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇), 𝑓(𝐶𝐷𝐸𝑇), 𝑓(𝐿𝐸𝑅),
PROIR and POP as these vary for each alternative on a prescription occasion. While, the
𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑀𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 controls for NEW_D, YEAR, PAT_AGE, PR_SIZE,
QUAL_DATE, DR_SEX, INCOME and INSU.
Assuming the stochastic component follows a standard Type-I maximum extreme value
distribution with a variance equivalent to (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑝𝑑𝑖 2 / 6) and satisfies the independence assumption
(Expectation [𝜀𝑝𝑑𝑖 , 𝜀𝑝𝑑′𝑖 ] = 0 for any d ≠ d’ then 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑝𝑑𝑖 can be represented as:
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑝𝑑𝑖 =∑𝑁

𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽∗𝐷𝑟𝑢𝑔 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑑𝑖 + 𝛼𝑑 ∗𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑀𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑝𝑖

𝑘=1 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽∗𝐷𝑟𝑢𝑔 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑘𝑖

+ 𝛼𝑘 ∗𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑀𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑝𝑖 )

--- 11

Suppose, 𝐶𝑝𝑑𝑖 =1 if the drug ‘d’ is prescribed by the physician on the prescription occasion and 0
otherwise. Then the likelihood for obtaining the observed data can be expressed as:
£=

𝐶

𝑝

𝑝𝑑𝑖
𝑖
𝑁
∏𝑀
𝑝=1 ∏𝑖=1 ∏𝑑=1 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑝𝑑𝑖 --- 12

To get parameter estimates we maximize the log likelihood using the following expression
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𝑝

𝑖
𝑁
∑𝑀
𝑝=1 ∑𝑖=1 ∑𝑑=1 𝐶𝑝𝑑𝑖 𝑙𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑝𝑑𝑖 --- 13

In the above equations, M refers to the total number of physicians, 𝑖 𝑝 is the total number
of prescription occasion for the physician p and N is the number of drug alternatives. In the model
the marginal effect of the change in an attribute ‘l’ associated with the alternative ‘k’ 𝑋𝑙𝑘 is
represented by:
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑑
𝜕𝑋𝑙𝑘

= 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑑 (r-𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑘 )𝛽𝑙 --- 14

where r = 1 if d = k and 0 otherwise
The marginal effect of an attribute is a function of the values all other attributes hence the
average marginal effect can be evaluated as.
𝑝

𝑖
𝑀
𝑝
∑𝑀
𝑝=1 ∑𝑖=1 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑝𝑑𝑖 (𝑟 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑝𝑘𝑖 )𝛽𝑙 / ∑𝑝=1 𝑖 --- 15

3.4.5 Accounting for Endogeneity in Detailing
Detailing visits are planned to maximize the return from marketing investment. Sales
representatives may detail physicians, who are more responsive to detailing or easily approachable,
more frequently than less accessible doctors. Therefore, detailing visits are not assigned randomly
but are planned at the individual level based on certain unobserved physician-specific
characteristics. It is possible that some unobserved variables (represented by stochastic component
𝜀) are correlated with the detailing 𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇) which can contribute to unbiased estimates of the
effects of detailing on prescription choice. The approach posits that the endogenous 𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇) can
be represented as a function of the variables entering the utility function (Drug Attributes and
Decision Maker Characteristics) and instruments that do not directly affect the prescription utility
but do impact the prescription choice.
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𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇)𝑝𝑑𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐷𝑟𝑢𝑔 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑑𝑖 , 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑀𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑝𝑑𝑖 , 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑝𝑑𝑖 ,
€𝑝𝑑𝑖 ) --- 16
The approach assumes that the stochastic terms 𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑖 and 𝜀𝑝𝑑𝑖 are independent of
𝐷𝑟𝑢𝑔 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑑𝑖 and 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑀𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑝𝑑𝑖 and 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑝𝑑𝑖 but are not
independent of each other. The feasibility of the approach depends on the recovered €𝑝𝑑𝑖 which
enters the second stage utility equation to control for the unobserved bias. The stochastic
component is represented in the terms of the control function (CF) as:
𝜀𝑝𝑑𝑖 = CF(€𝑝𝑑𝑖 ,δ) + 𝜀̃𝑝𝑑𝑖 --- 17
Where CF(€𝑝𝑑𝑖 ,δ) is the control function with the parameters δ. The CF is approximated
to be linear in the parameters δ such that CF(€𝑝𝑑𝑖 ,δ) = δ*€𝑝𝑑𝑖 . Therefore, the utility of prescribing
a drug on a prescription occasion can be written as
𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑖 = 𝑆𝑝𝑑𝑖 + δ*€𝑝𝑑𝑖 + 𝜀̃𝑝𝑑𝑖 --- 18
The utility function parameters in the presence of endogeneity using the control function
approach are estimated in two steps: First, the endogenous detailing variable 𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇)𝑝𝑑𝑖 is
regressed with observed Drug Attributes, Decision Maker Characteristics and instruments. The
residuals from this first are then used to estimate the control function. In the second stage, the
choice model is estimated using the observed variables and control functions or residuals obtained
from the first stage.
The CF approach has also been shown to be useful for addressing endogeneity concerns
for discrete choice models (Petrin and Train, 2010). The approach relies on similar identification
conditions as 2SLS which require valid instruments for the endogenous variables. However, CF is
preferred to 2SLS for estimating average partial effects (APE) in the nonlinear models and in the
presence of endogenous interaction terms (𝑒. 𝑔. 𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇)𝑥𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑇) (Wooldridge, 2008).
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To establish a causal link and we explore exogenous variable that impact 𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇) but does
not affect the utility of prescribing a drug and therefore choice ( 𝐶𝑝𝑑𝑖 ) on a prescription occasion.
We identify that the patent expiration (PAT_EXP) of certain prescription drugs (FLOU, PARO,
CITA) in the sample are adversely impacting the detailing for those prescription drugs. The
availability of a generic variant of the prescription drug should not impact the utility of the drug
for the physicians or patients in a centralized health care system as that of UK. Since, NHS is the
key buyer of the prescription drugs it is safe to assume that patients and physicians are indifferent
to generic or branded prescription choices. In addition, we model the choice of a particular
molecule by the physician irrespective of its branded or generic variant.
The detailing plan is formulated annually or semi-annually, and pharmaceutical
representatives aggressively target top decile of the drug-prescribing physicians (Manchanda et al.
2004) therefore we also use the relative share of detailing (SHARE_DET) of a drug received by
the physicians in past six months. This comparative measure is irrelevant to the physicians but
represents the importance of the physician for the drug manufacturers. For the model with the
endogenous interaction term (𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇)𝑥𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑇) we also include the interaction instrument
(INTERNET x SHARE_DET, INTERNETxPAT_EXP) in our first stage equation (Wooldridge,
2008).
To summarize, in the first stage we run a pooled OLS regression of 𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇) with all
̂
exogenous variables (including instruments) and obtain the residuals €
𝑝𝑑𝑖 . In the second stage, we
run the combined conditional logit model for prescription utility using exogenous variables
̂
(excluding instruments) and €
𝑝𝑑𝑖 . The presence of endogeneity in the equation can be tested
̂
through a t-test on the coefficient of €
𝑝𝑑𝑖 . We adjust for two step estimation procedure and serial
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correlation by calculating bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the physician level
(Wooldridge, 2008).

3.6 Results

The descriptive statistics of the alternative specific numerical variables in our study are
reported in table 11 while table 12 describes the case specific variables which are constant across
alternatives during each prescription occasion for a physician.
Table 13-16 presents the results of various conditional logit models to test the proposed
hypothesis in our study. The models 1-4 show the estimates of the main effects of various
explanatory variables under consideration. For each model we have a specification that controls
for endogeneity in detailing of prescription drugs using a control function (CF). The CF variable
is obtained by regressing the endogenous detailing stock on each prescription occasion using all
external variables and the instruments (patent expiration dummy and relative physician’s
prescription share) using OLS regression. The first stage OLS regression results show that the
patent expiration of a prescription drug indeed has a negative impact on its detailing while higher
relative share of a prescription for a physician has a significant positive impact on the detailing
stock of a physician.
Table 15 Conditional Logit Models Statistics 1
VARIABLE

MODEL 1
Coefficient

MODEL 1 (CF)
SE

Coefficient

SE

MODEL 2
Coefficient

MODEL 2(CF)
SE

Coefficient

SE

DETAILING

0.095***

-0.018

0.23***

-0.050

0.097***

-0.018

0.23***

-0.051

LEARNING

0.058***

-0.006

0.054***

-0.006

0.057***

-0.006

0.054***

-0.006

POPULARITY

0.032***

-0.005

0.029***

-0.005

0.029***

-0.005

0.027***

-0.005

-0.14**

-0.055

-0.14**

-0.056

RESIDUALS(CF)
FLOU

4.430

-17.100

8.040

-16.900

4.420

-17.200

8.630

-16.800

PARO

12.800

-20.900

7.140

-21.100

13.500

-21.100

7.940

-21.400
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Table 16 Conditional Logit Models Statistics 1 continued
SERT

0.990

-24.200

-2.500

-24.200

0.890

-24.400

-2.390

-24.40

VENL

-11.100

-15.200

-18.600

-16.100

-11.200

-15.200

-18.500

-16.100

FLOUxPAT_AGE

-0.016***

-0.003

-0.016***

-0.003

-0.016***

-0.003

-0.016***

-0.003

PAROxPAT_AGE

-0.0080**

-0.002

-0.0078**

-0.002

-0.0080**

-0.002

-0.0078**

-0.002

SERTxPAT_AGE

-0.001

-0.003

0.000

-0.003

-0.001

-0.003

0.000

-0.003

VENLxPAT_AGE

-0.0042*

-0.002

-0.0040*

-0.002

-0.0041*

-0.002

-0.004

-0.002

FLOUxNEW_D

0.034

-0.049

0.022

-0.052

0.040

-0.050

0.027

-0.053

PAROxNEW_D

0.074

-0.046

0.050

-0.050

0.078*

-0.046

0.051

-0.051

SERTxNEW_D

0.049

-0.051

0.042

-0.053

0.053

-0.052

0.045

-0.054

VENLxNEW_D

0.054

-0.052

0.041

-0.054

0.058

-0.053

0.044

-0.055

FLOUxYEAR

0.033

-0.027

0.041

-0.028

0.013

-0.032

0.024

-0.033

PAROxYEAR

-0.037

-0.048

-0.067

-0.045

-0.066

-0.050

-0.099**

-0.048

SERTxYEAR

0.021

-0.033

0.011

-0.032

0.017

-0.038

0.008

-0.037

VENLxYEAR

0.026

-0.032

-0.004

-0.030

0.032

-0.031

-0.004

-0.031

FLOUxPR_SIZE

0.048

-0.033

0.044

-0.032

0.047

-0.033

0.043

-0.032

PAROxPR_SIZE

0.028

-0.026

0.024

-0.026

0.026

-0.026

0.020

-0.026

SERTxPR_SIZE

0.048

-0.043

0.049

-0.043

0.049

-0.043

0.050

-0.043

VENLxPR_SIZE

0.021

-0.029

0.016

-0.029

0.022

-0.029

0.016

-0.029

FLOUxQUAL_DATE

-0.002

-0.009

-0.004

-0.009

-0.002

-0.009

-0.004

-0.008

PAROxQUAL_DATE

-0.006

-0.011

-0.003

-0.011

-0.007

-0.011

-0.004

-0.011

SERTxQUAL_DATE

0.000

-0.012

0.001

-0.012

0.000

-0.012

0.001

-0.012

VENLxQUAL_DATE

0.006

-0.008

0.010

-0.008

0.006

-0.008

0.010

-0.008

FLOUxDR_SEX

-0.31***

-0.093

-0.32***

-0.092

-0.31***

-0.092

-0.32***

-0.091

PAROxDR_SEX

-0.19*

-0.110

-0.19*

-0.110

-0.19*

-0.110

-0.18*

-0.110

SERTxDR_SEX

-0.28*

-0.170

-0.30*

-0.170

-0.280

-0.170

-0.30*

-0.170

VENLxDR_SEX

-0.084

-0.140

-0.087

-0.130

-0.083

-0.130

-0.093

-0.130

FLOUxINSU

-0.010

-0.032

0.021

-0.034

PAROxINSU

-0.097***

-0.033

-0.10***

-0.033

SERTxINSU

-0.028

-0.027

-0.021

-0.026

VENLxINSU

0.042

-0.029

0.057*

-0.029

FLOUxINCOME

0.160

-0.390

0.160

-0.380

PAROxINCOME

0.550

-0.350

0.74**

-0.360

SERTxINCOME

-0.130

-0.510

-0.080

-0.510

-0.590

-0.380

-0.440

-0.390

VENLxINCOME
AIC

81044.800

80990.600

80970.600

80917.100

BIC

81354.500

81310.200

81360.100

81316.600

Table 13 above gives the estimated parameter for model 1 and model 2 with and without
endogeneity correction using the control function approach. Model 2 has additional controls in the
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form of regional variables (private insurance – INSU and income -INCOME). The variables that
enter into these models can be classified in to alternative specific (DETAILING, LEARNING
POPULARITY, CF (RESIDUALS)) and case specific (PAT_AGE, DR_SEX, QUAL_DATE,
PR_SIZE, YEAR, INSU and INCOME). As the case specific variables do not vary across the drug
alternatives on each prescription occasion, they are interreacted with the drug alternatives (CITA
being the baseline) for identification. In the conditional logit models the sign of the alternative
specific variables coefficients are directly interpretable and represents the effect of the variable on
the choice probability of the alternatives. However, unlike linear regression the marginal effects
of the variables in the non-linear is a function of other model variables and hence, vary at each
observation. We do a separate Average Marginal Effect (AME) analysis later.
Model 1 shows that the stock of detailing for a drug, its popularity and learning for the
physician have a positive impact on its prescription choice. On correcting for endogeneity due to
the stock of detailing using control function (CF) approach we find that the stock of detailing is
indeed endogenous (residuals significant at p < 0.01, model 2 (CF)) and there are omitted drug
specific characteristics that are correlated with the detailing stock. The models including the
control function residuals fit better (lesser AIC and BIC values) and increases the impact of
detailing by two-fold (β = 0.01 in model 1 vs β = 0.023 in model 1(CF)). The control function
residuals themselves have significant negative coefficients implying that unobserved factors that
determine stock of detailing for a prescription drug negatively influence the prescription choice.
This may imply that drug manufacturers preferably detail physicians who heavily prescribe their
drugs, but they might also be prescribing in other competing drugs which is undermining the
impact of detailing on the prescription choice. From model 2 we also find that variations in the
INSU and INCOME of citizens in the GOR of the physician significantly influence the choice of
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the five alternatives on a prescription occasion. More specifically, we find that in comparison to
CITA (baseline drug) the probability of prescribing PARO differs significantly with changes in
INSU and INCOME.
Table 17 Conditional Logit Model Statistics 2
VARIABLE

Model 3
Coefficient

Model 3 (CF)
SE

Coefficient

SE

Model 4
Coefficient

Model 4(CF)
SE

Coefficient

SE

DETAILING

0.089***

0.016

0.21***

0.045

PRIOR PRESCRIPTION

0.51***

0.031

0.50***

0.031

COMPETITIVE DETAILING

-0.097***

0.018

-0.16***

0.032

LEARNING

0.057***

0.006

0.062***

0.005

0.050***

0.005

0.047***

POPULARITY

0.029***

0.005

0.035***

0.005

0.026***

0.004

0.025***

0.005
0.00
4

FLOU

4.42

17.2

5.08

17.2

3.24

15.3

6.91

14.9

PARO

13.5

21.1

8.32

21.2

12.2

19.2

7.36

19.4

SERT

0.89

24.4

-2.47

24.2

0.0071

22.6

-2.79

22.5

VENL

-11.2

15.2

-17.4

14.8

-11.5

14.0

-17.8

14.7

FLOUxPAT_AGE

-0.016***

0.002

-0.016***

0.002

-0.016***

0.002

-0.016***

0.002

PAROxPAT_AGE

-0.008***

0.002

-0.008***

0.002

-0.008***

0.002

-0.007***

0.002

SERTxPAT_AGE

-0.00052

0.002

-0.00031

0.002

-0.00055

0.002

-0.00035

0.002

VENLxPAT_AGE

-0.0041*

0.002

-0.0039*

0.002

-0.0042*

0.002

-0.0040

0.002

FLOU+xNEW_D

0.040

0.050

-0.0016

0.047

0.038

0.045

0.026

0.047

PAROxNEW_D

0.078*

0.046

0.051

0.043

0.073*

0.042

0.049

0.046

SERTxNEW_D

0.053

0.052

0.024

0.050

0.051

0.048

0.043

0.049

VENLxNEW_D

0.058

0.053

0.025

0.050

0.056

0.049

0.044

0.051

FLOUxYEAR

0.013

0.032

0.061*

0.033

0.011

0.028

0.020

0.029

PAROxYEAR

-0.066

0.050

-0.002

0.050

-0.062

0.044

-0.090**

0.043

SERTxYEAR

0.017

0.038

0.062

0.042

0.012

0.035

0.0048

0.034

VENLxYEAR

0.032

0.031

0.059**

0.030

0.028

0.029

-0.0033

0.028

FLOUxPR_SIZE

0.047

0.033

0.047

0.033

0.044

0.029

0.040

0.028

PAROxPR_SIZE

0.026

0.026

0.034

0.026

0.024

0.023

0.019

SERTxPR_SIZE

0.049

0.043

0.055

0.042

0.043

0.041

0.043

0.023
0.04
0

VENLxPR_SIZE

0.022

0.029

0.022

0.029

0.020

0.027

0.015

0.027

FLOUxQUAL_DATE

-0.001

0.008

-0.002

0.008

-0.001

0.007

-0.003

PAROxQUAL_DATE

-0.006

0.011

-0.004

0.011

-0.006

0.009

-0.003

0.007
0.00
9

SERTxQUAL_DATE

-0.0003

0.012

0.001

0.012

0.0001

0.011

0.002

0.011

VENLxQUAL_DATE

0.005

0.007

0.009

0.007

0.006

0.007

0.009

0.007

FLOUxDR_SEX

-0.31***

0.092

-0.32***

0.093

-0.26***

0.082

-0.28***

0.081

PAROxDR_SEX

-0.19*

0.11

-0.17

0.11

-0.16*

0.098

-0.16*

0.097

SERTxDR_SEX

-0.28

0.17

-0.26

0.17

-0.24

0.16

-0.26*

0.15

VENLxDR_SEX

-0.083

0.13

-0.073

0.13

-0.060

0.12

-0.069

0.12

99

Table 18 Conditional Logit Model Statistics 2 continued
FLOUxINSU

-0.010

0.032

0.011

0.033

-0.011

0.029

0.017

0.031

PAROxINSU

-0.097***

0.033

-0.10***

0.033

-0.087***

0.029

-0.090***

0.029

SERTxINSU

-0.028

0.027

-0.027

0.027

-0.026

0.025

-0.020

0.025

VENLxINSU

0.042

0.029

0.041

0.028

0.041

0.027

0.054**

0.027

FLOUxINCOME

0.16

0.39

0.16

0.40

0.14

0.35

0.14

0.34

PAROxINCOME

0.55

0.35

0.73**

0.35

0.50

0.31

0.66**

0.32

SERTxINCOME

-0.13

0.51

-0.076

0.51

-0.12

0.48

-0.073

0.48

VENLxINCOME

-0.59

0.38

-0.50

0.37

-0.55

0.35

-0.41

0.36

0.061***

0.020

-0.12**

0.049

RESIDUALS
AIC

80970.6

80900.7

79553.5

79514.7

BIC

81360.1

81300.2

79953.1

79924.2

Table 14 above introduces new explanatory variables of competitive detailing stock and
prior prescription choice to Model 2. Model 3 does not include the variable DETAILING due to
perfect collinearity with the COMPETITIVE DETAILING within each case. The effect of
COMPETITIVE DETAILING is significant and negative. This finding is consistent with our
hypothesis 2(b) arguing negative effect of competing detailing efforts on the probability of
prescribing a focal drug. Similarly, on control for prior prescription choice we find that choice of
a drug on previous prescription occasion would have a strong positive significant effect on the
choice probability. Model 4 fits the observed data best as it has the least value of the model
goodness of fit statistics AIC and BIC. Therefore, to test the moderation hypothesis we build upon
the specification of the model 4.
Table 19 Conditional Logit Model Statistics 3
VARIABLES

MODEL 5
Coefficient

MODEL 6
SE

Coefficient

MODEL 7
SE

Coefficient

MODEL 8
SE

Coefficient

SE

DETAILING

0.43***

0.067

0.20***

0.049

0.21***

0.045

LEARNING

0.044***

0.0051

0.050***

0.0050

0.047***

0.0052

0.047***

0.0052

POPULARITY

0.023***

0.0042

0.026***

0.0043

0.039***

0.0093

0.025***

0.0042

PRIOR PRESCRIPTION

0.49***

0.031

0.51***

0.032

0.50***

0.031

0.69***

0.093

DETAILINGxINTERNET

-0.26**

0.13
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Table 20 Conditional Logit Model Statistics 3 continued
COMP. DETAILING
COMP. DETAILING x
INTERNET

-0.18***

0.060

0.24*

0.13

POPULARITYxINTERNET

-0.031*

0.018

PRIOR PRES.xINTERNET

-0.48**

0.20

RESIDUALS (CF)

-0.24***

0.049

0.0002

0.019

-0.12**

0.054

-0.13**

0.050

FLOU

10.6

14.8

3.35

15.3

6.62

14.9

7.18

15.0

PARO

2.44

19.8

12.0

19.8

7.60

19.3

8.01

19.1

SERT

-6.86

22.2

-1.40

22.6

-2.12

22.3

-1.95

22.3

VENL

-23.4

15.3

-10.7

14.1

-17.0

14.8

-17.3

14.7

FLOU#PAT_AGE

-0.016***

0.0026

-0.016***

0.0025

-0.016***

0.0025

-0.016***

0.0025

PARO#PAT_AGE

-0.007***

0.0023

-0.008***

0.0023

-0.008***

0.0023

-0.007***

0.0023

SERT#PAT_AGE

0.000

0.0025

0.000

0.0025

0.000

0.0025

0.000

0.0025

VENL#PAT_AGE

-0.0038

0.0024

-0.0042*

0.0024

-0.0041*

0.0025

-0.0039

0.0024

FLOU#NEW_D

0.014

0.046

0.035

0.045

0.0025

0.047

0.024

0.047

PARO#NEW_D

0.026

0.045

0.069

0.042

0.030

0.044

0.046

0.045

SERT#NEW_D

0.036

0.047

0.045

0.049

0.023

0.048

0.041

0.049

VENL#NEW_D

0.034

0.049

0.053

0.050

0.022

0.049

0.041

0.050

FLOU#YEAR

0.029

0.029

0.010

0.029

0.035

0.028

0.022

0.029

PARO#YEAR

-0.11***

0.041

-0.058

0.044

-0.080*

0.043

-0.091**

0.042

SERT#YEAR

0.0034

0.033

0.013

0.036

-0.012

0.035

0.0015

0.034

VENL#YEAR

-0.020

0.028

0.038

0.028

-0.020

0.029

-0.0081

0.028

FLOU#PR_SIZE

0.038

0.028

0.045

0.029

0.041

0.028

0.039

0.029

PARO#PR_SIZE

0.014

0.023

0.023

0.023

0.021

0.023

0.018

0.023

SERT#PR_SIZE

0.045

0.040

0.042

0.040

0.043

0.040

0.042

0.040

VENL#PR_SIZE

0.012

0.027

0.021

0.027

0.015

0.027

0.014

0.027

FLOU#QUAL_DATE

-0.0051

0.0074

-0.001

0.0077

-0.0032

0.0075

-0.0034

0.0075

PARO#QUAL_DATE

-0.0012

0.0100

-0.006

0.010

-0.0039

0.0097

-0.0040

0.0097

SERT#QUAL_DATE

0.0035

0.011

0.0008

0.011

0.0012

0.011

0.0011

0.011

VENL#QUAL_DATE

0.012

0.0078

0.0056

0.0072

0.0089

0.0075

0.0090

0.0075

FLOU#DR_SEX

-0.29***

0.079

-0.27***

0.082

-0.28***

0.080

-0.28***

0.082

PARO#DR_SEX

-0.16

0.096

-0.16*

0.098

-0.17*

0.096

-0.17*

0.097

SERT#DR_SEX

-0.26*

0.15

-0.24

0.15

-0.26*

0.15

-0.26*

0.15

VENL#DR_SEX

-0.072

0.12

-0.061

0.12

-0.077

0.12

-0.073

0.12

FLOU#INSU

0.039

0.029

-0.014

0.031

0.027

0.030

0.018

0.030

PARO#INSU

-0.094***

0.029

-0.086***

0.029

-0.068**

0.031

-0.087***

0.029

SERT#INSU

-0.015

0.024

-0.025

0.025

-0.0022

0.025

-0.017

0.025

VENL#INSU

0.059**

0.027

0.036

0.027

0.072**

0.030

0.058**

0.027

FLOU#INCOME

0.089

0.33

0.11

0.35

0.22

0.34

0.15

0.34

PARO#INCOME

0.79**

0.31

0.47

0.32

0.65**

0.32

0.66**

0.32

SERT#INCOME

-0.0032

0.48

-0.12

0.48

-0.21

0.50

-0.10

0.48

VENL#INCOME

-0.26

0.36

-0.52

0.34

-0.55

0.38

-0.44

0.36
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Table 21 Conditional Logit Model Statistics 3 continued
AIC

79371.2

79528.9

79485.8

79472.7

BIC

79790.7

79948.5

79905.3

79892.2

Next, we analyze the hypothesis 1(a), 1(b) and 3(a), 3(b) pertaining to moderating effects
of internet on the impact of key explanatory variables. Table 15 above presents the estimates of
conditional logit models with the interaction terms of variables of interest and the internet
diffusion. It can be observed that the inclusion of interaction terms in each model across all four
drugs substantially improves the model fit.
Model 5 in Table 15 accounts for the moderating effect of the internet on response to
detailing. We observe that the impact of detailing on the probability of prescribing a drug
alternative is significantly moderated by the internet diffusion. Although the internet significantly
moderates the impact of detailing on prescription choice the interpretation of the effects in the
nonlinear models is not straightforward (Ai & Norton, 2003). The marginal effect depends on the
values of other model covariates and hence for some combinations, the effect may be positive and
may be negative for others. Therefore, we estimate the average marginal effects (AME) of detailing
at different values of internet diffusion using the margins command in STATA. The procedure
accounts for the relationship between the main effect and the interaction covariates and correctly
estimates the overall effect. Figure 19 below displays the variation in the AME of detailing for an
increasing internet diffusion. It can be observed that with increase in internet diffusion from 20%
(sample minimum) to 70% (sample maximum) the AME of detailing decreases by 26% from 0.068
to 0.050. AME represents the change in the probability of prescribing a drug for a unit change in
the detailing stock.
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Hypothesis 3(b) predicts positive moderating effect of internet on the impact on
competitive detailing on the prescription choice. From model 6 in table 15 we conclude that the
internet significantly moderates the relationship between competitive detailing and prescription
probability. The effect of competitive detailing is reduced by 84% for an increase in internet
diffusion from 20% to 70% hence, our hypothesis 3(b) holds for the sample under investigation.

Prescription Probability
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Figure 19 AME of Detailing
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Figure 20 AME Competitive Detailing
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95% (Upper)

Hypothesis 1(a) predicts that with an increase in internet penetration the effect of drug
popularity on the prescription choice would decrease. From model 7 in table 15 we find that
internet indeed significantly moderates the influence on drug popularity on prescription choice.
The AME of drug popularity on prescription choice decreases by 38% (from 0.0048 to 0.0029) for
an increase in internet penetration from 20% to 70% (Figure 21).

AME of DRUG POPULARITY
0.007
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Figure 21 AME Drug Popularity
In the earlier analysis, the drug popularity is measured as the percentage of times other
physicians in the sample prescribed the reference drug. This formulation does not differentiate
between drug popularity within and outside of the GOR of the physician. As an addition analysis,
we also compare the impact of drug popularity within the GOR of the physicians and outside the
GOR of the physician. Figure 21 below compares the impact of the popularity of a drug within
and outside of the GOR of the physician. It is evident that a 1 percent increase in the drug
popularity in the regions outside the GOR of the physician will have higher impact on the
prescription probability of the drug than a similar rise in prescription probability within the
REGION. The physician’s lookup more to physicians outside their GOR for being competitive in
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the market and prescribing the best drug. However, with an increase in internet penetration the
difference between the impact of the popularity of the drug within and outside the GOR decreases

Prescription Probability

AME of POPULARITY WITHIN GOR (POP1) and OUTSIDE
GOR (POP2)
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Figure 22 AME of Popularity Within and Outside GOR of the Physician

Finally, hypothesis 1(b) predicts that the probability of a physician to persist with the prior
prescription would decrease with an increase in internet penetration. The information cost reducing
and efficiency enhancing effect of internet would reduce satisficing behavior from the physicians
and encourage them to experiment with alternative drugs. The coefficient of the interaction term
PRIOR PRESCRIPTION x INTERNET is indeed significant implying strong moderation effect.
The AME analysis of the relationship finds that the effect prior prescription decreases by 39% for
an increase in INTERNET diffusion from 20% to 70%.
All models have a sample size of 32177 and a cluster size (physician) of 135. We report
the cluster robust standard errors estimated used bootstrapping to account for two step control
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function estimation procedure in the table 13-15. The coefficient estimates for other control
variables remain consistent across various specifications for corrected and uncorrected models.
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Figure 23 AME Prior Prescription

3.6.1 Robustness Tests
In the control function approach, we first regress the suspected endogenous variable
𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇) against the instruments (Drug Patent Expiration and Relative Detailing to a physician)
and other exogenous variables in the second stage using pooled OLS regression and obtain the
residuals (RES) for each ‘i’ and ‘t’. The second stage involves inserting the residuals from the first
stage into the conditional logit models. We test the strength of the instruments used in our study
using the partial F-test on first stage models with and without our exogenous instruments. Table
16 below displays the results of the partial F-test for all model’s specifications used in the study.
For all the models we reject the null that the coefficients associated with the exogenous instruments
is 0. Instead, Chi-square test statistics for all the models is more than 10 indicating that the
instruments are not weak.
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The conditional logit model assumes that all else being equal a physician’s choice between
two drug alternatives (e.g. CITA or PARO) is unaffected by other choices (e.g. PARO) that are
available. This assumption is also referred to as Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
Since, the physicians in general rationally compare two drug alternatives based on the information
they have about them, the presence of other alternatives would possibly not influence the choice
of between any pair of drug alternatives. For instance, it is certainly not possible that introduction
of the drug PARO would make FLO3 preferable over CITA. Since, these drugs are independent
in their composition and outcomes the expansion of alternatives should not impact their relative
odds. However, we test for this assumption in all our model specification using Hausman Test
where we randomly exclude one alternative from the sample and compare the coefficients of the
incomplete model with the complete model (including all drug alternatives). If the IIA assumption
is satisfied, then the coefficients across the two models should not be significantly different.
Hausman test tests the null hypothesis of no difference in the model coefficients for the models
with incomplete and complete data. Table
Table 22 Test for Instruments and IIA
Test
H0: Weak
Instruments
H0 : IIA
Hausman
Test

MODEL 1

MODEL 2

MODEL 3

MODEL 4

MODEL 5

MODEL 6

MODEL 7

MODEL 8

Test
Statistic
P-Val.

78.2

76.42

44.15

76.61

50

71

20.56

68

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Test
Statistic
P-Val.

-36.11

22.36

7.56

8.3

9.32

10.26

10.73

8.55

0.99

0.49

0.99

0.998

0.9989

0.9975

0.99

0.9991

As a robustness check, we also conduct Likelihood Ratio Test (LR test) to ascertain if the
coefficients associated with the interaction terms are significantly different from zero and
significantly adds to the explained variation. We test for the interaction terms of the explanatory
variables of interest in the models 5-8. The null hypothesis of the LR test is that the coefficient of
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the interaction terms is zero. Table 17 below confirms that the internet penetration significantly
moderates the relationship between the explanatory variables of interest and prescription choice
and leads to a better model fit.
Table 23 Likelihood Ratio Test
Model
MODEL 5
MODEL 6
MODEL 7
MODEL 8

DF

AIC

BIC

CHI
(PvaluE)

Observation

LL(NULL)

LL(MODEL)

160885

-51786.9

-39717.7

41

79517.3

79926.83

33.54

160885

-51786.9

-39700.9

42

79485.76

79905.28

0

160,885

-51786.9

-39722.5

41

79526.94

79936.47

157.78

160,885

-51786.9

-39643.6

42

79371.16

79790.68

0

160885

-51786.9

-39736.8

40

79553.53

79953.06

28.58

160885

-51786.9

-39722.5

42

79528.94

79948.46

0

160885

-51786.9

-39715.2

41

79512.37

79921.89

41.64

160885

-51786.9

-39694.4

42

79472.72

79892.24

0

3.6.3 Counterfactual Analysis
Our analysis finds that internet penetration in the physician’s prescription region negatively
moderates the positive impact of pharmaceutical detailing on the brand prescription. A marketing
manager who does not account for regional internet adoption may end up overestimating the effect
of detailing on the prescription choice. When making resource allocation decisions, such as
planning the routes for the salesmen, it is important for marketers to consider technology related
factors. To understand the joint impact of the main and interaction effect of computer use (COMP)
across various GORs we obtain counterfactual estimates of the impact of detailing under low
(Minimum Internet = 20 %) and high (Max. Internet = 70 %) internet penetration (INTERNET)
scenarios. In the counterfactual analysis, we set all the other explanatory variables at their mean
level and vary INTERNET from minimum to high across all GORs. We then utilize the parameter
estimates from the fitted model to derive the impact of detailing on the elasticity of prescription
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probability for each GOR. Elasticities are important for the resource allocation as traditional
research in advertising relates them to optimal policies (Dorfman and Steiner, 1954). At the mean
value of the covariates across all the GORs we estimate the % change in the probability of
prescribing a drug for a one percent change in the detailing to a physician.

Elasticity of Detailing
0.13
0.12
0.11
0.1
0.09
0.08
0.07
0.06

0.05

Low Internet (20%)

Without Internet

High Internet (70%)

Figure 24 Elasticity of Detailing
From the above figure 23, it can be observed that not accounting for internet penetration in
the physician’s prescription region leads to a general overestimation of the impact of detailing
(under high internet scenario) in all GOR. This result also complements and generalizes the earlier
analysis (Table 13-15) where we found the negative moderating effect. More specifically, the
models that do not account for internet penetration in the GOR of the physicians (Without Internet)
would overestimate the elasticity of detailing under high internet scenario while they may
underestimate the elasticity of detailing in the high internet scenario.
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Elasticity of Competitive Detailing
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Figure 25 Elasticity of Competitive Detailing
Similarly, figure 24 above shows the elasticity of competitive detailing on the prescription
probability (i.e. % change in the prescription probability of a drug for a 1 % change in stock of
competitive detailing. From the above figure, it is clear that in the presence of high internet
penetration the marketers can overestimate the negative effect of the competitor’s detailing efforts
while in the low internet penetration scenario they can underestimate the negative effect of
competitor detailing efforts.

3.7 Discussion and Conclusion

The internet and other advances in the IT are influencing the way physicians interact with
the patients and the information available at their disposal for decision making. The growth in
internet penetration is contributing to an information rich eco-system where physicians are more
110

efficient and patients more engaging. Yet the knowledge concerning how the diffusion of internet
has affected the physicians’ prescription behavior over time is limited. Further, any variation in
the prescribing pattern of the physicians have ramifications for the marketing actions of the drug
manufacturers as well. Although the influence of information access on consumer decision making
and loyalty has been theorized in the consumer choice literature, very little is known about the
impact of internet on physicians’ response to pharmaceutical detailing.
The study contributes to existing literature by providing a better understanding of pathways
through which internet influences prescribing decisions and relative usefulness of detailing as an
information source. Our integrated decision model based on expectancy value theory explains how
the information from different sources is analyzed and applied in the prescribing decisions.
Augmenting the data on new prescription decisions and detailing in the anti-depressant category
with internet penetration and patient profile information in the physician’s practice region we
empirically characterize the effect of internet on prescribing inertia of physicians. In addition, we
identify the influence of internet on the effect of detailing using quasi experimental variations in
marketing actions due to exogenous changes such as drug patent expiration.
Our central finding is that the diffusion of internet is significantly reducing inertia or
persistence in the prescription decisions of the physicians. Essentially, the prescribing inertia
reduced by 39% for an increase in internet penetration from 20% to 70%. While, on average the
positive impact of detailing and the negative impact of competitor’s detailing decreased by 24%
and 84% respectively. We control for a variety of confounding variables related to physician,
patient, drug and location of the medical practice that may impact drug choice in our empirical
analysis. In addition, from managerial perspective, counterfactual simulations confirm that not
accounting for internet penetration leads to over estimation of the elasticity of detailing under high
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IT penetration across all geographical regions while under low internet penetration scenarios the
marketers can underestimate the effect of detailing. These findings lend support to our argument
that reduction in comparison friction of various drug alternatives by the virtue of cost reducing
effect of internet allows physicians to personalize the drugs better for their patients.
Our findings have implications for healthcare providers, suggesting that information
sharing and internet use at medical practice can reduce suboptimal drug prescribing and foster
evidence-based medicine (EBM). The availability and ease of knowledge discovery would allow
physicians to anchor their decisions on evidence rather than personal habits or outdated medical
norms. In addition, with the advent of medical apps, wearables and avenues for remote monitoring
the engagement of patients in medical decisions in rising hence, catching up with latest IT
innovations will be the key to reducing costs and improving patient satisfaction.
However, obstacles in the seamless movement from patient information from different
service providers and IT platforms still poses challenges for efficient health services. The
inequality in the access of technology due to costs and differences in internet connectivity or
patient information due to the reluctance of health providers to share records create obstacles in
taking full advantage of IT potential (Blumenthal, 2016). For instance, a recent (2016) data shows
that only 50% of the physician’s in united states have access to their patient health information
outside their medical practice ("cdc.gov", 2016). Hence, on policy side our findings suggest that
improving ease of access to patient information would be a positive step towards personalized
health care.
Our findings have implications for marketers as well. The results suggest that not
accounting for internet penetration the physician prescription region would lead to over or under
estimation of the effect of marketing actions on the physicians. Though we were not able to test it
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because of our research design engagement of patients in decision making due to advances in
digital technology may also be a contributing factor to it. Most of the pharmaceutical firms make
their detailing policies for the nation but internet diffusion in the physician’s practice is something
they should consider while making these decisions. Finally, the academic detailing initiatives taken
by the governments for better utilization of the treatment options available to the patients should
also consider targeting physicians with lesser IT resources at their disposal.
The empirical findings derived from this research have implications for the pharmaceutical
industry as well as governmental agencies. Firstly, the pharmaceutical industry can benefit by
incorporating physician’s practice variables, as well as summaries derived from household panel
survey into their targeting algorithms to improve their drug’s market share. An industry report
(SAS, 2018) has found that despite changes in the medical trends and practice marketing models
have in general remained the same. Most the marketers have information on physician prescription
choices and detailing through the third-party data collection sources but augmenting them with
geographical information, internet usage and overall patient profile would give more insight on
the utility of a drug for a certain physician. More specifically, the information on the disparity in
the adoption of Electronic Medical Records (EMRs) in the medical practice can be utilized to
target physicians selectively.
We expect that the use of EMRs would lead to more customization at the patient level and
hence the persuasive effect of the detailing would be lesser for these physicians. The marketers
should tap the targeting opportunities in the regions where there is greater potential and need for
drug information. The prescription customization as the result of reduced persistence leads to
reduction in the impact of pharmaceutical detailing on the prescription choices. Therefore, the
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firms should account for digital divide in the physician prescription region while investing in the
emerging economies.
In addition to heavy spending on detailing by pharmaceutical company’s governments also
spend money on educational programs and this is especially true in developing countries. These
publicly funded initiatives encourage evidence-based drug choices rather than influencing the sales
of a drug. These programs operate on meager budgets and lack of physician interest leads to their
cessation. From the policy perspective, regulatory organizations should target physicians who have
less developed access to IT resources in their practice compared to those who have access to a
variety of information sources. By doing so, these programs can be made more sustainable, and
their benefits transferred more effectively.
Lastly, in future, we wish to estimate the welfare gains from the of internet use for the
physicians. Since the physicians maximize their utility amongst the drug alternatives the use of
internet would allow them the better distinguish between the drugs at each prescription occasion.
The research findings will have implications for regulatory policies for subsidizing the use of the
computers for social welfare.
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CHAPTER 4: INVESTIGATING TEMPORAL VARIATIONS
PRESCRIPTION LOYALTY USING PRESCRIBER-PRESCRIPTION
NETWORK
4.1 Introduction
The modern internet services such as web search, blogs, and online discussions forum
contribute to information proliferation and its use in decision making. Recent studies have
suggested that the more information about the quality of competing brands may reduce the impact
of prior brand experiences and thereby the loyalty towards a brand (Simonson, 2015). Essentially,
the quantity of information and the ease with which it can be obtained through the internet has led
to an increase in the scope of brand comparison and has brought more rationality in the customer
decision making. While, some other researchers are of the view that customer would remain loyal
to the brands that satisfy their needs irrespective of IT (Heskett, 2014). Taking this discussion
forward in this study we investigate the impact of internet on the loyalty of prescription drugs.
Prescription loyalty is the indicator of a physician’s commitment to continue prescribing a
drug possibly due to a satisfactory outcome, detailing or costs associated with exploring new
prescriptions (Frank and Zeckhauser, 2007). Prior, studies assumed that loyalty does not change
over time, but this assumption may not be true in the current information-rich environment. Hence,
to study the impact of internet diffusion on the drug loyalty it is necessary to obtain a loyalty
measure that incorporates information related to extent and intensity of prescription loyalty in the
physicians’ prescriptions over time.
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The physician’s prescription decision is based on several factors (including patient
diagnosis, drug attributes etc.) they cannot be loyal on one prescription occasion while disloyal on
another. Moreover, the loyalty of the same drug may vary across the physicians. Hence, to
effectively utilize the available information the loyalty measure should incorporate the extent of
loyalty across the physicians on a continuous scale and should be able to summarize information
in the loyalty distribution in the dataset.
In this paper, we measure the loyalty of a prescription drug across physicians using the
prescriber-prescription bipartite network that is induced during the drug prescribing process. Every
time a physician prescribes a drug to a patient, both physician and drug are linked. Prescribing a
drug indicates that the physician perceives the drug to be best fit for the patient- thus establishes a
link or relationship between the prescriber and prescription. As other patients keep on visiting the
physician, the repeat prescription of the same drug in the presence of other drug alternatives
measures the strength of the physician’s loyalty to the prescription drug.
Studying loyalty in the context of the prescription drugs is new. Much of the existing
literature focuses on the prescription inertia of a physician with respect to a drug (Erdem and Sun
2001; Janakiraman et al. 2008). Persistence in the prescription of a drug is a pre-requisite for drug
loyalty but by itself, it does not inform about the loyalty of the drug across all the physicians in the
market. Therefore, the studied dichotomous measure of the physician level persistence essentially
provides no actionable insight on drug’s loyalty for strategic planning.
Hence, our goal is to understand and learn about the prescription loyalty from the
prescriber-prescription network. To that end, we first use the information in the prescriberprescription network to obtain a drug’s loyalty distribution across the physicians. Then, borrowing
from the ideas of the functional data analysis, we capture key elements of that distribution using
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functional principal component analysis and characterize the drug’s loyalty across all physicians.
Essentially, our goal is mine the rich prescription choice data in health care for new patterns and
knowledge
We utilize a unique dataset on prescription choices (105949 in total) of 145 general practice
physicians over a period of 10 years (1997-2006). The longitudinal panel structure of the data and
significant variation in internet diffusion during the observation period allows us to assess the
influence of internet on prescription loyalty.
In the next sections, we describe the drug prescription mechanism in general and the dataset
we use in the study. Next, we motivate the network structure induced by the physicians’
prescription choices and characterize the loyalty distribution. The empirical model follows next.

4.2 Prescription Drug Choice

The drug prescription process is complex: it involves patient diagnostic information, drug
alternatives, their attributes and the respective utility values associated with those attributes. The
theoretical framework of the expectancy-value theory proposes that physicians follow a linear and
additive compensatory decision process for choosing the optimal drug for a patient (Chinburapa
et al. 1993). According to this decision rule the physicians’ link the attributes of the relevant drug
as well as the patient diagnosis and prior medical history to the medical outcome. Therefore, given
a set of competing drugs, each characterized by a set of attributes, the drug with the highest overall
evaluation is chosen for the prescription.
Physicians therefore, invest in information search, analysis and learning to provide the best
medication to patients, (Janakiraman et al., 2008); they accumulate knowledge about available
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drugs and match them to the individual needs of the patients (Smith 1996, Gorman 1995).
Pharmaceutical detailing is a timesaving source of information for physicians as pharmaceutical
sales representatives personally visit primary care physicians and provide them the latest
information related to relevant clinical trials (Greene, 2004; Ventura et. al 2012). Detailing has
been shown to positively influence the prescription of detailed drug by the physicians (Narayanan
and Manchanda, 2009).
The detailing of prescription drugs may also increase inertia in prescription patterns of the
physicians (Janakiraman et al. 2008). Drugs which are detailed more and/or those with higher
market shares are consistently prescribed to mitigate risks arising from incomplete information or
costs involved in information gathering. This persistence in prescription choice builds loyalty with
respect to a medication or a prescription drug. Pharmaceutical firms encourage such loyalty
because it increases the market shares of their drugs. Hence, empirically diagnosing the drug’s
loyalty amongst the physicians would allow firms to optimize firm’s expenditure across the range
of manufactured drugs and prevent unnecessary costs and overcome the criticism related to over
detailing. Therefore, in this paper we first propose a data driven measure for characterizing drug’s
loyalty in the drug market.

4.3 The Prescription Dataset

In this paper, we study the 109272 prescription choices of 145 general practice physicians
for the diseases related to the nervous system. The dataset is obtained from a market research firm
and comprises the daily record of new prescription decisions, detailing visits and patient-specific
information for patient visits in the United Kingdom (UK). We consider drugs in six therapeutic

127

categories

(Anti-migraine,

Antipyretics,

Anti-psychotic,

Anxiolytics,

Sedatives,

and

Antidepressants) with at least two competing drugs, as we are concerned with the loyalty of the
prescription. If a drug/disease category consists of only one influential drug, then the physicians
will be 100% loyal to that drug in the absence of other viable alternatives.
The drugs within the same therapeutic category would be competitors as they can be
prescribed for the same diagnosis conditional on patient history and side effects. Because of a
larger number of alternatives and to avoid outliers we restrict out analysis to drugs with at least
1% of market share. These selection criteria yield ‘54’ unique prescription drugs that were
prescribed by the physicians across six therapeutic drug categories under consideration.
Table 18 below provides the details of summary statistics associated with the 54
prescriptions (such as the total number of prescription, market share, total detailing visits, detailing
of competitive drugs). We also observe that for about 39 prescription drugs the generic variants
were available in the market while for remaining 15 drugs the generic variants were introduced
within the observation period. Since, we are concerned with the loyalty patterns of the physicians
towards a prescription choice we do not distinguish between the branded and generic prescriptions.
However, we do control from the availability of generic molecule while empirically modeling the
loyalty distributions of the brand.
Table 24 Summary Statistics of Prescription Drugs
No of Prescription
Total Detailing
Competitor Detailing
Average Market Share

Mean
1672
251
2923
0.12

Std.Dev
2500
485
3378
0.14

Min
24
0
94
0.011

Max
10676
2132
10789
0.81

The cost of providing health care services to the residents of the United Kingdom is borne
by the National Health Services (NHS), which contracts virtually all GPs. It is estimated that about
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80% of the total UK drug costs is dispensed without charge to the patient. The centralized nature
of the health care system compels pharmaceutical companies to communicate directly with NHS
for approval of new drugs and the conditions under which they can be prescribed. (Magrini and
Font, 2007; Gov.uk, 2014). Therefore, it can be safely assumed that physicians had no personal
incentive in being loyal to a drug in the market.

4.4 The Prescriber-Prescription Network

The physician patent interaction can be visualized as a network linking physician and
prescription. The prospective drugs that could have been prescribed to the patient based on his/her
diagnosis are all part of the network. The physician can prescribe the same drug to different
patients thus, the repeat prescription measures the strength of the physician-prescription
relationship. For instance, if within anti-depressant therapeutic category, a physician prescribes
the drug ‘d1’ 8 times and drug ‘d2’ 2 times during last 10 patient visits then, we can say that
physician has a stronger link (80% loyalty) with prescription drug ‘d1’ in comparison to drug ‘d2’
(20% loyalty within this category. Similarly, in any other therapeutic categories the physician may
have liked some other drugs. Since, firms usually plan their marketing strategy annually we
measure the loyalty of a drug at the annual level and allow it to vary over time.
Consider the figure 1 which shows the top 1% of highly prescribed drugs in Antidepressant
category for year the 1999. A (black) line between a drug and a physician represents a transaction
or the act of prescribing the drug on a patient visit. The width of the line is proportional to the
number of repeat prescription during the time interval (one year) of observation. The width of the
line/edge measures the strength of a link. We can see that some physicians prescribe more than
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one type of drug to patients with diagnosis in antidepressant category while some are completely
loyal to a single drug within the sample period (Figure 26).

Figure 26 Prescriber – Prescription Network for
Analgesic Category (Year – 2005)

Figure 27 Prescriber – Prescription Network
for Antidepressant Category (Year – 2005)
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Note that in our data the prescriber and prescription drug form disjoint groups, that is, a
node in the network is either a physician or a drug but not both at a time. Therefore, the network
is a bipartite network. Next, we extract the loyalty measures from these bipartite networks
4.4.1 Extracting Loyalty Measures from the Network
To obtain the annual loyalty measure for each drug we first summarize the proportion of
loyal physicians and the degree of their loyalty using a loyalty distribution. For instance, the loyalty
distribution of the two-drug is shown in the figure 28 and 29. The x-axis denotes the degree of
loyalty (e.g., 50% or 70% loyal), and y-axis denotes the corresponding density. For instance, for
the drug Zimovane we can say that about 40%of the physicians who prescribed it in 2006 showed
loyalty between 90-100% (Figure 28). Further, we see that the shape of loyalty distribution of two
drugs is very different: while drug Prozac’s distribution is very right skewed (high frequency of
less loyal physicians) while drug Zimovane’s distribution is very left skewed (mostly high-loyal
physicians).

Figure 28 Loyalty Distribution 1
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Next, we obtain the loyalty distributions for all 54 drugs for each of 10 years (1997-2006)
under consideration. The information in the distribution plots should be summarized using a few
numbers to use in an empirical model. The statistics such as mean, median or mode can be used to
summarize the distributions, but it would lead to information loss due to data aggregation. Figure
28 and 29 also suggests that the loyalty distribution is too heterogenous and too dispersed. Hence,
consistent with other prior studies (Jank and Yahav,2010) on a similar data structure we employ a
very flexible dimension reduction approach via functional principal component analysis (fPCA).

Figure 29 Loyalty Distribution 2

The fPCA is similar in nature to ordinary principal component analysis; however, it
operates on functional objects such as continuous plots, images etc. rather than on data vectors. In
our context, we take the observed loyalty distribution (e.g. smoothed histograms, figure 3 and 4)
for each drug ‘d’ across all years ‘t’ as input. More specifically assume that we have a set of curves
𝑥𝑑𝑡 (𝑠) (where ‘d’ (drug) varies from 1 to 54 and ‘t’ (year) varies from 1 to 10) each measured on
a continuous scale indexed by s. The next goal is to find a corresponding set of principle component
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PC curves 𝐶𝑖 (𝑠), that, maximize the variance along each component and are orthogonal to each
other. In other words, we first find the PC function, 𝐶1 (𝑠), whose principal component score (PCS)
2
𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑑𝑡1 = ∫ 𝐶1 (𝑠) 𝑥𝑑𝑡 (𝑠)d - (1), maximize ∑𝑑𝑥𝑡 𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑑𝑡1
, subject to ∫ 𝐶12 ds = ||𝑪𝟏 || 2. The nest

step involves finding another component 𝐶2 (𝑠) for which the 𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑑𝑡2 = ∫ 𝐶2 (𝑠) 𝑥𝑑𝑡 (𝑠)ds maximize
2
∑𝑑𝑥𝑡 𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑑𝑡2
subject to ||𝑪𝟐 || 2 = 1 and the additional constraint

∫ 𝑪𝟏 (𝒔) 𝑪𝟐 (𝒔)ds = 0 --- 19
We use a grid-based approach to approximate the integrals 1-3 to get the eigenvectors that
correspond to the largest eigenvalues (Ramsey and Silverman (2005)). Next, we choose the
eigenvectors that explain most of the variation across the distribution curves 𝑥𝑑𝑡 (𝑠). By discarding
the eigenvectors that explain very small proportion of variation we capture most important patterns
in the loyalty distribution without losing much of the information. In our dataset, the first two
principal components (PC1 and PC2) capture 79% and 16% (i.e. 95.8% in total) variation in the
annual loyalty distributions of drugs in the sample.
The loyalty distributions are characterized based on the interpretation of PC1 and PC2 and
therefore should be done with care. The first principle component (PC1) shows a declining trend
with steep decline for smaller values of loyalty. PC1 puts a large positive weight on the lowest
loyalty scores (between 0 and 0.2) while putting slight negative weight on loyalty between 0.2 0.4 and 0.9 - 0.1. We can say that PC1 contrasts extremely disloyal loyalty distribution from the
rest. The large negative correlation with the mean and skewness suggests that PC1 truly captures
extremes in the loyalty distributions’ scores and shape (Table 19). Hence drugs with high scores
PCS1 would have a high frequency of disloyal physicians. The second PC has a different shape. It
puts most positive weight on the highest loyalty scores (between 0.8 and 1) and negative weight
on the loyalty scores between 01 and 0.4. Hence, this component contrast extremely high loyalty
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from below average loyalty. From table 19 also we observe that drugs with high score (PCS2) on
PC2 have a higher mean of the loyalty distribution (0.41 correlation) and long left tail (-0.01
correlation with skewness). This implies that high PCS2 indicates that the drug enjoys ‘extreme’
loyalty (within range of 0.8-1) from the majority of the physicians.

Figure 30 PC1 for Loyalty Distributions

Figure 31 PC2 for Loyalty Distributions
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The data driven loyalty scores PCS1 and PCS2 obtained from the analysis to an extent
distinguish prescription drugs that exhibit high disloyalty and high loyalty respectively amongst
the physicians (Figure 34 and 35). Though, the interpretation of drug loyalty based on PC scores
informs about patterns in loyalty distributions, the actual distribution, however, would comprise
of a different mix of PC1 and PC2 by the nature of principle component decomposition.

Variations Explained by Principal Components
Cumulative VAriations EXplained

0.7

0.6447597

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3

0.2

0.151998

0.1

0.0653391

0.0461119

0.03923809

PC3

PC4

PC5

0
PC1

PC2

Figure 32 Variations Explained by PC
Table 25 Correlation between PC scores and summary statistics of the drugs’ loyalty
distributions
PCS1
PCS2

Mean
-0.85
0.41

Median
-0.78
0.45

Std.Dev
-0.65
0.29

Kurtosis
0.47
0.001

Skewness
0.66
-0.1

4.5 The Impact of the Internet on Prescription Loyalty
To access the impact the internet has on prescription loyalty, we model the measured
loyalty scores (𝑃𝐶𝑆1𝑑𝑡𝑟 and 𝑃𝐶𝑆2𝑑𝑡𝑟 ) for a drug ‘d’ in the year ‘t’ in the physicians GOR ‘r’ using
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a linear regression framework. For the choice of the covariates, we are primarily interested in the
effect of internet diffusion (% of internet users in the GOR of the physician).

Figure 33 Distribution Segmentation Based on PCS1

Figure 34 Distribution Segmentation Based on PCS2
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However, we also control for other factors that can have an impact on the drug’ loyalty;
these factors include total detailing for the drug ‘d’ and its competing drugs, availability of generic
variant in the market and time effects (Year).
The drug related variables are repeatedly observed over a period of 10 years (1997-2006)
therefore, the observations are clustered at the drug-region level. The Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) estimators are not feasible in this case due to violation of assumption of independence and
homogeneity of the error terms. Therefore, we use panel data estimators (fixed effect (FE) and
random effect (RE)) to estimate the coefficients of the regression model. Both estimators account
for heterogeneity due to drug specific characteristics but differ in their model assumptions. The
FE estimator assumes that drug specific effects are correlated with independent variables and
therefore the inference from FE estimation is limited to the data in the sample. While, RE estimator
assumes that unobserved drug specific effects are uncorrelated with independent variables and
therefore, the inference from RE estimation can be generalized to the whole population. Since we
do not have any prior intuition regarding the assumed relationship we use both estimators to ensure
the consistency of the findings.
The increase in PCS1 for a drug in a region indicates a higher number of disloyal physicians
for the prescription drug. The internet diffusion has positive sign and is statistically insignificant
for models with PCS1 as the dependent variable implying that internet has no impact on the
frequency of extremely disloyal physicians of a prescription drug. However, with the arrival of
generic variant in the market the frequency of extremely disloyal physicians decreases (Coef = 0.074**, Model 3, Table 21). The availability of low cost generic variant may entice disloyal
physicians or patients to accept them as a viable alternative.
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Table 26 Model Estimation Results PCS1 1

Variables

Model 1 (FE)

PCS1

Coefficients

Model 1 (RE)
SE

Coefficients

SE

Model 2 (FE)
Coefficients

SE

DETAILING

-0.0032***

-0.0006

-0.0030***

-0.0006

0.0008

-0.0014

COMP. DETAILING

-0.00033**

-0.0001

-0.00034***

-0.0001

-0.00043***

-0.0002

INTERNET

-0.1600

-0.1500

-0.1300

-0.1300

-0.1400

-0.1500

YEAR

0.0100

-0.0072

0.0087

-0.0067

0.0097

-0.0072

GENERIC

-0.063***

-0.0140

-0.064***

-0.0140

-0.059***

-0.0140

PRIVATE INSU

0.0350

-0.1400

0.0500

-0.1200

0.0590

-0.1400

-0.011***

-0.0036

DETAILINGxINTERNET
COMP. DETAILINGxINTERNET
N

5066.0000

R-sq

0.0130

AIC

-2948.6000

5066.0000

5066.0000
0.0150

-874.3000

-2957.3000

BIC
-2902.9000
-815.5000
-2905.0000
Note: FE – Drug Fixed Effect Model Specification; RE – Drug Random Effect Model Specification;
P-Values of the coefficient estimates are based on Cluster Robust Standard Errors; +p < 0.1, *p < 0.05 and **p < 0.01;

Table 27 Model Estimation Results PCS1 2
Variables
PCS1

Model 2 (RE)
Coefficients

Model 3 (FE)
SE

Coefficients

Model 3 (RE)
Coefficients

SE

DETAILING

0.0003

-0.0014

-0.0027***

-0.0006

-0.0027***

-0.0006

COMP. DETAILING

-0.00040***

-0.0001

-0.0011***

-0.0002

-0.0010***

-0.0002

INTERNET

-0.1100

-0.1300

-0.2300

-0.1500

-0.2000

-0.1300

YEAR

0.0082

-0.0067

0.0110

-0.0072

0.0099

-0.0067

GENERIC

-0.060***

-0.0140

-0.073***

-0.0140

-0.072***

-0.0140

PRIVATE INSU

0.0690

-0.1200

-0.0180

-0.1400

-0.0036

-0.1200

DETAILINGxINTERNET
COMP.
DETAILINGxINTERNET

-0.0087**

-0.0034
0.0035***

-0.0007

0.0026***

-0.0006

N

5066.0000

R-sq

5066.0000

5066.0000

0.0190

AIC

-878.7000

-2974.4000

-889.2000

BIC

-813.4000

-2922.2000

-823.9000

On the other hand, the frequency of loyal physicians (higher PCS2) of a prescription drug
in region, however significantly decreases with increase in internet diffusion. Since, higher value
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PCS2 for a drug during a year indicates higher frequency of extremely loyal physicians hence,
negative coefficients (Coef = -0.016**, Model 1, Table 22) associated with internet variable
confirms significant negative impact.
Table 28 Model Estimation Results PCS2 1
Model 1 (FE)

Variables
PCS2

Coefficients

Model 1 (RE)
SE

Coefficients

SE

Model 2 (FE)
Coefficients

SE

DETAILING

-0.0013***

-0.0003

-0.0015***

-0.0003

-0.0005

-0.0008

COMP. DETAILING

-0.00035***

-0.0001

-0.00045***

-0.0001

-0.00037***

-0.0001

INTERNET

-0.16**

-0.0780

-0.0770

-0.0690

-0.15**

-0.0780

YEAR

0.0044

-0.0038

0.0001

-0.0034

0.0043

-0.0038

GENERIC

-0.0069

-0.0075

-0.0043

-0.0072

-0.0061

-0.0075

PRIVATE INSU

-0.25***

-0.0760

-0.15**

-0.0620

-0.24***

-0.0760

-0.0022

-0.0019

DETAILINGxINTERNET
COMP.
DETAILINGxINTERNET
N

5066.0000

R-sq

0.0120

5066.0000

5066.0000

AIC

-9372.0000

-7542.2000

-9371.5000

BIC

-9326.2000

-7483.5000

-9319.3000

0.0130

Table 29 Model Estimation Results PCS2 2
Variables
PCS1

Model 2 (RE)
Coefficients

Model 3 (FE)
SE

Coefficients

Model 3 (RE)
SE

Coefficients

SE

DETAILING

-0.0004

-0.0008

-0.00092***

-0.0003

-0.0013***

-0.0003

COMP. DETAILING

-0.00047***

-0.0001

-0.00095***

-0.0001

-0.00079***

-0.0001

INTERNET

-0.0710

-0.0690

-0.21***

-0.0780

-0.1100

-0.0690

YEAR

0.0000

-0.0034

0.0053

-0.0038

0.0008

-0.0034

GENERIC

-0.0032

-0.0073

-0.014*

-0.0075

-0.0080

-0.0073

PRIVATE INSU

-0.14**

-0.0620

-0.29***

-0.0750

-0.17***

-0.0630

DETAILINGxINTERNET
COMP.
DETAILINGxINTERNET

-0.0028

-0.0018
0.0026***

-0.0004

0.0012***

-0.0003

N

5066.0000

R-sq

5066.0000

5066.0000

0.0230

AIC

-7542.6000

-9423.5000

-7553.5000

BIC

-7477.3000

-9371.3000

-7488.2000
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Therefore, as internet technologies are diffusing extremely loyal physicians of a
prescription drug are switching to other alternatives possibly, due to more information about other
competing brands or higher patient engagement. The detailing of competing drugs also
significantly reduces the number of extremely loyal prescribers of a drug and its impact is
moderated by internet. Interestingly, the availability of generic variant in the market has no impact
on the number of extremely loyal prescribers.

4.6 Spillover Effects of Manufacturer Related Information Shocks on Brand’s
Loyalty
Next, we study if there are spillover effects of the manufacturer related information shocks
on the branded drug’s loyalty across the physicians. The prescription drugs consistently undergo
medical trails and information related to their efficacy and side effects is frequently circulated to
the physicians through drug manufacturers via sales representatives and regulatory agencies.
However, in a shocking incident of medical negligence in 2001 a study led by Dr. Martin Keller a
professor of psychiatry at the Brown University found that the manufacturers of the
PAROXETINE misled the physicians by undermining the negative effects of the drug on the
children by not disclosing them. Several pharmaceutical drug manufacturers have brands in
multiple treatment categories and these unethical tactics by them have the potential to malign their
brand’s images in other categories as well. Therefore, next, we study how manufacturer related
information shocks impact the loyalty of a branded drug. To address the above research question,
we identify the brands in our dataset whose manufacturers were involved in unethical activities
during the observations. Table 24 represents major prosecutions or settlements in the
pharmaceutical industry by some of the brand manufacturers.
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Table 30 Data Summary (Information Shocks)
BRAND

VARIABLE

MIRT

PCS1

-0.22

0.18

0.24

0.10

18.32

PCS2

-0.23

0.01

0.15

0.05

1.04

0.00

5.89

30.00

6.21

607.00

16.00

94.56

299.00

66.15

9740.00

DETAILING
COMP. DETAILING

PARO

SUM

0.02

0.17

0.03

2.46

0.00

11.43

95.00

16.14

1177.00

PCS1

-0.78

-0.20

0.24

0.30

-20.75

PCS2

-0.35

-0.14

0.04

0.12

-14.64

0.00

14.83

57.00

14.34

1527.00

15.00

85.63

276.00

58.77

8820.00

MEAN LOYALTY

0.00

0.14

0.50

0.11

14.44

TOTAL PRESCRIPTIONS

0.00

80.18

269.00

74.81

8259.00

PCS1

-0.83

0.16

0.24

0.19

16.28

PCS2

-0.59

0.01

0.37

0.11

1.43

DETAILING

0.00

0.74

8.00

1.42

74.00

COMP. DETAILING

0.00

8.57

34.00

8.31

857.00

MEAN LOYALTY

0.00

0.03

0.50

0.08

2.64

TOTAL PRESCRIPTIONS

0.00

0.24

3.00

0.55

24.00

PCS1

-0.32

0.05

0.24

0.13

5.29

PCS2

-0.20

-0.05

0.04

0.06

-5.42

0.00

15.33

60.00

16.24

1579.00

16.00

85.13

274.00

56.37

8768.00

COMP. DETAILING

ZOLM

SD

0.00

DETAILING

TRIF

MAX

TOTAL PRESCRIPTIONS

COMP. DETAILING

SERT

MEAN

MEAN LOYALTY

DETAILING

QUET

MIN

MEAN LOYALTY

0.00

0.06

0.23

0.04

5.73

TOTAL PRESCRIPTIONS

0.00

29.54

115.00

26.78

3043.00

PCS1

-1.00

0.10

0.24

0.24

10.37

PCS2

-0.59

0.04

0.70

0.13

3.85

DETAILING

0.00

0.02

1.00

0.14

2.00

COMP. DETAILING

0.00

9.29

35.00

8.86

929.00

MEAN LOYALTY

0.00

0.07

1.00

0.15

7.37

TOTAL PRESCRIPTIONS

0.00

0.87

9.00

1.71

87.00

PCS1

-0.86

-0.02

0.24

0.19

-1.72

PCS2

-0.27

-0.04

0.09

0.07

-4.05

DETAILING

0.00

5.46

47.00

9.93

508.00

COMP. DETAILING

1.00

22.88

99.00

19.18

2128.00

MEAN LOYALTY

0.00

0.10

0.45

0.08

8.98

TOTAL PRESCRIPTIONS

0.00

6.95

35.00

6.66

646.00
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YEAR OF SHOCK
(REASON)

2002

(Poor Manufacturing
Practices)

2001

(False Drug Claims)

2003
(335 Million settlement
Illegal Marketing Bribing
Doctors)

2004

(Off Label Promotion
Settlement)

2003

(False Drug Claims)

2003
(Illegal Marketing Bribing
Doctors)

For instance, the manufactures of the prescription drug QUET were involved in 335 million
settlements in 2003 for using unethical practices such as bribing to entice physicians to prescribe
another branded drug. We use our brand loyalty formulation described in the earlier sections to
investigate if these information shocks related to manufacturers impact the loyalty of a branded
drug or not.
We take a subsample of the six drugs that are featured in the table 24 and link their loyalty
scores PCS1 and PCS2 in each region across the years 1996-2006 in the presence of other control
variables. We account of unobserved heterogeneity in the drug-region effects using the fixed (FE)
and random effects (RE) formulation of the linear models. Table 25 before details the estimation
results for the model with PCS1 as the dependent variable. The information shock is represented
by a dummy variable which takes value 1 after the shock is reported and zero otherwise. It should
be noted that higher PCS1 indicates higher disloyalty or higher frequency of disloyal physicians
in the drug’s loyalty distribution. As evident the coefficient of detailing is negative (Coef = 0.0064**, Model 1, Table 25) for both FE and RE specifications implying increasing in detailing
leads to lesser number of extremely disloyal physicians. However, information shocks seem to
have no impact on the extent of extremely disloyal physicians of a prescription drug (Coef = 0.035, Model 1-2, Table 25). Similarly, information shocks do not moderate the impact of detailing
on the distribution of extremely disloyal physicians.
However, the impact of competitive detailing on the loyalty of extremely disloyal
physicians is significantly higher in the presences of an information shock (Coef = 0.0012**,
Model 3, Table 26). Interestingly, the significance of moderation effects varies across FE
(significant) and RE (non-significant) models, however the estimates from FE models are more
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reliable as confirmed by Hausman tests (later) and the better fit on the observed data (lower AIC
values).
Table 31 Impact of Information Shocks on PCS1 – 1
Variables

Model 1 (FE)
Coefficients

Model 1 (RE)

SE

Coefficients

SE

Model 2 (FE)
Coefficients

SE

DETAILING

-0.0064***

-0.0015

-0.0072**

-0.0031

-0.0071***

-0.0016

COMP. DETAILING

-0.000015

-0.00031

0.00024

-0.00044

0.00019

-0.00028

INTERNET

-0.55

-0.4

-0.33

-0.28

-0.62

-0.4

SHOCK

-0.035

-0.026

-0.061

-0.042

-0.064*

-0.032

YEAR

0.035

-0.022

0.031***

-0.0082

0.041*

-0.022

GENERIC

-0.10***

-0.033

-0.12

-0.095

-0.098***

-0.032

PRIVATE INSU

-0.43

-0.47

-0.073

-0.2

-0.72

-0.51

0.0050**

-0.0019

DETAILINGxSHOCK
COMP.
DETAILINGxSHOCK
N

602

602

602

R-sq

0.128

AIC

-386.5

-211.1

-388.9

BIC

-355.7

-167.1

-353.7

0.134

Table 32 Impact of Information Shocks on PCS1 – 2
Model 2 (RE)

Variables

Coefficients

SE

Model 3 (FE)
Coefficients

PCS2

Model 3 (RE)
Coefficients

SE

DETAILING

-0.0075**

-0.0036

-0.0057***

-0.0016

-0.0069**

-0.0031

COMP. DETAILING

0.00029

-0.0004

0.00019

-0.00028

0.00019

-0.00051

INTERNET

-0.34

-0.27

-0.6

-0.39

-0.36

-0.26

SHOCK

-0.072

-0.057

-0.086**

-0.038

-0.088

-0.061

YEAR

0.032***

-0.0087

0.041*

-0.021

0.033***

-0.0086

GENERIC

-0.12

-0.094

-0.097***

-0.033

-0.12

-0.095

PRIVATE INSU

-0.12

-0.26

-0.65

-0.49

-0.13

-0.24

DETAILINGxSHOCK

0.002

-0.0027
0.0012**

-0.00052

0.00062

-0.0005

COMP
DETAILINGxSHOCK
N

602

R-sq

602

602

0.138

AIC

-210.4

-391.5

-212.4

BIC

-162

-356.3

-164
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Table 33 Impact of Information Shocks on PCS2 – 1
Model 1 (FE)

Variables

Model 1 (RE)
SE

Coefficients

Model 2 (FE)

PCS2

Coefficients

Coefficients

SE

DETAILING

-0.0018***

-0.0006

-0.0025**

-0.0013

PCS2

-0.0021***

-0.0006

COMP. DETAILING

0.0000

-0.0001

-0.0001

-0.0002

0.0001

-0.0001

INTERNET

-0.1300

-0.1500

-0.0190

-0.0620

-0.1600

-0.1500

SHOCK

-0.028**

-0.0140

-0.041*

-0.0230

-0.039**

-0.0160

YEAR

0.015*

-0.0077

0.0100**

-0.0047

0.017**

-0.0078

GENERIC

-0.054***

-0.0130

-0.057*

-0.0340

-0.053***

-0.0120

PRIVATE INSU

-0.2400

-0.2300

-0.1000

-0.1000

-0.3500

-0.2500

0.0018*

-0.0009

DETAILINGxSHOCK
COMP
DETAILINGxSHOCK
N

602

602

602

R-sq

-1248.7

-1089.5

-1249.2

AIC

-1217.9

-1045.5

-1214

BIC

-0.0018***

-0.0006

-0.0025**

-0.0013

-0.0021***

-0.0006

Table 34 Impact of Information Shocks on PCS2 - 2
Model 2 (RE)

Variables

Model 3 (FE)
SE

PCS2

Coefficients

DETAILING

-0.0025*

-0.0014

-0.0015**

-0.0006

-0.0026**

-0.0012

COMP. DETAILING

-0.0001

-0.0002

0.0001

-0.0001

-0.0001

-0.0002

INTERNET

-0.0190

-0.0600

-0.1500

-0.1500

-0.0180

-0.0540

SHOCK

-0.0390

-0.0290

-0.050***

-0.0190

-0.0400

-0.0320

YEAR

0.0098**

-0.0049

0.017**

-0.0074

0.0099**

-0.0049

GENERIC

-0.057*

-0.0340

-0.053***

-0.0130

-0.057*

-0.0340

PRIVATE INSU

-0.0990

-0.1200

-0.3400

-0.2400

-0.1000

-0.1100

DETAILINGxSHOCK

-0.0003

-0.0013
0.00050*

-0.0003

-0.0001

-0.0003

COMP DETAILINGxSHOCK

Coefficients

Model 3 (RE)
PCS2

Coefficients

N

602

602

602

R-sq

-1087.5

-1251.9

-1087.6

AIC

-1039.1

-1216.7

-1039.2

BIC

-0.0025*

-0.0014

-0.0015**

-0.0006

-0.0026**

SE

-0.0012

Next on modeling PCS2 with the information shocks and other control variables we find
that information shocks do have a significant negative impact on the loyalty of extremely loyal
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physicians (Coef = 0.028**, Model 1(FE), Table 28). This finding is consistent with our hypothesis
that manufacturer related information shocks may have spillover effects over brand’s loyalty.
As a robustness test, we test the correlation between the regressors and model errors to test
the model assumptions of RE and FE estimation methods. The random effects (RE) methods have
some more stringent assumptions that the fixed effects methods and they assume that model errors
are not corrected with the explanatory variables for unbiased parameter estimates. The null
hypothesis of the Hausman test is that there is no correlation between the model errors and the
explanatory variables. We find that for all the models in tables 25-28 the null hypothesis is not
accepted and therefore the FE estimates for the above models can be considered more reliable.

4.7 Discussion and Conclusion

In this paper, we characterize the loyalty distribution of a drug using a bipartite network
and access the impact of internet diffusion on the drug’s loyalty. Our approach identifies two key
dimensions of variations in the loyalty distribution across the prescription drugs. The prescription
drugs vary in the number of extremely loyal prescribers and extremely disloyal prescribers. We
quantify the extent of extreme loyalty and disloyalty in the loyalty distributions of the prescription
drugs and study the impact of external interventions in influencing them.
We find that internet has a significant negative impact on the loyalty of extremely loyal
prescribers of the drug while we do not find evidence of its effect on the loyalty of the less loyal
prescribers. Meaning, with an increase in internet penetration the loyalty of extremely loyal
prescribers of the drug is expected to decrease possible due to brand switching or variety seeking.
The excessive loyalty of a physician may be the result of prescribing inertia which results from the
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high cost of information gathering about other drugs. Therefore, it is possible that internet plays a
role in reducing the prescribing inertia. To that end, we want to point out that we do not determine
the causes for this finding. However, our study is first (to best of our knowledge) to empirically
characterize a drug’s loyalty across physicians and study the impact of internet over it.
In addition, we also find that the manufacturer related information shocks such as
settlements related to false claims, unethical marketing, and manufacturing practices etc.
significantly impact the loyalty of extremely loyal prescribers of the prescription drug, however
those shocks does not impact the loyalty of extremely disloyal prescribers of the prescription drug.
Through the findings are intruding and intuitive the study is not free from some major
limitations. Since, our approach is data driven we were only able to identify two dimensions of the
loyalty distribution (extreme disloyalty and extreme loyalty). The loyalty distribution is extremely
heterogenous and there are other facets of it which are not captured by the two measures quantified
in this study. Future research can investigate a better more comprehensive instrument for
quantifying loyalty distribution.
The loyalty distribution for a drug may also depend on the prescription category, the
condition of patients visiting the physicians and their preference for the drug. Nevertheless, it
would be equally important for the marketers to understand what factors drive loyalty and we
believe that prescriber-prescription networks are a way to address this question. Further, unlike
prior studies that assumed loyalty to be static over time (Jank and Yahav, 2011, Fader and Hardie
(2007)), we incorporate temporal variation in loyalty at the annual level by analyzing the network
with a one year sliding window in the empirical model.
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In this study, we are not unable to identify the effect of patient engagement in the
prescription decisions in influencing the loyalty of a prescription drug. In the digital age, patients
feel empowered by the vast amount of information available online and on apps, and by the array
of health and fitness wearables such as FitBit and Apple Watch. Future research can investigate
the pathways (via patient or physician) through which internet is influencing the prescription
loyalty.
Further, studies in this direction can investigate if “internet will punish brands faster and
more severely than in the past” (Simonson, & Rosen, 2014). Essentially, it would be interesting to
study how new technologies influence the impact of drug related information shocks (e.g. negative
news such as failed drug trial) on the prescription loyalty. Finally, based on spatial variation in the
loyalty distribution of the prescription drug, future studies can formulate some optimal marketing
resource allocation strategies for different regions.
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Appendix A: Functional Data Analysis

FDA techniques usually operate on continuous functional objects but due to limitations in
the data collection the customer spending time series that we analyze in this paper is discrete in
nature. The monetary spending of a customer at store is measured on weekly basis. Hence, the first
step is to obtain the continuous functional curves from this weekly data. To accomplish this, we
fit a penalized smoothing spline on discrete spending observations for each customer (Ramsey and
Silverman 2005; Jank and Foutz,).
A polynomial spline of order p is represented as f(t) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1t + 𝛽2 𝑡 2 + … + 𝛽𝑡 𝑡 𝑝 +
∑𝐿𝑖=1(𝑡 − 𝑤1 )𝑝+ . Where + indicates that only positive values are considered in the expression
(𝑡 − 𝑤1 )𝑝+ . Let 𝑤1,…. 𝑤𝐿 represent the set of knots or the breakpoints where the polynomial
function is joined end to end. In this study, we place the knot at each week of the 10-week prior
spending history of the customer. The roughness penalty of a polynomial spline is defined as
𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑚 (𝑡) = ∫[𝐷𝑚 f(t)]2 dt where 𝐷𝑚 𝑓 denotes the mth derivative of the function f(f). In order to
estimate the unknown parameter vectors 𝛽 = (𝛽0, 𝛽1,… 𝛽𝑝 , 𝛽𝑝1,… 𝛽𝑝𝐿 )′ of length (L +p + 1) we
minimize the penalized squared error 𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑆𝜆,𝑚 = ∫[𝑠(𝑡) − 𝑓(𝑡)]2 dt + λ𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑚 (𝑡). Here, 𝑠(𝑡)
denotes the observed data which is customer spending history in this study. The choice of λ
determines the tradeoff between the smoothness and data fit and in this study we use a model
selection heuristic to determine the appropriate value of λ.
However, for a given value of λ the parameter vector β is estimated using the ordinary least
squares procedure. Let x(t) represent the vector of the spline basis functions x(t) = (1, t, 𝑡 2 …
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𝑝

𝑝

𝑡 𝑝 , (𝑡 − 𝑤1 )+ ….(𝑡 − 𝑤𝐿 )+ ). Then the f(t) can be presented as x(t)β and the roughness penalty can
be expressed as 𝑃𝑚 = β’Dβ, where D is defined as D = ∫[𝐷𝑚 f(t)]′ [𝐷𝑚 f(t)] dt. The penalized
2
residual sum of squares is equivalent to 𝑄𝜆,𝑚 = 𝜆𝛽′𝐷𝛽 + ∑10
𝑖=1[𝑠𝑖 − 𝑥(𝑡𝑖 )β] where 𝑠 = (𝑠1 ,….. 𝑠𝑛 )’

denotes the vector of the observed spending at times t = (𝑡1 ,….. 𝑡𝑛 ) for a customer. Representing
the vector of spline basis functions for different values of t as X = (x (𝑡1 ), x(𝑡2 ), x(𝑡3 ), x(𝑡𝑛 ))’ the
expression for penalized residual sum of squares 𝑄𝜆,𝑚 = 𝜆𝛽′𝐷𝛽 + (s – Xβ)’ (s – Xβ). The values
of vector β that maximizes 𝑄𝜆,𝑚 can be obtained by minimizing the gradient of 𝑄𝜆,𝑚 with respect
to β. The solution of the equations (X’X + λD) β =X’s obtained after minimizing the objective
′
−1
function 𝑄𝜆,𝑚 gives the penalized spline estimator of the vector β as 𝛽̂
𝑝𝑠 = (𝑋 𝑋 + 𝜆𝐷) 𝑋′𝑦. The

second order partial derivative of 𝑄𝜆,𝑚 with respect to the vector β or the Hessian matrix is equal
to 2(X’X + λD). The term X’X is positive definite and λD is positive semidefinite therefore 2(X’X
+ λD) is positive definite. Hence, 𝛽̂
𝑝𝑠 meets the second order condition of the optimization and
therefore maximizes 𝑄𝜆,𝑚 .
Dimension Reduction of the Functional Curves: We obtain the functional spending curves
f(t) for each customer using the estimation procedure described in the appendix 2. Taking the first
and second order derivative of f(t) we get f’(t) and f’’(t). In order to include the information in
these curves into the predictive model we use principal component analysis (PCA) technique to
reduce the dimensions. First, we obtain a set of data vectors 𝐹(𝑡) = [𝑓1 (𝑡), 𝑓2 (𝑡),… 𝑓𝑛 (𝑡)], 𝐹′(𝑡)
= [𝑓1 ′(𝑡), 𝑓2 ′(𝑡),… 𝑓𝑛 ′(𝑡)], 𝐹′′(𝑡) = [𝑓1 ′(𝑡), 𝑓2 ′(𝑡),… 𝑓𝑛 ′(𝑡)], where say 𝑓𝑛 (𝑡) is a p dimensional
data vector for a customer ‘n’. The 𝑓𝑛 (𝑡) = [𝑓𝑛 (𝑡1 ), 𝑓𝑛 (𝑡2 ),.. 𝑓𝑛 (𝑡𝑝 )] represents the values of the
functional spending curve (𝑓𝑛 (𝑡)) of a customer n at the times 𝑡1 ….𝑡𝑝 . The goal of PCA is to
project the set of data vectors F(t), F’(t) and F’’(t) on to a new space of the orthogonal dimensions
while maximizing variance along these dimensions. The idea is to obtain a principle component
152

(PC) vector 𝑝𝑐1 = [𝑝𝑐11 , 𝑝𝑐12 ,……. 𝑝𝑐1𝑝 ] such that its principle component score PCS, 𝑝𝑐𝑠𝑖1 =
∑𝑗 𝑝𝑐1𝑗 𝑓𝑖 (𝑡𝑗 ) = 𝑝𝑐1𝑇 𝑓𝑖 (𝑡), maximizes ∑𝑖 𝑝𝑐𝑠𝑖1 2 subject to ∑𝑗 𝑝𝑐1𝑗 2 = ||𝑝𝑐1||2 = 1. Similarly, in the
next step a second PC 𝑝𝑐2 = [𝑝𝑐21 , 𝑝𝑐22 ,……. 𝑝𝑐2𝑝 ] is computed for which the PCS 𝑝𝑐𝑠𝑖2 =
𝑝𝑐2𝑇 𝑓𝑖 (𝑡) maximizes ∑𝑖 𝑝𝑐𝑠𝑖2 2 subject to ||𝑝𝑐2 ||2 and the additional constraint ∑𝑗 𝑝𝑐1𝑗 𝑝𝑐2𝑗 =
𝑝𝑐2𝑇 𝑝𝑐1𝑇 = 0 to ensure the orthogonality of the principle components. Since we have p unique
observations for each customer a total of p principle component vectors are generated which
together explain 100% of the variations. The same step is repeated for the data vectors F’(t), F’’(t)
obtained from the first and second order derivative of the smoothed spending curves.
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Appendix B: Simulation Script for Replication
First, we draw the base optimal order quantity (Q0f) and base consumption rate (cmf) for
1,000 customers in the interval 1 and 1,000.
Q0f <- NULL; cmf <- NULL
v1 <- seq(1,1000,1) ## Sequence to draw consumption rate and optimal up to or
der quantity
total <- 1000 ## total number of the customers
seed <- 11
for(k in 1:total)
{
set.seed(k*seed)
Q0f[k] = sample(v1[10:1000],1) ## a sample of optimal order quantity for th
e customer
cmf[k] = sample(v1[which((v1< Q0f[k]) & (v1 > Q0f[k]/10))],1)
set.seed(k*seed)
## sample based consumption rate of the household such that it is greater t
han optimal order quantity and greater than Q0f[k]/10 (to ensure that the cus
tomer shops at least once in 10 week pre promotion duration)
}
> summary(Q0f)
Min. 1st Qu. Median
Mean 3rd Qu.
Max.
10.0
258.5
496.5
500.3
746.0 1000.0
> summary(cmf)
Min. 1st Qu. Median
Mean 3rd Qu.
Max.
2.0
95.0
212.0
269.8
388.5
964.0

# Next, we simulate product inventory (q) of a household over time using a variable consumption
rate (cmc) between subsequent purchase cycles and estimate the expected spending (y) during a randomly
introduced promotion. The variation in consumption rate is determined by the deviation parameter (r). The
final output data-frame (custsv) contains 10 weeks of store spending (s), visits frequency (f) and inventory
(q) prior (past = 10) to the promotion. We also display the last 10-week purchase history of a customer with
id = 3 and randomness 10%.
custsv <- NULL ## customers with varying consumption rate
tf <- 10;
for(l in 1:11)
{
r = (l-1)*tf ## To change the variations
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## Level of Randomness (Standard Deviation)
custf <- NULL ##
for(k in 1:total)
{
cust <- NULL
cmc <- NULL ## Consumption rate within purchase cycles
q <- NULL ## inventory at home during each week
s <- NULL ## spending at store during each week
week = NULL
past = 10 ## Prior promotion spending history to be considered
j = 1
## initialization index
price = 10 ## The price of each unit of product.
## track of spending
Q0 = Q0f[k] ## a sample of optimal order quantity for the customer
cm = cmf[k] ## for at least one cycle in 10 weeks
q[j] <- Q0 ## initialize the series with customer buying Q0 product at t
he store
s[j] <- Q0*price ## spending of the customer during first week
week[j] <- j
cmc[j] <- cm ## starting with base consumption rate within first purchase
cycle
Q = Q0
C = cm
for(i in 1:100) ## We consider 10 purchase cycles so that we have at leas
t
## 10 observations prior to the promotion
{
while(Q > C) ## the model assumes that the customer shops only when the
product inventory is less than consumption rate
{
Q <- Q-C
j = j+1
q[j] <- Q
s[j] <- 0
week[j] <- j
cmc[j] <- C
}
j = j+1
s[j] <- (Q0 + (C-Q))*price ## monetary amount the product the household
will buy at the store visit
q[j] <- Q0 ## the product inventory after the purchase
Q = q[j] ## BEgenning inventory for the next purchase cycle
week[j] <- j
set.seed(k*i*seed)
C = abs(rnorm(1,cm,(r/100)*cm)) ## A randim draw of consumption rate of
next purchase cycle
cmc[j] <- C ## New consumption rate
}
cust <- data.frame(cbind(week,q,s,cmc)) ## inventory spending and consump
tion rate
cust$f <- 0
cust[cust$s!=0,"f"] = 1 ## f = 1 if store trip made on that week or 0
cust$cm <- cm ## Base consumption rate
cust$Q0 <- Q0 ## Base Optimal inventory fixed
cust$id <- k ## The id of customer
ind <- nrow(cust) - 4 ## Index to introduce the promotion.
hist <- past-1
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cust$y<- (Q0 - (cust$q[ind-1] - cmc[ind]))*price ## Spendig during the pr
omotion
cust <- cust[((ind-hist):ind),] ## 10 weeks prior to the start of the pro
motion
cust$prior <- c(1:(past))
cust$r <- r ## Extent of random Variation
custsv <- rbind(custsv,cust) ## Change this value for the cust
print(k);
#print(k);
}
}
}
custsv[custfsvid == 3 & custsv$r==10,] ## Past 10 weeks spending and visits
and inventory for a customer with id = 3 and randomness 10%

273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282

week
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282

q
s
cmc f cm Q0 id
y prior r
451.00000 4655.988 196.5845 1 205 451 3 3822.211
1 10
254.41549
0.000 196.5845 0 205 451 3 3822.211
2 10
57.83098
0.000 196.5845 0 205 451 3 3822.211
3 10
451.00000 5897.535 137.2304 1 205 451 3 3822.211
4 10
313.76961
0.000 137.2304 0 205 451 3 3822.211
5 10
176.53923
0.000 137.2304 0 205 451 3 3822.211
6 10
39.30884
0.000 137.2304 0 205 451 3 3822.211
7 10
451.00000 5489.215 191.1105 1 205 451 3 3822.211
8 10
259.88946
0.000 191.1105 0 205 451 3 3822.211
9 10
68.77891
0.000 191.1105 0 205 451 3 3822.211
10 10

The data-frame (custsv) has information on the past 10 weeks of expenditure (s) and visits
(f) history for varying randomness in consumption rate of 1,000 households prior to the promotion.
We fit our linear models on this data and predict household spending during the randomly induced
promotion using the spending path information and the RFM information. The output data-frame
(outf) produces the model comparison analysis.
library(MASS)
library(formula.tools)
## Loading required package: operator.tools
outf <- NULL;
id <- unique(custsv$id) ## Unique ids of all customers
for (l in 1:11)
{
custf <- custsv[custsv$r== (l-1)*tf,] #
dsim1 <- matrix(NA,total,past) ## matrix to store smoothed spending
path
dsim2 <- matrix(NA,total,past) ## matrix to store smoothed spending
velocity
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dsim3 <- matrix(NA,total,past) ## matrix to store smoothed spending
acceleration
print(paste(" ",l));
#h <- NULL
for(h in 1:11) ## Interations for values of smoothing parameter
{
print(h)
spa = (h - 1)/ 10 ## smoothing parameter needs to be changed
for(i in 1:total)
{
cust <- custf[custf$id==id[i],]
ws <- (cust$s)
vs <- (cust$f)
x <- cust$prior
sws <- smooth.spline(x,ws,spar = spa) ## cumulative spending
svs <- smooth.spline(x,vs,spar = spa) ## cumulative spending
dsim1[i,1:past] <- sws$y
dsim2[i,1:past] <- svs$y
}
dspc1 <- princomp(dsim1[,1:(past)]) ## principal component of spen
ding path
dspc2 <- princomp(dsim2[,1:(past)]) ## PCs of spending velocity
#dspc3 <- princomp(dsim3[,1:(past)]) ## PCs of spending accelerati
on
top = 0.98
stopc <- topcomp(dspc1, top)
#pcplot(cpcs)
spcs <- NULL
spcs <- dspc1$scores[,1:stopc];
spcs <- data.frame(spcs)
vtopc <- topcomp(dspc2, top)
stopc2 <- topcomp(dspc2, top)
#pcplot(cpcs)
vpcs <- NULL
vpcs <- data.frame(dspc2$scores[,1:stopc2])
colnames(vpcs) <- paste0("VCS", 1:(stopc2))
colnames(spcs) <- paste0("PCS", 1:(stopc))
#colnames(vpcs) <- sapply(colnames(vpcs),function(x)paste("V",x,se
p=""))
rms <- matrix(NA,total,6) ##matrix to store scores and other custo
mer related variables
for(i in 1:total)
{
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cust <- custf[custf$id==id[i],] ## Change the customer data set
here
rms[i,1] = cust$Q0[1] ## Maximum holding capacity for the custom
er
rms[i,2] = cust$cm[1] ## Base consumption rate for the customer
rms[i,3] = sum(cust$s) ## Monetary value of spending
rms[i,4] = cust$y[1] ## Total spending during promotion
rms[i,5] = sum(cust$f) ## Frequency of spending
rec <- which(cust$f==1)
rms[i,6] = past
if(length(rec)!=0)
{
rms[i,6] = past - rec[length(rec)]## Recency of spending
}
}
rms <- data.frame(rms)
colnames(rms) = c("Q0","cm","mon","y","fre","rec")
rms <- cbind(rms,spcs)
rms <- cbind(rms,vpcs)
rmsp <- NULL
rmsp <- rms[801:1000,] ## split into training and prediction sampl
e
rms <- rms[1:800,]
##--- Model Selection rms traning set and rmsp prediction set
pc <- paste0("PCS", 1:(stopc))
vc <- paste0("VCS", 1:(stopc2))
formula1 <- as.formula(paste("y"," ~ ", paste(pc, collapse= "+"),"
+",paste(vc, collapse= "+")))
ft <- lm(formula1 ,data = rms)
step <- stepAIC(ft,direction = "both",trace = FALSE) ##library MAS
S
step <- step$anova
f <- which(attributes(step)$heading=="\nFinal Model:")
if(attributes(step)$heading[f+2]!="\n")
{
fit1 <- lm(paste(attributes(step)$heading[f+1],attributes(step)$
heading[f+2])
,data = rms)
}
if(attributes(step)$heading[f+2]=="\n")
{
fit1 <- lm(attributes(step)$heading[f+1],data = rms)
}
formula2 <- as.formula(paste("y"," ~ ","mon + fre + rec"))
fit2 <- lm(formula2,data = rms)
predict1 <- predict(fit1,rmsp) ## predictION for 2SFDA
attributes(predict1) <- NULL
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predict2 <- predict(fit2,rmsp) ## prediction for RFM
attributes(predict2) <- NULL
mape1 <- NULL
mape2 <- NULL
for(i in 1:nrow(rmsp))
{
yp <- rmsp[i,"y"]
mape1[i] = (abs(predict1[i]-yp))/(yp)
mape2[i] = (abs(predict2[i]-yp))/(yp)
}
out1 <- NULL
out1$AICFDA <- AIC(fit1)
out1$BICFDA <- BIC(fit1)
out1$RSQFDA <- summary(fit1)$adj.r.squared
out1$MAPEFDA <- mean(mape1[mape1!=Inf])
out1$AICRFM <- AIC(fit2)
out1$BICRFM <- BIC(fit2)
out1$RSQRFM <- summary(fit2)$adj.r.squared
out1$MAPERFM <- mean(mape2[mape2!=Inf])
out1$Randomness <- unique(custf$r);
out1 <- data.frame(out1);
#out1 <- data.frame(out1) ## Change this with change is DV
outf <- rbind(outf,out1)
#print(h);
}
}
> outf
AICFDA
BICFDA
RSQFDA MAPEFDA
# 14456.83 14522.42
0.71 0.78
# 14454.62 14515.52
0.71 0.77
# 14451.32 14502.85
0.71 0.78
# 14460.33 14521.23
0.71 0.76
# 14558.71 14605.55
0.67 0.83
# 14774.78 14812.26
0.57 0.95
# 14899.21 14932.00
0.49 0.97
# 14999.43 15022.86
0.43 1.01
# 14999.81 15023.23
0.43 1.01
# 14999.83 15023.25
0.43 1.01
# 14999.83 15023.25
0.43 1.01

AICRFM
15015.98
15015.98
15015.98
15015.98
15015.98
15015.98
15015.98
15015.98
15015.98
15015.98
15015.98
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BICRFM
RSQRFM MAPERFM
15039.41
0.41 1.06
15039.41
0.41 1.06
15039.41
0.41 1.06
15039.41
0.41 1.06
15039.41
0.41 1.06
15039.41
0.41 1.06
15039.41
0.41 1.06
15039.41
0.41 1.06
15039.41
0.41 1.06
15039.41
0.41 1.06
15039.41
0.41 1.06

Rand
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50

